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“Men [sic] in the plural, that is, men in so far as they live and move 
and act in this world can experience meaningfulness only because they 
can talk with and make sense to each other and to themselves” 
Hannah Arendt  - The Human Condition 
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1.0  Municipal Investments in Climate Adaptation 
The scientific research is clear: we are not planning for climate change, we are 
planning in times of climate change (IPCC, 2014; Matthews, 2013). It is also clear that 
local governments are on the frontline of expected adverse impacts. The effects of 
extreme weather, which include impacts ranging from harder and more frequent 
rainfall, to prolonged periods of extreme heat and drought, will manifest in a range 
 of challenges including economic disruption, health effects, and damage to public 
infrastructure (Bobylev, Hunt, Jefferson, & Rogers, 2013; Makropoulos & Butler, 2010; 
McCarney, Blanco, Carmin, & Colley, 2011; van Hooff & Blocken, 2010). Research 
broadly agrees that the effects will be experienced locally. While evidence mounts 
about the certainty of climate change and the need to adapt to climate change 
(IPCC, 2014), municipal governments are already struggling to operate and maintain 
deteriorating, and increasing obsolete, physical infrastructure within constricting 
budgets. A combination of overburdened physical systems, and reduced financial 
resources, plus the need to invest in strategies to reduce the impact of climate 
change, compounds policy-making and investment decisions at the municipal level. 
 In making decisions about investing in climate adaptation, the conundrum for 
local government is determining what investments are required, when to invest, 
where is most effective, and what resources should be used to finance long-term 
physical infrastructure investments. A range of possible instruments are identified in 
the literature that could be used to facilitate investment, including regulatory 
conformance requirements or performance measures (Uittenbroek, 2014), economic 
incentives such as subsidies (Mees & Driessen, 2011), or communication strategies 
that focus on building the awareness of non-governmental actors about the benefits 
of autonomous adaptation (Roders, Straub, & Visscher, 2013). The question of what 
type of instruments should be applied raises issues about roles and the balance of 
responsibilities between government and non-governmental actors (Mees, Driessen, 
& Runhaar, 2012), degrees of financial risk,  and about the distribution of benefits 
between those who invest and those who may benefit without financial contribution. 
For example, in the context of long-term adaptation to climate change, intergenera-
tional equity has been identified as a substantive dilemma for those making decisions 
about nearer term futures, which conventionally delineate capital planning processes 
(Hulme, 2009). These issues bring into focus the degree to which selecting an 
instrument to facilitate local investment is not wholly an environmental nor an entirely 
technical undertaking. Rather, the process of identifying an appropriate instrument to 
facilitate investment is embedded within an institutional context, which is underpinned 
by formal structures and socio-political dimensions, including norms and values. 
Although the lack of political priority-setting to allocate resources for climate 
adaptation is often attributed to a lack of financial resources, there is a greater degree 
502987-L-bw-Root
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of complexity in the governance process in assembling the sufficient conditions to 
stimulate investment in adaptation measures. 
 The aim of the research described herein is to enrich our thinking about the role 
of institutions in shaping practitioners’ perspectives concerning financing instruments 
that could be used to facilitate investment in local climate adaptation. Specifically, this 
dissertation reports on the potential of applying a financing instrument, known as tax 
increment financing, to facilitate adaptation-related public infrastructure. The analysis 
is situated in the institutional nexus of planning actors and climate adaptation, in the 
context of planning and development in the Netherlands. The objective is to contribute 
to climate adaptation research by focusing on the role of institutions in local municipal 
planning. This will shed more light on the yet to be identified climate adaptation 
implementation pathway. A single climate adaptation pathway is unlikely. The adaptation 
literature points to multiple routes, yet the most successful journeys are likely to be 
those that provide a comfortable fit for the operators. As Adger (2003) states “…the 
effectiveness of strategies for adapting to climate change depends on the social 
acceptability of options for adaptation, the institutional constraints on adaptation, and 
the place of adaptation in the wider landscape of economic development and social 
evolution” (p. 388). But how is the fit determined and by whom? A rich adaptation 
literature exists but the relationship between the hard and soft infrastructure (Healey, 
2007) of governance processes remains weakly theorized (Wejs, 2014). More attention 
in climate adaptation research should be given to the interplay between contexts and 
structures in order to build an understanding about the frames of reference and 
planning cultures that shape the policy formation process (Healey, 2007). As identified 
above, this theoretical aim occurs within the context of an empirical problem of 
financing local investments in adaptation, using a market-based mechanism.
 In this research project, adaptation to climate change is situated within the 
context of urban planning. The inter-connectedness of adaptation as a planning issue is 
explored from a new institutionalist analytical perspective. It builds on the institutionally 
oriented climate adaptation literature, highlighting why it might be difficult to define 
precisely what the barriers to implementation are. Rather, the new institutional approach 
used in this research (see chapter 2) provides the analytical tools to develop a thick 
understanding of varied institutional conditions that shape enabling or constraining 
factors. Indeed, whether financing is available or not is more likely to be related to a 
complex set of institutional conditions than the absence of funding or lack of instruments 
that could be utilized to facilitate investment. Firstly, this introductory chapter identifies 
the relationship between institutions and urban planning and, secondly, identifies the 
comparatively untapped conceptual potential of new institutionalism in the climate 
adaptation governance literature. The intention of this first chapter is to locate institutions 
theoretically and empirically, while chapter 2 provides a more in-depth account of the 
theoretical approach applied in the research design.
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 The remaining sections identify the research objectives and questions that 
underpin the research, sketch out the scientific and practical relevance of the study, 
and conclude with a brief outline of the overall organization of the dissertation.
2.0   Relationship of Urban Planning and Adaptation 
to Climate Change: Why institutions matter 
The common implementation challenge cited by research on climate adaptation is 
identified under a broad umbrella of governance. The governance-oriented literature 
on climate adaptation provides different explanations about the complexity 
associated with integrating adaptation into organizational routines. The complexity is 
generally associated with different types of barriers or stimuli that either constrain or 
act as drivers of the adaptation policy-making processes. Barriers may include 
uncertainty and lack of knowledge about climate change, unclear governance 
arrangements and ineffective policy frameworks, institutional inertia, financial and 
technological limitations, and lack of political support (Eisenack et al., 2014; Moser & 
Ekstrom, 2010; Oberlack & Neumarker, 2011; Uittenbroek, Janssen-Jansen, & 
Runhaar, 2013; Wilson, 2006). The particular combination of barriers and stimuli tend 
to be contextually specific, which indicates that institutions play a fundamental role in 
shaping planning adaptation outcomes. In the research described here, institutions 
are conceived of as providing: “…the organizational and socio-cultural context within 
which human activity is structured, values are expressed and norms are created. 
They represent the systems of rules that govern decision-making, and the underlying 
logic for the organizations that fundamentally shape the design and implementation 
of policies that help societies respond to risk” (Burch, 2011, p. 180). Yet, despite the 
significant role of institutions in governance, the market, and daily life, research on 
climate adaptation offers a limited amount of theorizing that endeavors to explain the 
interplay of the governance process and the institutional context of the adaptation 
planning process (Eisenack et al., 2014). Rather, a dominant stream in the literature 
offers solution-oriented analyses, including cost-benefit analyses, assessment 
frameworks, and sets of indicators, which provide a diverse package of prescriptions 
to the wicked problem of adapting to climate change (Termeer, Dewulf, & Breeman, 
2013). As a relatively new field of research (Aakre & Rubbelke, 2010), these findings 
contribute fundamental knowledge and analytical variations towards developing 
localized solutions. However, these approaches reflect a certain deliberative1 
instrumental rationality, which is free from the complexities of context and the broader 
1 According to Alexander (2000b),  the objective of classic rational deliberative planning is “...for the 
actor to decide on the ends of future action and what course of the action would be most effective”
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factors that inform decision-making processes. Drawing from Alexander’s planning 
paradigms and framework of types of rationalities (Alexander, 2000a), in the 
aforementioned stream of adaptation literature there is a logical connection between 
the evidence arising from the data, projections about future outcomes, and the 
formulation of solutions that are likely to be the most effective2. But in order to 
advance knowledge about how, or the degree to which, adaptation has become, or 
can become, embedded in planning routines, contributions that come back to “…
earth in the complex flow of practices” (Healey, 2009) will build complementary 
knowledge towards embedding adaptation in governance processes.  Planning 
processes exist within a set of rationalities that are unlikely to reflect the ideal mode 
on which to implement the most effective adaptation solutions in an unencumbered 
manner. As argued by Alexander, the different rationalities of planning are not clear 
cut, because planning practice operates within the types of rationality that ‘have’ 
reasons and a second type of rationality that ‘give’ reasons, which are communicative 
in nature (2000a). Delving into why certain reasons are ‘given’ focuses attention on 
the issues that are important to practitioners at the ‘street level’, but also offers some 
clues about constraining factors that confront them when faced with adjusting 
existing processes to accommodate new public policy issues. 
Urban planners are amongst the interdisciplinary actors that will contribute to policy 
formation and implementation processes, which will in turn enable investment in new 
or existing infrastructure to cope with changes to local climatic conditions. The 
contribution of urban planning to climate adaptation is not limited to coordinating the 
delivery of adaptation solutions using regulations and land use policies. Rather, the 
activity of planning should also be understood as playing a role in mediating the 
place of adaptation within shifting socio-political discourses, policy agendas, and 
implementation practices. As Healey argues, the contribution of planning to the 
future “… should be in helping open up institutional spaces within which transformative 
energy gets released, in feeding transformative initiatives with knowledge resources, 
technical capacity and repertoires of practice [and] in highlighting value issues at 
stake and in shaping emergent possibilities” (2007, p. 82). Fischler (2012) describes 
urban planning as occupying uneasy axes between long-term and incremental 
planning, between systematic analysis and ad hoc action, and between the design 
of physical spaces and as an activity that is about the “…design of institutions and 
processes” (p.108). The challenge for urban planning practice is to evolve practices 
that embed climate adaptation within those axes and to find strategies to overcome 
the complex dilemmas presented by climate change. 
2 We can see similar modernist tendencies in the ambition to govern climate change. As Hulme (2009) 
argues, it is unlikely climate change can be ‘solved’ through scientific and technological interventions.
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Decision-making in urban planning continually navigates through what Savini (2013) 
describes as a series of dilemmas wherein practitioners must make “…compromises 
over different trade-offs, based on politically and arbitrary constructed visions of the 
specific problem at stake” (336). In the context of climate adaptation, Haug et al. 
(2010) highlight six governance dilemmas in their evaluation of European climate 
policies: 1) problem perception and policy objectives; 2) levels and scales of 
governance; 3) timing and sequencing; 4) modes and instruments of governance; 5) 
costs and benefits; and, 6) implementation and enforcement. These six can be 
further reduced into three broader themes that are also addressed in the literature 
(Adger et al., 2009; Berkhout, Hertin, & Jordon, 2002; Mees et al., 2012; Preston, 
Dow, & Berkhout, 2013; Walker et al., 2011). Firstly, the lack of consolidation about 
social values concerning climate adaptation is fundamentally unresolved; secondly, 
the perception that benefits are too far off in the distant future to justify planning 
actions in comparison to immediate concerns; thirdly, financial commitments are 
unlikely to benefit initial investors directly, thus there is little incentive to take actions 
or impose requirements. Those dilemmas are, arguably, socially constructed and 
reflect wider frames of reference that influence how adapting to climate change is 
framed. That is to say, such dilemmas are types of informal rules that play a role in 
situating the problem of climate adaptation and thus are presented to planning 
practice with a particular socially constructed package. Given the role that formal 
and informal institutions play in the planning process (Verma, 2007), the intention of 
the research described in this dissertation is to consider the role of institutions in 
facilitating local climate adaptation investments. This will provide a contribution 
towards answering the question about why actions remain limited.
 
2.1  Understanding Institutions in Climate Adaptation
As thus described, in the field of urban planning, institutions clearly matter. Institutions 
in the climate adaptation literature are, however, described in a variety of ways from 
representing a constraint (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009; Funfgeld, 2010) to being a 
‘double edged sword’ as both a facilitator and limiter (Anguelovski & Carmin, 2011). 
Inherently conservative, institutions are considered as both a strength and a 
weakness in relation to embedding adaptation into practice (Gupta et al., 2008). How 
is it that institutions can represent such a varied and contradictory set of characteri-
zations? One explanation often cited is that as a new public policy issue, climate 
adaptation is distinguished by its “weakly defined ambitions, responsibilities, 
procedures, routines, and solutions” (Termeer et al., 2011, p. 164). In the aggregate, 
these contradictions create what is referred to as an institutional void, a concept 
which is cited to explain barriers to climate adaptation implementation (Eisenack et 
al., 2014).  Defined by Hajer (2003, p. 175), an institutional void occurs when  “there 
are no clear rules and norms according to which politics is to be conducted and 
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policy measures are to be agreed upon”. Indeed, the lack of a clear connection 
between formal and informal institutions about climate adaptation hinders the 
potential of institutions to structure social actions (Healey, 2007). Hence, institutions 
tend to be identified as barriers, rather than facilitators, of adaptation to climate 
change (Runhaar, Mees, Wardekker, van der Sluijs, & Driessen, 2012) and, as a 
result, there is a limited focus on the institutional conditions that may shape how 
organisations approach the problem and devise adaptation strategies.
 Other research turns to institutions as a resource from which to reveal insights 
about why certain barriers may exist, which Eisenack et al. (2014) described as the 
need to understand the origins of barriers and develop explanations that link the 
potential clarifying capacities of those variables. An evolutionary process is 
detectable with respect to explaining the role of institutions in the literature. For 
example, institutionally-oriented research that focuses on multi-level governance 
pays attention to the role of institutional structures as linkages between national 
climate adaptation goals and the capacities of local governments (Biesbroek, 
Klostermann, Termeer, & Kabat, 2011; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005; Laukkonen et al., 
2009; Wilson, 2006). This area of research emphasises that while climate adaptation 
is largely dependent on concrete actions taken at the local level, such actions must 
be appropriately enabled, financially, technically, and legislatively by higher levels of 
government (Amundsen, Berglund, & Westskogô, 2010). This research stream 
analyses the formal institutional structures and cites a similar range of barriers and 
constraints as identified in the previous paragraph. However, in a recent article 
Bulkeley and Betsill reflect on the evolution of climate adaptation in the urban domain 
over the past 10 years. They suggest that multi-level governance approaches would 
be enhanced by descaling the vertical orientation: investigating what is referred to as 
“…the discursive and institutional terrains through which climate change comes to 
be an issue on urban agendas” (2013, p. 150) and to consider the structures and 
norms of the socio-technical networks that underpin urban decision-making. 
We can see Bulkeley and Betsill’s advice in research that is scaled to the municipal 
level of government. This body of literature analyses the emerging institutional 
terrains of local climate adaptation policy-making. Broadly, these scholars draw 
from a social constructivist tradition that emphasises “…how social and historical 
particularities structure the policy world and how such understandings become 
normalised and, thus, unquestioned, institutionalised into practices and routines” 
(Juhola, Keskitalo, & Westerhoff, 2011, p. 460). For example, the research of Wejs 
focuses on juxtaposing the events that represent ‘why’ integration of climate 
adaptation actions are initiated and the mechanisms that relate to ‘how’ the actions 
taken to integrate such action into organizational routines are undertaken (Wejs, 
2014). The interconnection between ‘why’ and ‘how’ illustrates the range of responses 
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and configurations that are possible. The commonality in this stream of research is 
the focus on getting beyond the ‘barrier’ metaphor, but rather to consider the broader 
structural logics and the organizational rationales that are buffeted and shaped by 
the institutional context in which practitioners are operating (Keskitalo, Juhola, & 
Westerhoff, 2012). Overall, this research-orientation analyzes the tension between 
structure and agency. This also implies that potential lies within existing structures 
that could be used. The challenge in practice is unlocking the potential. As Burch 
(2010) asserts there is a “…fallacy of explanations of inaction that focus on technical 
and financial insufficiency” (p.296), but rather the focus should be put on organizational 
culture and strategies for incremental institutional learning.
A new institutional approach in climate adaptation research expands the conceptual 
blackbox of institutions as path dependent and inert. By considering the diverse and 
changing barriers, we can improve our understanding about the complexity of 
adapting to climate change. However, more than just identifying that a diverse range 
of barriers and dilemmas relative to the institutional context exists, by making 
institutions endogenous, rather than exogenous, to the analysis (Verma, 2007) we 
can analyze the degree of agency that actors are willing to exert, within the formal 
institutional structures in which they operate. This approach offers scope to apply the 
findings beyond the contextual specificities associated with case study research. 
Moreover, new institutionalist theory offers analytical tools that allow that the 
dynamics of governance processes to have their own rationality. As Healey suggests, 
governance “processes are not a machine, but complex continually emergent 
dynamics in which small contributions matter and large-scale projects may easily 
fail” (2007, p. 82). By not restricting the role of institutions to formal rule application, 
institutions can be conceived of as evolutionary, where change is part of a creative 
selection process about what formal and informal rules will legitimately be applied 
(Moroni, 2010). Institutions from this perspective are not static nor can institutions be 
newly invented to deal with problems as they arise. Institutions are ontologically prior 
(Bell, 2011) and new institutions are better understood as ‘successor’ institutions 
(Moroni, 2010) that emerge as part of a process of gradual change (Hall & Thelen, 
2009; Lowndes, 2005; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). From this perspective, actors are 
understood as embedded within institutions and to evoke change, actors can use 
existing tools to deal with new problems. Indeed, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) argue 
institutional change often occurs “… precisely when problems of rule interpretation 
and enforcement open up space for actors to implement rules in new ways” (p.4). For 
adapting to climate change, these theoretical insights point to a broader intercon-
nectivity between the idea that there are both barriers and stimuli to implementing 
climate adaptation.  More specifically, this dissertation explores the degree to which 
institutions constitute the ground on which modes of practice in governance 
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processes are played out and values and ideas evolve or are reinforced (Schmidt, 
2010). The findings add to the research on climate adaptation, both theoretically and 
empirically, as we learn about the degree to which adaptation actors are willing to 
use existing instruments as means to facilitate investment in climate adaptation.
3.0 Research Objectives and Questions
3.1 Research Objectives
The previous sections established, firstly, the institutional connection between urban 
planning and climate adaptation and, secondly, the contribution of conceptualizing 
the role played by institutions in shaping practitioners’ perspectives on policy choices 
to climate adaptation research. The ambition is to provide insights and empirically 
based explanations about why a financing instrument might be understood as more 
or less appropriate and applicable than other means that could be used to facilitate 
investment in climate adaptation-related public infrastructure investments.  
 The research objectives are based upon a layered analytical approach that 
builds an empirical foundation on which to experiment with a novel financing 
instrument. The first two layers establish the interplay between formal and informal 
institutional structures and norms and the third layer is designed to ‘play’ with the 
“rules of the game” (North, 1990). The three-layered approach illustrates the case 
study construction and how the analytical process is conceived, as follows: 
Figure 1  Case Study Construction and Analytical Process 
Learn:
About the role of the Dutch planning and development in adapting 
to climate change (see chapter 3)     
Analyze:
The inter-relationship between institutional structures
and norms and whether space is available to apply
existing instruments to facilitate investment in local climate 
adaptation related physical infrastructure (see chapter 4)  
Explore:
The application of a market-based instrument (tax increment financing: 
TIF) and how practitioners learn about whether TIF is appropriate 
(see chapter 5 and 6)    
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3.2  Research Questions: 
Following the aim and objectives of this research, the questions are both empirical 
and theoretical:
o Empirical questions:  1) What modes of practice and instruments do Dutch spatial 
planning actors use to facilitate investment in local public urban infrastructure? 
2) Are new municipal instruments necessary to facilitate investment in climate 
adaptation? 3) Are spatial planning practitioners willing to reinterpret and reshape 
institutional rules to enable local investment in climate adaptation? 
o Theoretical question: 4) How can we conceptualize and explain the role of institutions 
in facilitating local public investments in climate adaptation and in shaping 
practitioners’ perspectives about the applicability of policy instruments? 
Figure 2 illustrates the analytical relationship between the questions:
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4.0 Relevance 
4.1  Scientific Relevance  
There is a substantial body of research about the threat (Adger et al., 2009; IPCC, 
2014; Swart et al., 2009) of climate change and the need to make investments in 
urban areas to mitigate impacts. However, questions remain in relation to the role of 
institutions in shaping perspectives towards approaches to facilitate investment in 
local planning processes. The findings described in this dissertation build on existing 
governance literature and add theoretical insights about the interplay between 
structures and norms in the planning process. This contributes to the scientific 
community’s ambition to develop a deeper understanding about the complexity of 
operationalizing adaptation measures into existing processes and programs, and 
to enrich the limited analytical capacity of the barrier metaphor. Further, in addition 
to contributing to the body of case study literature, this dissertation also builds on it 
by developing a simulation game method to explore urban planning practitioners’ 
responses to a novel financing mechanism. The knowledge generated by the 
simulations provides further insights in relation to both the technical-physical and 
the social-political dynamics of implementing and investing in climate adaptation at 
the local level. 
4.2  Practical Relevance 
Analyzing the potential institutional fit of a financing instrument for investment in 
climate adaptation makes an important contribution to planning practice. By focusing 
on the socio-political dimensions in relation to formal institutional structures, this 
research has practical relevance on several levels. Firstly, practitioners were provided 
with an opportunity to ‘test drive’ a financing instrument not used in the Netherlands. 
The experience enabled them to obtain technical knowledge about tax increment 
financing but, perhaps more importantly, also to develop a multi-dimensional 
understanding about the socio-political dynamics that may constrain or enable oper-
ationalizing it. Secondly, the simulation gaming sessions provided an opportunity for 
participants to experience the instrument and interactively learn from each other, 
without the risk of professional or organizational damage. While the particular 
nuances of the debates about whether to apply the financing instrument are specific 
to the Dutch spatial planning context, the method could be applied in other planning 
environments by amending the simulation scenario for other planning contexts. For 
planning practitioners struggling to figure out what instruments are appropriate for 
their particular location, the findings offer insights about ways to develop a deeper 
understanding about the context in which they are operating; secondly, given that 
strategies for climate adaptation investment are inherently local, the findings offer 
ideas on how to reconceive existing local resources. Moreover, rather than focusing 
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on lack of financing as an obstacle that is dependent primarily on a buoyant economy, 
the findings offer evidence of innovative ways to overcome a financial gap by 
reinterpreting existing formal rules. 
 
5.0  Organization of the Dissertation
The sequencing of the chapters is organized based on the three layers of the 
research design (figure 1). The dissertation is a compilation of four papers, as 
identified in table 1. Chapter 2 elaborates on the theoretical perspective applied in 
this research project with a fuller explanation about the new institutional approach 
that was introduced in this chapter. Secondly, having situated the theoretical 
perspective in the relevant literature, chapter 2 describes the research design and 
methods. Included is an introduction to the Dutch case and tax increment financing, 
with the latter conceptualized as a potential instrument to facilitate municipal 
investments. Chapter 7 summarizes and discusses the core findings, provides reflections 
on methodological considerations, implications for practice, and suggestions for 
future research.
 As described in section 2.1, the research design is composed of three distinct 
phases. Phase one is the ‘learning’ layer and establishes evidence of innovative 
practices that have facilitated investment in local adaptation measures using existing 
mechanisms. These practices were enabled by emerging norms and values, both in 
urban planning practice and in relation to evolving ideas about how to implement 
climate adaptation actions. The findings are based on a case study of the Rotterdam 
Stadhaven redevelopment project, as described in Chapter 3.
Phase two builds on the findings of phase one with respect to the potential to 
reinterpret existing mechanisms and processes by considering the potential of 
redirecting a local income stream. In the ‘analyze’ layer, Chapter 4 describes the 
complexity of reinterpreting the conventional use of property taxes should using the 
income to underwrite area specific investments be a strategy. Here the focus is on 
the institutional system that structures and informs investments in local public 
infrastructure in the Netherlands.
 The third phase draws from the cumulative findings of the first two phases to 
develop a simulation game. This phase shifts from an analysis of current practices 
into the ‘explore’ layer by engaging practitioners in a future scenario wherein 
participants are confronted with a market-based instrument to facilitate investment in 
climate adaptation related investments. The results of these sessions are described 
in chapters 5 and 6, where the evidence highlights three fundamental dilemmas of 
climate adaptation that shape perspectives about the types of instruments that are 
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appropriate. The findings also illustrate how a new instrument is more likely to be 
confronted with the enforcement of both formal and informal institutional rules, rather 
than technical issues, if applied to a climate adaptation agenda.
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1.0 Introduction: Theoretical approach and methods
New institutionalism offers a rich conceptual toolkit from which to draw. A socio-
logically oriented new institutionalist approach is particularly applicable, given that 
the aim is to explore the degree to which adaptation actors are willing to reinterpret, 
or enforce, existing practices, the institutional rules that underpin their behavior in 
relation to what Oberlack and Neumarker refer to as the “…plethora of challenges for 
adaptation governance” (2011, p. 10). Amongst the list of complexities, the scholars 
highlight that the lack of adaptation to climate change is connected to entrenched 
worldviews and shared mental models; scale and multi-level governance mismatches 
that cause coordination and free rider problems; issues of justice and legitimacy that 
impact adaptation actions (or lack of actions); and the challenge of integrating 
adaptation actions into existing structures given the “…multiple climatic and 
non-climatic stresses” (p. 11) that compete for attention and adequate resources. 
Lastly, Oberlack and Neumarker identify the need to consider what they describe as 
the “pre-conditions for autonomous adaptation” (p.11).  These governance challenges 
are interrelated and can be understood as institutional in nature, wherein broader 
structures are at play, coupled with norms and values. The interplay between 
structures, values and norms ultimately affects whether (and what) actions are taken 
to address societal problems (Healey, 2007). 
 The results described in the forthcoming chapters elaborate on these structural 
and normative challenges by empirically investigating and analyzing behavioral 
variables, which include how actors interpret narratives in relation to the type of policy 
instruments that are selected (Turnpenny, Jordon, Benson, & Rayner, 2015), and how 
actors connect values with formal structural means. The new institutional theoretical 
approach described in this chapter illustrates the overall findings in terms of the degree 
to which actors make institutionally situated choices. Local adaptation to climate 
change faces varying and unique challenges. The evidence arising from this research 
builds on, and contributes empirically, to the governance literature, aiming to develop 
theoretical generalizations and learning across cases (Oberlack & Neumarker, 2011). 
More particularly, the sociological-normative orientation applied here distinguishes 
from what, as described in chapter 1, can be characterized as the deliberative-rational 
orientations that represent a dominant stream of the governance-related literature. 
Here the theoretical perspective assumes that actions occur within a set of institutional 
rules, which are created, maintained, and changed by actors operating within “… 
 institutionally defined logics of effect or appropriateness” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006, p. 220). This implies that while actors are ‘rational’ they operate within a degree 
of bounded-ness and adapt to the institutional conditions and dynamics.
 The purpose of this chapter is to sketch out the methodological approach used 
to address the research objectives identified in chapter 1. The chapter begins with an 
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introduction to the central theoretical ideas associated with new institutionalism. In 
doing so, the theoretical approach and key concepts that were applied to the 
empirical data are identified. Although new institutionalist theory is broader than the 
following overview, the intention is to draw out the theoretical underpinnings of this 
approach, and to sharpen the description in relation to the theoretical perspective 
applied. The second half of the chapter turns to the methods. The research design 
assumes that local context matters, and local actors construct meanings that 
underpin the views that they express. As such, the theory and methods reflect an 
actor-centered approach that acknowledges the role of structures, but stresses the 
role of actors, as stated: the “…raw material on which institutional evolution acts is 
supplied by human trial and error, by intentional agents trying to deal with problems” 
(Rivolin, 2012, p. 70). Overall, the research approach offers a strategy to consider 
how ‘adaptation actors’ (Eisenack et al., 2014) play with the institutional rules. It also 
concerns the extent to which practitioners stake out the outer perimeter of rules as 
they engage in the far-reaching and complex challenge of determining what 
institutional arrangements are appropriate and possible, given the range of dilemmas 
that are coupled with climate adaptation policy formation processes (Haug et al., 
2010; Mees, Driessen, & Runhaar, 2012; Preston, Dow, & Berkhout, 2013).  
2.0  New Institutional Theory:  
Expanding the conceptual blackbox 
The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines adaptation to climate 
change as “the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate change and its 
effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit 
beneficial opportunities. In some natural systems, human intervention may facilitate 
adjustment to expected climate change and its effects’’ (IPCC 2014, p. 5). Identified 
in this definition is the need to adjust structures and behaviors. The question of what 
types of structural and behavioral adjustments are required, by whom, and when the 
adjustments should begin continues to be contested and fraught with socio-political 
complexity. Scholarly research has been fundamental to building the scientific case 
to support actions to mitigate or reduce the risk of climate change, as exemplified in 
the aggregate reporting by the IPCC. The multidisciplinary scientific evidence sets 
out the need to reduce greenhouse emissions and to initiate adaptation actions in 
order to reduce vulnerability to climate-related risks. Despite the evidence, practitioners 
and scholars alike struggle to ‘unpack’ the climate adaptation puzzle into actionable 
items, including calibrating actions into an effective system of governance. Termeer, 
Dewulf, and Breeman (2013) assert that “governance scholars nowadays risk causing 
more confusion in practice over whether wicked problems are in fact tame. They can 
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raise expectations far beyond their ability to deliver” (p.36). Indeed, drawing from 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006), the complexity of making adjustments to existing 
systems of governance can be characterized as “institutional work”. Lawrence and 
Suddaby conceptualize “institutional work” as a “broad category of purposive action 
aimed at creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions” (2006, p. 216). Thus, the 
work of making structural and behavioral adjustments in relation to climate change is, 
ultimately, a socio-political-economic project that is centrally concerned with purposefully 
engaging and understanding existing sets of practices: the normative and the 
structural underpinnings. The aim of institutional work is to build an understanding 
about the availability of institutional space for a diverse range of possible adaptation 
actions.
 In institutional work, we use analytical concepts of new institutional theory to 
analyze the work of adapting to climate change in the context of urban planning. The 
contribution of an institutional approach is that it focuses on creating accounts “….of 
the processes through which institutions govern action” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006, p. 215). Indeed, while it is often lamented that we do not know why embedding 
climate adaptation actions into practice faces a range of barriers, an alternative way 
of viewing the issue is that it is the role of institutional dynamics in the process of 
adapting to climate change that we do not understand. Thus, by focusing on the “act 
of production, rather than the product itself” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 248) the 
research described here is concerned with understanding the relational origins that 
may play an important role in shaping, constraining or enabling the climate adaptation 
process.
2.1 Distinctions Between New Institutionalist Schools of Thought 
New Institutionalism comes in a range of ‘flavours’ (March & Olsen, 2005) and offers 
theoretical variations about the role of institutions in structuring society within a 
school of thought (Hall & Taylor, 1996). New Institutionalism is associated with a 
range of disciplines: economics, political science, sociology, and organizational 
studies (Healey, 2007). Each offers a different understanding about how institutions 
structure behavior, and the degree to which individuals can exert agency to create 
new institutions. The common theme is the departure from ‘old’ institutionalism, 
which emphasized the central role of law and the reification of structures that left 
scant room for individual agency (G. Peters, 2005). Beginning in the 1960’s and 
1970’s, the dominant schools of new institutional thought started to develop a deeper 
concept of institutions as created and shaped by humans (i.e. not a natural order of 
things) by offering analyses that introduced other variables such as culture, power, 
and cognition. New institutionalists are interested in the contradictions represented 
by institutions, such as predictability and change; innovation and inertia; and learning 
and replication (Clemens & Cook, 1999). Lines of inquiry within this theoretical 
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orientation focus on explaining how humans develop rules, scripts and cultural 
accounts, and why different strategies for organizing society may occur (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006; March & Olsen, 2005). 
In the mid-1990’s Hall and Taylor (1996) sketched out the new institutional terrain as 
represented in three foundational streams of thought: historical institutionalism, 
rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism. According to Hall 
and Taylor, although the three orientations developed independently and were based 
on different conceptions of the origins of human behavior, the theories shared an 
interest in explaining the role of institutions and the way in which institutions emerge 
and change (Hall & Taylor, 1996). In part, new institutionalism was a broad reaction to 
the assumption that organizations and individual behavior are somehow rational and 
can be changed through purposeful institutional design. Drawing from G. Peters 
(2005) and Hall & Taylor (1996), historical institutionalism, rational choice institution-
alism, and sociological institutionalism share the understanding that because 
institutions play an essential role in shaping human behavior, whether in terms of 
determining behavior or imposing a degree of regularity, institutions are an essential 
unit of scholarly analysis. Secondly, while analytical focus varies between the 
approaches, institutions are understood to be a result of purposeful human action. 
The difference, according to Peters, is how constraints and enabling factors are 
understood to be enforced either through values and norms or through a combination 
of formal rules and incentives (p. 157). The emphases differ between the relative role 
of structure and agency (p. 157) and the degree to which institutions are understood 
as exogenous (rational choice, empirical institutionalism) or endogenous (normative, 
sociological; historical). Further, the analyses chart various pathways in relation to 
cognition in terms of the role of ideas in relation to institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006), or the role of  norms and routines in defining the extent of agency (Bell, 2011). 
Institutionalists of all flavors are generally interested in the decision process, not the 
actual decision (Healey, 2007). Historical and sociological institutionalists understand 
that actors are the heirs of institutional repertoires, and rules and regulations are in a 
constant state of negotiation, which, in the aggregate, is the “…history of language, 
experience, [and]  memory…” (March & Olsen, 2005, p. 10). Alternatively, rational 
choice institutionalists understand that rules and incentives arise from interactions 
and negotiations, and there is particular focus on the objective of interactions. The 
explanations generally focus on the degree to which the exchanges between 
calculating self-interested actors (March & Olsen, 2005) produce improved collective 
outcomes or maximize their own utilities (G. Peters, 2005). Also important is the 
degree to which actors are punished because the results of their maximizing 
behaviors lead to sub-optimal collective outcomes. Nonetheless, the idea of shared 
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understandings about institutional rules is a common new institutional thread. As 
asserted by Ostrom (1999), institutionalist rules are not arbitrary insofar as “rules are 
shared understandings among those involved that refer to enforced prescriptions 
about what actions (or states of the world) are required, prohibited, or permitted... all 
rules are the result of implicit or explicit efforts to achieve order and predictability...” 
(J. Mahoney & K Thelen, 2010).  Institutions are characterized as formal (legislature, 
legal framework) or informal (shared norms and values). Together institutions create 
regularity and stability over time, and provide patterned interactions that individuals 
and groups can understand within a set of shared socio-cultural perspectives, which 
both shape and constrain behavior (Lowndes, 2009; G. Peters, 2005). 
New institutionalists also make a distinction between organizations and institutions 
(Healey, 2007). Although organizations (especially large organizations such as 
universities, hospitals, and governmental offices and religious organizations) are 
often commonly referred to as institutions, institutionalists conceptualize formal and 
informal rules as affecting and structuring the routines of organizations and the 
individuals that operate within them. A concrete example of how formal and informal 
institutions structure organizations and the actions of individuals is in relation to 
compliance with property taxes remittance. In the Netherlands, property owners are 
legally required to pay taxes in conjunction with a market-based assessment system 
(Allers, 2011). Paying taxes is also generally understood to be part of a broader social 
contract for property-owning citizens to contribute towards collective investments. 
Social convention also exerts pressure on politicians with respect to taxation rates 
and the relative responsibility of paying taxes between residential, commercial, and 
social housing tenants. Thus, paying property taxes is an important institution that 
structures how both local and senior levels of government organizations set and 
collect taxes and how property owners comply to technical and social institutional 
requirements. The practices are articulated via formal structures set out in laws and 
administrative requirements between the national government and local municipal 
governments, and informal norms and values. The latter are detected in political 
narratives regarding, for example, fairness and equity in relation to distribution of 
resources and overburdening from those local taxpayers who argue against taxation 
increases. Thinking about institutions metaphorically, Mantzavinos, North and Shariq 
(2004) propose that “institutions are the rules of the game; organizations are the 
players” (page). Indeed, while property taxes are a conventional form of taxation 
used by countries throughout Europe, how the particular rules of the game are 
played vary and the institutional arrangements are comparatively unique.
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Returning to the definition of adaptation to climate change, institutions play an 
important role in adaptation to climate change, in terms of creating the conditions 
(i.e. constraints and opportunities) that organizations and individuals must negotiate 
in order to achieve adaptation objectives (Lowndes, 2009). Further, institutions are 
conceptualized as a source from which incentives, or disincentives, are drawn, as a 
means to stimulate organizational change. As noted by scholars, organizations make 
adjustments in response to changing institutional circumstances both as a means to 
retain relevancy but, more broadly, as a means to achieve certain common goals 
(Berkhout, 2012a). Institutional change is a dominant theme in the climate adaptation 
literature. As already identified, new institutionalists generally argue that, as human 
systems, institutions do change, as a result of concerted human actions that may 
occur through ‘windows of opportunity’ or gradually through incremental change. 
Explanations about how institutions change, and the role of individuals and 
organizations in the change process, is, nonetheless, theoretically contested ground. 
In advance of characterizing the conceptual approach used in this dissertation in 
more detail, the following two sections conceptually couple ‘change and uncertainty’ 
and ‘agency and learning’ and provide a brief new institutionalist description of these 
concepts, which form part of the analytical toolkit that is applied in the remaining 
chapters.
2.2 Explaining Change and Uncertainty
For institutionalists that consider institutions as endogenous (for example, 
sociological and historical, normative, and constructivist institutionalism) context 
matters. For historical institutionalists, social causation is traditionally referenced by 
the concept of path dependency. Path dependency refers to the idea that existing 
structures and practices operate within a bounded rationality, making change 
difficult. Institutions tend towards maintaining and replicating the status quo, thereby 
creating a self-referential inertia that is enduring and difficult to change. For historical 
institutionalists, understanding the past provides a strong indication of what will 
happen in the future (i.e. predictive abilities). In its foundational conceptualization, 
historical institutionalists understood institutions to be in a state of equilibrium, 
remaining stable and constant until a sudden occurrence punctures the equilibrium 
(G. Peters, 2005) thereby provoking destabilization and uncertainty. This brand of 
historical institutionalism is what Lowndes (2001) refers to as “vulgar” institutionalism 
insofar as institutions are understood as inflexible and interventions by human 
agency institutions are not a meaningful part of the analysis. This perspective has 
shifted to what Bell (2012) refers to as ‘flexible’ historical institutionalism, in contrast 
to earlier ‘sticky’ historical institutionalism. In this approach, the choices of individuals 
and organizations are embedded within a historical context, which provides 
legitimacy for the choices. Thus, as Bell argues, choices are not made on a “tabula 
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rasa” (p. 719), but rather institutional change occurs over time, in the interaction 
process between institutional environments and actors. Bell characterizes this 
phenomena as “institutionally situated agency” (p. 717). Similarly, scholars that draw 
from historical institutionalism, such as Mahoney and Thelen (2010), argue that 
institutional change should be understood as occurring gradually. By allowing for 
constructivist explanations, in this conception agents engage in interpretative 
struggles wherein institutions do evolve and change is unlikely to be sudden. Rather, 
institutional change occurs through subtle shifts in relation to actors’ interests, 
preferences, and resources (Bell, 2012; J. Mahoney & K. Thelen, 2010). Overall, 
historical institutionalism provides a theoretical background that allows for strategic 
action and individual agency, and in contrast to rational choice institutionalism, as 
described below, individuals are characterized as “satisfiers not utility maximizers” 
(Hall & Taylor, 1996) and change is explicitly connected to a historically contextualized 
causal chain.
 Rational choice approaches offer an alternative theoretical background to 
historical institutionalism to explain how and why institutions change. Broadly, the 
commonality between rational choice institutionalists is the shared assumption that 
institutions are non-equilibrium structures (G. Peters, 2005). Rather than passively 
awaiting critical junctures or incremental change, scholars argue that individuals and 
organizations will proactively initiate change in order to adjust the institutional 
environment to meet their own needs (G. Peters, 2005). For example, a rational 
choice institutionalist, such as those found in new institutional economics, tends to 
focus on strategic choices based on sets of preferences. Individuals will, accordingly, 
behave instrumentally in order to maximize those preferences (Hall & Taylor, 1996, 
p. 945). Institutions are developed in order to increase efficiency, thus reducing 
transaction costs, and to absorb undesirable externalities that can be a result of 
ill-defined institutional arrangements. From this perspective, institutional change is a 
result of strategic calculation, wherein choices that are not aligned with norms are 
likely to result in sub-optimal results for the individual and, by association, sub-optimal 
results for the broad collective. As summarized by Hall & Taylor, “…what prevents the 
actors from taking a collectively-superior course of action is the absence of 
institutional arrangements that would guarantee complementary behavior by others” 
(p.945), i.e. a lack of incentives. Thus, rational choice institutionalism allows for 
institutional change, which is a result of human agency, but agency is ultimately 
reduced to rules and incentives (G. Peters, 2005). 
In the third new institutionalism school identified by Hall and Taylor, i.e. those 
operating within the sociological institutionalist framework, departs from punctuated 
equilibrium as a key variable of institutional change, or the pivotal role of individual 
actions in effecting collectivities, as offered by rational choice institutionalism scholars. 
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Institutional change for sociological institutionalists occurs through a process of 
learning and adaptation to emerging circumstances (G. Peters, 2005). Similar to 
historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism acknowledges that institutions 
are ontologically prior and endogenous but focus attention on the process of 
interpretation conducted by actors in relation to institutional change. March & Olsen 
coined the concept of the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (1989) to describe how actors 
(as individuals or within organizations) discover what institutional rules guide 
behaviors and routines. Here the emphasis is on the informal rules at play that will 
inform actors’ perspectives about what should happen in a given situation and, in the 
event of a new situation, they consider what existing rules could be applied. 
According to March & Olsen “through rules and logic of appropriateness, political 
institutions realize both order, stability, and predictability, on the one hand, and 
flexibility and adaptiveness, on the other” (p. 160). Change, unlike rational choice 
and historical institutional change, is less precise, neither predictable nor efficient 
and purposeful institutional design is unlikely to be achieved in the way envisioned by 
initiators. Instead, as argued by March & Olsen, change is constant and the particular 
formations will have exponential impact as subsequent changes emerge, including 
the speed of change or seeming lack of change (March & Olsen, 2005). 
 Change, it seems, is not easy and occurs slowly. Indeed, institutions can be 
characterized as a double-edged sword, wherein, on the one hand, they provide 
certainty, consistency, and stability, but for those wanting change, institutions are an 
obstacle to alternative pathways. This is due in part to the prospect of uncertainty 
that is introduced by change. Institutions thus provide a ballast of stability against 
change that, conversely, offers an unknown future (March & Olsen, 2005). Unlike 
historical or sociological institutionalists, in this conception, rational choice institu-
tionalism distinguishes institutions a-historically and focuses on the ability of humans 
to impose sufficient agency to design and assemble the mix of rules and incentives 
to generate an optimal institutional arrangement. This ultimately reduces uncertainty, 
given the multiplicity of possible preferences (Schmidt, 2010). But how do actors 
exert agency to effect change, and how do they learn about what the preferred 
institutional arrangement might be? The following section provides a brief explanation, 
including identifying variation between the theoretical orientations. 
2.3 Explaining Agency and Learning
New institutionalists place a different emphasis on human agency in creating, 
shaping, or shifting practices and, thus, changing institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006). As noted in the preceding, institutions constrain or enable human agency and 
play a role in structuring interactions between individuals and organizations (Berkhout, 
2012b; Healey, 2007). Sociological and normative institutionalists emphasize the 
embeddedness of individuals and organizations within their institutional context, 
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insofar as actors are constantly engaged in acts of (re)interpretation as a strategy to 
determine what is appropriate in the given circumstances (March & Olsen, 1989). 
Interactions between individuals, between individuals and organizations, and 
between organizations and the institutional environment on which society is 
underpinned, inform how decisions are made, and as a result, what decisions are 
made. Actors, according to this perspective, draw from the institutional environment 
to piece together what rules and norms are appropriate, thereby providing frames of 
reference. Individual actors undertake these considerations within the context of 
interactions with others, as a means to gather knowledge about the conditions under 
which they are operating. As March and Olsen (2005) suggest, individuals are not 
muscular engineers directing and guiding institutional change, but rather “institutional 
gardeners” (p. 19) thus implying the need to tend multiple factors by engaging in a 
type of social husbandry. 
 Rational choice institutionalists argue that sociological normative approaches 
have a thin explanation of the origins of agency (Mantzavinos et al., 2004; G. Peters, 
2005). Rational choice institutionalists focus on the role of human agency in devising 
institutions and the degree to which rules and incentives are designed for the 
purpose of maximizing individual benefits, rather than being informed by norms and 
values (Hall & Taylor, 1996). As exemplified by North (1990), rational choice analyses 
consider cognition as an autonomous factor in how actors interpret the social reality 
in which they are operating and, thus, how actors encode and replicate institutions 
(Mantzavinos et al., 2004). Institutions are conceived of as ‘givens’ that can be 
devised and remade, rather than as an outcome of enduring and continuous historical 
process (G. Peters, 2005). Nonetheless, Clemens and Cook (Clemens & Cook, 
1999) argue that the distinct lines between sociological and normative explanations 
about agency, and those explanations from rational choices are less clear. For example, 
the concept of ‘choice within constraints’ exemplifies the crossover between analyses 
that emphasize the role of norms and values, and rational choice oriented analyses 
that assume actors exert strategic agency in the choices that they make. 
 Before turning to a description of the research methods, the next section briefly 
introduces how the concept of ‘learning’ is used in this research. Learning is a 
conceptual thread that connects the overall analysis. Here the analytical interest is 
focused on how practitioners learn about what is appropriate and how learning is 
operationalized through organizational routines. The intention is not to offer an 
exhaustive explanation, but rather this section touches on the conceptual apparatus 
that informs the analysis.  
2.4 Learning About What is Appropriate
The aim of this research is not to analyze and propose what technical changes ought 
to be done to improve systems of governance in order to adapt to climate change. 
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Rather in thinking about how, or whether, existing systems are responsive climate 
adaptation imperatives, a broader goal, and the starting point of this research, is 
garnering insights into how individual actors and organizations learn about the 
significance (or insignificance) of particular values and norms. Also important is the 
degree to which certain formal rules should be ‘used’ through enforcement, largely 
ignored, or comparatively easily reinterpreted. Under the rubric of new institutional-
ism, the theoretical variations provide explanations about the role of institutions as 
the backbone of continuity and, paradoxically, of change (whether sudden or 
gradual). Social learning is an important variable between agency and institutional 
change or, conversely, of institutional inertia, wherein existing practices are taken for 
granted and continuously reinforced. Institutional change, however discrete or 
obvious, may occur as actors interact with others, reinterpret rules (informal/formal) 
and, in the process, engage in a negotiation process wherein actors/organizations 
learn about what may work and what will not work (for example, either through 
positive reinforcement, sanctions or punishment). 
Here we consider explanations about how individuals and organizations learn. 
Starting with the concept of social learning, Reed et al. define this concept as follows: 
“…social learning may be defined as a change in understanding that goes beyond 
the individual to become situated within wider social units or communities of practice 
through social interactions between actors within social networks” (Reed et al., 2010). 
According to this definition, social learning is truly achieved if the learning extends 
beyond the individual and is transferred into a deeper level of understanding and 
behavior change. This type of learning is in contrast to a second type which Reed 
refers to as instrumental and technical learning, which remains at the level of the 
individual and not distributed more widely. The concept of social learning is drawn 
from organizational studies. Similarly, institutional analyses use the concept of 
diffusion to conceptualize how patterns of collective learning are established, which 
is to say, institutionalized. According to Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) institutional-
ization occurs through diffusion when  “…the pattern of events and relationships 
among them … involves an object from being recognized, then accepted by relatively 
few actors, and then widely diffused and broadly accepted with a field” (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006, p. 247). Actors, in this process, undertake to demonstrate the 
benefits of innovation and the relevance to current and future practices by building 
legitimacy. Learning occurs when legitimacy is established for new or a revised set of 
rules and practices. 
The question of how new ideas and practices are established is encapsulated in the 
concept of routines, which, like social learning, is also drawn from organizational 
studies. Routines are described as “…rules, procedures, strategies, technologies, 
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conventions, cultures and beliefs around which organizations are built and through 
which they operate” (Berkhout, Hertin, & Gann, 2006, p. 137). Routines are the oper-
ationalization of processes that are understood to be appropriate to the particular 
circumstances, which are derived from experience and learning (Berkhout et al., 
2006). Here we integrate the concept of ‘soft spots’, as spaces of action between the 
rules-in-use and rules-in-form (J. Mahoney & K. Thelen, 2010), and routines as part 
of the conceptual  toolkit to help explain how new practices using existing instruments 
occur. Berkhout et al. (2006) identify a four tier interconnected typology of processes 
that enable or constrain organizational change actions. I conceptualize this as 
occurring within the ‘soft spots’. The interconnection is cumulative where the process 
of ‘signaling and interpretation’ initiates a process of ‘experimentation and search’. 
The mechanisms that characterize these first two tiers are processes of sense-making 
in the face of a novel situation. Actors draw from previous experience and tacit 
knowledge as key frames of reference. These processes play a foundational role in 
shaping the pathway of the next two tiers of processes, which shift into more 
deliberative activities by codification of new or revised routines. In ‘knowledge 
articulation and codification’ new procedures are created and/or behavioral 
requirements, where the details of operationalizing the ideas, which had been 
deemed appropriate, are developed. The last tier, according to this conceptual 
package, is ‘feedback and iteration’. Here, assumptions are validated when 
adjustments demonstrate organizational benefits, insofar as changes are responsive 
to the first two tiers. The typology offers concepts that can be used to unpack 
processes of change, or resistance to change. These concepts of organizational 
change offer complementary analytical resources to March and Olsen’s (2005) 
assertion that institutions cannot be changed automatically  “…because institutions 
are defended by insiders and validated by outsiders, and because their histories are 
encoded into rules and routines, their internal structures and rules cannot be 
changed arbitrarily. The changes that occur are more likely to reflect local adaptation 
to local experience and thus be both relatively myopic and meandering, rather than 
optimizing, as well as ‘inefficient’, in the sense of not reaching a uniquely optimal 
arrangement. Even when history is relatively “efficient”, the rate of adaptation is likely 
to be inconsistent with the rate of change in the environment to which the institution 
is adapting” (p. 9). 
2.5 Convergence: A sociological new institutionalist orientation
Both theoretically and empirically, the boundaries are not always clear between the 
different versions of new institutionalism. Attributes and strategies are empirically 
evident in the behavior of individuals and organizations. This is to say, actors use 
strategic behaviors to maximize preferred outcomes, while at the same time picking 
up normative cues from the institutional context to which behaviors conform. Indeed, 
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the boundaries between the institutionalisms are more often than not blurred. For 
example, Ostrom (2010), who is associated with rational choice as an institutional 
economist, argues for the need of a behavioral theory of human action in order to 
address climate change: “…a behavioral theory of the individual assumes that 
individuals do not possess perfect information but are capable of learning as they 
interact in a particular setting. Individuals are boundedly rational and do seek benefits 
for themselves but vary in their other-regarding preferences and norms about the 
appropriate actions that should take place in particular setting” (2010, p. 551). 
Further, Ostrom emphasizes the role of interactions between actors to develop and 
sustain trust and reciprocity as a means to overcome social dilemmas.  Here the 
focus is not on efficiency as a primary driver of behavior. Rather Ostrom draws on the 
idea of appropriateness and learning as key variables, rather than limiting the 
analysis to rules, incentives, and explanations that emphasize the role of utility 
maximizing behaviors. Similarly, March & Olsen (2005) argue that the analytical 
strength of new institutionalism is that it relaxes conceptual rigidity by loosening 
expectations about actors’ capacities “…in terms of normative commitments (virtue), 
cognitive abilities (bounded rationality), and social control (capabilities). The rules, 
routines, norms, and identities of an ‘institution’, rather than micro rational individuals 
or macro social forces, are the basic units of analysis…[and]…the spirit is to 
supplement rather than reject alternative approaches” (p.20).  
 The new institutionalist orientation used in this research can be characterized 
as a sociological-normative perspective. By adopting this theoretical perspective, 
the research focuses on the availability of interpretative space between formal and 
informal rules, and offers an analytical lens through which to view micro-interactions 
between actors and the role of interpretation in gradual organizational learning. By 
assuming interpretative agency, the analysis endeavors to unpack how actors make 
choices as they navigate the complex institutional terrain of climate adaptation. Their 
choices, as individual actors situated within a broader institutional context, provide a 
signal about the dynamic interplay between the institutional context and the 
governance process. The focus is not on the heroic institutional entrepreneur, but 
rather attention is paid to the steps, and the underlying conditions that allow 
interpretative actions, that preceded the emergence of an organizational ‘champion’. 
Interpretative actions occur in what Mahoney and Thelen  (2010) refer to as the ‘soft 
spots’ between rules, interpretation of rules, and enforcement of rules. When faced 
with new problems, organizational actors use the so-called soft spots to apply 
existing rules in new ways by acts of reinterpretation (Hall & Thelen, 2009; Lowndes, 
2009). 
 The pathway to institutionalizing organizational routines can be explored by 
examining the interconnections of institutional dynamics. In these, actors/organizations 
are knitted into the dynamic both as being part of the fabric and as the knitters. This 
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social constructivist perspective assumes while actors/organizations actively shape 
and/or resist new ideas, embedded discourses and practices also exert influence 
(Healey, 2007, p. 67). This theoretical approach allows for interpretative actions by 
institutional actors yet assumes that actors are “…highly attentive to social and 
symbolic pressures arising from their institutional environment” (Suddaby, Deidl, & 
Le, 2013, p. 330). However, learning and institutional change remain a constant. 
Similarly, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) argue that by focusing on actors as active 
players (rather than passive) scholarly research can “… break the dramatic spell of 
institutions and draw attention behind the scenes, to the actors, writers and stage 
hands that produce them ….to understand the ways in which disparate sets of actors, 
each pursuing their own vision, can become coordinated in a common project. By 
paying attention to institutional work, theorists can avoid the subjective illusion of 
institutional outcomes and begin to unpack the relation and interactive moments of 
institutional production” (p.249). For research and policy formation that is focused on 
developing and establishing policy process for climate adaptation, dismantling the 
institutional puzzle is important in order to develop a richer understanding about how 
adaptation to climate change is situated within the values and norms of adaptation 
actors and the ways in which informal institutions are connected to formal enabling 
structures. 
3.0  Research Design and Methods
The remaining sections now turn to a description of the research design and methods. 
As explained in the preceding chapter, the research design is based upon a layered 
analytical approach with the first two layers (referred to as ‘learn’ and ‘analyze’) 
establishing the interplay between formal and informal institutional structures and 
norms, and the third layer (‘explore’) designed to ‘play’ with the “rules of the game” 
(North, 1990). In this chapter the methods that were utilized to achieve the research 
objectives are described, including the case study selection of the Netherlands and 
the exploration of tax increment financing as a possible mechanism to facilitate 
municipal level investment in climate adaptation. In describing the methods, this 
section pays particular attention to the simulation gaming strategy used in the 
‘explore’ phase. As an experiential research strategy, it offers an interactive format 
that is well suited to building knowledge about the socio-political and structural 
challenges facing practitioners as they struggle in the current phase of ‘trial and 
error’ (Berkhout et al., 2006). In that sense, simulation gaming offers an experiential 
setting practice as adaptation actors travel along a learning curve of climate 
adaptation policy formation and, for research, it provides an experimental setting to 
observe the way in which policy-makers make room for institutional action spaces.  
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3.1 Research Design 
The research methods combine: 1) multiple case studies as a means to conduct 
in-depth research on real life phenomena, and as a strategy to understand the same 
phenomena under different conditions (Swanborn, 2010; Yin, 2013) and 2) an 
experimental method using simulation gaming, which is consistent with Yin’s 
contention that case studies can offer important evidence to complement experiments. 
Drawing from Straatemeier et al.  (2010), the research design is based on a sequential 
research process that builds knowledge through case studies and applies the learning 
to test practitioners’ responses ‘in action’. This approach reflects what Straatemeier 
refers to as an experiential research design. The objective of this approach is to 
iteratively build on case study findings, which serve as the input to develop abstract 
concepts that can be ‘tested’ in the context of planning practice. Arguing that “..if one 
wants to know how new planning practices can be generated...” (p.578) research 
methods that create an interface between  “…science’s ‘codified’ knowledge and 
practitioners ‘tacit’ knowledge…” are essential in order to address socio-political 
challenges that are cross-disciplinary and confound uni-dimensional responses. The 
way in which ‘testing’ is conceived draws from the design sciences wherein the aim 
is not to pinpoint causation or predict behaviors, as practiced in the natural sciences 
(Klabbers, 2009; Straatemeier et al., 2010). Rather, an approach influenced by the 
design sciences aims to maintain a firm link between the activity of building knowledge 
and applying knowledge as a contribution towards “…changing existing situations 
into preferred ones” (Klabbers, 2006). The orientation of design sciences, in the 
Figure 1   Research Process and Design - drawing from Straatemeier et al.’s  
“An Experiential Approach to Research in Planning” (2010) 
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context of social inquiry, is to both understand the problem, develop insights into 
possible underlying mechanisms, and to consider alternatives and possible solutions. 
The aim of the research described herein is to consider the interplay of informal and 
formal institutional dynamics, with the objective of learning and exploring participants’ 
perspectives on existing municipal instruments to facilitate municipal investment in 
local-level adaptation. The approach achieves two fundamental goals: firstly, as 
described in chapters 3 and 4, knowledge based on case studies established further 
insights about current and innovative practices in relation to the use of existing 
mechanisms; secondly, as described in chapters 5 and 6, the research process 
builds on that data from the first half of the project, but introduces an alternative 
application of an existing mechanism that practitioners are asked to ‘test drive’ using 
a simulation gaming process. Figure 1 draws from Straatemeier et al.’s model of 
experiential research design, which illustrates the integrated research approach 
reflecting a cumulative learning cycle. Beginning by coupling investing in local 
climate adaptation as both a scholarly research question and as a tangible practical 
planning problem, the next step is the case study phase. This phase was used for 
three key inter-related objectives: firstly, to gather data and gain a deeper under- 
standing about the world (Qu & Dumay, 2011) of the planning practitioners and the 
complexity they face in relation to climate adaptation; secondly, the empirical findings 
were used as the basis to design the simulation game, wherein the complexity of the 
‘real world’ policy context is reduced into the abstraction as the reference system on 
which the ‘Watervliet Safe Haven’ game is modeled and; thirdly, the data was 
fundamental to creating the internal validity of the simulation game in the third phase 
of the research process (see section 3.3.1 for a description of simulation gaming). 
In the fourth phase further abstract concepts are developed. The purpose is to build 
theoretical and empirical knowledge as a contribution towards understanding the 
degree to which, for example, the oft cited financial barrier to implementing climate 
adaptation is a ‘surface constraint (Measham et al, 2011) or whether alternative 
explanations offer a richer understanding. Lastly, the intention of including a gaming 
process in the research design is to offer a ‘concrete experience’ that practitioners 
could learn from. As a dynamic model, the knowledge is returned to the first phase in 
relation to future research and further exploration towards improving planning 
practice. 
3.2  Case Selection
3.2.1  Urban Adaptation to Climate Change in the Netherlands: A policy laboratory 
The Netherlands has been selected as the case for this research because it is 
regarded as a front-runner in European climate adaptation, and has attracted 
international attention with flood risk management plans (ie the Room for River program), 
technological innovations (ie such as innovative approaches to dike design), and 
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global networking initiatives that focus on building awareness and transferring 
information between the world’s major Delta regions (known as the Connecting Delta 
Cities Network).  Nonetheless, as experience in other European countries shows, 
how to finance local investments remains unclear (Swart et al., 2009). The Netherlands 
has been engaged in developing policy processes and producing climate research 
since the national adaptation program was launched almost 10 years ago under 
the ARK program in 2007. The Delta Program is now responsible for developing 
 recommendations for adaptation to climate change in the Netherlands (Termeer, 
Biesbroek, & van den Brink, 2011). Local-level climate adaptation-related infrastructure 
improvements will be delivered using existing spatial planning investment frameworks, 
and through coupling adaptation investments with redevelopment activities over 
time.  (Deltaprogramma, 2010, 2012a, 2012b) (Delta Programme, 2014). 
 While the policy framework is still a work in progress, two key directions stand 
out. Firstly, local spatial adaptation investments will be achieved through market- 
based development activities in conjunction with planning and land development 
processes; thus secondly, the implication is that new institutions or introducing new 
instruments will not be necessary. These directions highlight an inclination towards 
market and growth-oriented solutions as potential means by which to facilitate 
investment in climate adaptation; and, secondly, an acknowledgement that alternative 
applications of existing mechanisms ought to be considered. Without additional 
targeted funds or specifically designed adaptation-related tools, local level municipal 
actors will need to consider how to strategically apply the existing ‘toolkit’ in such a 
way to facilitate investment in climate adaptation1. 
 In the foreseeable future, however, it is unclear how Dutch municipalities will be 
able to finance adaptation measures given the stagnated development sector. 
Conventional planning approaches and instruments that are used to facilitate 
local-level public goods investments during the development phase are unlikely to 
be effective because many development projects across the country are struggling 
to remain financially viable (Deltaprogramma, 2011). Thus, given the active policy 
process driven by the Delta program (van Buuren, van Vliet, & Termeer, 2015) and 
search for the new ‘holy grail’ of planning instruments and financing models, the 
Netherlands represents a kind of policy laboratory and a fertile research context  in 
which to explore new approaches to financing local level public infrastructure in 
times of climate change. 
 Finally, the Netherlands was also selected for practical reasons: the funding for 
this research was provided by the Dutch research program ‘Knowledge for Climate’, 
theme 4 of the ‘Climate Proof Cities’ component. While the funding was provided with 
1 This direction is generally consistent with the characterization of Dutch spatial planning as having 
transitioned into an era that is heavily focused on market-based processes and principles  (Heurkens, 
2014).
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the objective of focusing adaptive capacity of Dutch urban areas and the role of 
urban planning in the governance process, there was a substantial amount of 
research space to interpret and explore the theme from a broad perspective.  
3.2.2 Tax Increment Financing: A short introduction 
As described above, given the expressed interest in the application of market-based 
solutions to finance adaptation investments during the planning and land 
development processes in the Netherlands, the research design makes several 
propositions. First, it takes as a starting point that because of the underlying 
long-term incremental characteristics of climate change, mechanisms that focus on 
capturing immediate return on land value to facilitate investment in climate change 
are poorly designed to motivate commitment and a long-term investment perspective. 
Secondly, autonomous adaptation by municipalities could be enhanced if resources 
were available at the local level, and thus not dependent on actions from higher 
orders of government. Based on those two propositions, the research focuses on the 
use of property taxes, in the context of a specific value capture mechanism known as 
tax increment financing. A specific focus on the potential of property taxes to facilitate 
investment in local adaptation is based on four key characteristics: 1) it is a relatively 
long term stable source of income; 2) it provides a degree of local control; 3) the use 
of property taxes can strengthen the understanding about the connection between 
benefits and costs in relation to local service levels; and, 4) as an income source, it 
does not add upfront costs during the development phase (Kitchen, 2010; Merk, 
Saussier, Staropoli, Slack, & Kim, 2012).  
 Tax increment financing (TIF) is an instrument designed to capture the future 
projected value of property taxes (chapter 3 provides a detailed review of this 
instrument). TIF is defined within a group of instruments that “…enable the increased 
value of land and property as a result of public investments…to be captured directly 
or indirectly, so that it [the value] can be used for financing the activities that are 
responsible for the increased value” (van der Krabben & Needham, 2008, p. 654) 
and/or to finance those parts of the plan that are not cost effective (Priemus, 2007). 
Value capturing instruments assume that there is sufficient value in the future created 
by the development process that can be used to support the financing of public 
infrastructure investments. Value capturing is different from other strategies such as 
cost recovery, which is limited to recovering the costs of the public works in the plan 
area from the property developers during the development phase (van der Krabben 
& Dinteren, 2010). TIF indirectly captures value from land and property owners. It is 
inherently future oriented and does not directly add cost to the development phase, 
which can act as a disincentive to investment, as the design assumes that value is 
recouped over time. Conversely, development fees rendered in the development 
phase or additional levies, as used in assessment districts (Zhao & Larson, 2011) 
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add upfront costs. Other strategies, such tax abatements used in enterprise zones 
result in tax cuts thereby reducing the flow of tax income to the municipality. 
To summarize, the exploration of TIF as a possible means to facilitate investment in 
climate adaptation is based on the understanding that in tax increment financing the 
local investment is capitalized in the property, and the future property tax increment 
is captured over an extended period, thereby rendering a degree of cost and benefit 
distribution between contemporary and future users. It is a mechanism that earmarks 
a revenue stream for investment in a range of public investments (underground 
services, brownfield, parks, etc). Finally, it is a locally-based mechanism that is 
embedded in a regulatory framework based on defined policy criteria (referred to as 
the “But-For” test2), public consultation, and approval from designated authorities. It 
is also a mechanism that can be used to facilitate long term capital budgeting and as 
a means to attract private sector finance (Merk et al., 2012). TIF, however, is a 
risk-based financing instrument that is not without controversy. The degree to which 
certain TIF’s have not met expectations or, conversely, some TIF districts may 
exemplify sound management and good governance, is the subject of local 
administration and political decisions. What is empirically pertinent to this research is 
whether TIF is a potential new tool for the Dutch climate adaptation financial toolkit. 
From a theoretical perspective, as described in the foregoing sections, the emphasis 
of this research is on the degree to which practitioners’ perspectives are shaped by 
institutions in the type of financing mechanisms that they deem as acceptable. TIF 
provides a means to analyze whether practitioners are willing to consider such an 
instrument for conventional investments and whether it is deemed appropriate for 
climate adaptation-related investments. As described in chapters 4 and 5, introducing 
TIF provoked responses that are reflective and grounded in complex socio-political 
dynamics that offer rich insights about the possibilities of a new market mechanism 
for Dutch municipalities. 
3.3 Research Methods and Data Collection
A combination of research and data collection methods were employed in this 
project, based on case studies and simulation gaming. Simulation gaming is an 
interactive strategy that is actor-focused, in contrast, but complementary, to 
comparative analysis of planning policy and program documents, which forms the 
backbone of much governance climate adaptation research (Hamin & Gurran, 2009). 
A combination of case studies with simulation gaming is also well suited to the 
2 The policy rationale for creating a TIF district is based on the ‘but for’ test, i.e., private sector investment 
would not occur or it would not occur in a planned way within an acceptable timeframe, if it were not 
for government intervention and use of public resources (Squires, 2012).
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challenge of researching municipal investment in climate adaptation. This is because 
there is very limited empirical data that provides evidence about the use of 
market-based mechanisms to facilitate local area investment in climate adaptation.3
3.3.1  Summary of Methods
Desk Research: literature review (scholarly and policy documents and reports) to 
draw on research about: 1) Dutch spatial planning and land development, Dutch 
municipal financing: 2) international literature on climate adaptation, and focusing 
specifically on the Dutch policy process. 
Interviews and Engagement with Practitioners: in total, 121 professionals ranging 
from practicing spatial planners, economists, developers, municipal financing and 
tax advisors, and experts from academia and the banking sector provided data for 
this research. In-depth interviews (approximately 1.5 hours each) were conducted 
(n=28) with individuals that were identified in policy documents, websites, and 
snowball sampling (Farquharson, 2005). All interviews were recorded, transcribed, 
and coded using a qualitative data-analysis software (NVivo). Simulation game 
participants (n=59) self-identified by responding to an advertisement for the sessions 
that was posted on a range of social networking sites. The gaming sessions were 
focused on Dutch spatial planning issues and/or climate change related topics. Staff 
from the Knowledge of Climate program distributed the invitation for the simulation 
gaming sessions using the organization’s database of contacts.  
Questionnaires:  Senior municipal tax officials (n=34) participated in a nation-wide 
questionnaire via telephone. Data was analyzed using descriptive statistics. The 
strategy provided an indication of whether large municipalities engaged in 
redevelopment activities use or include future property taxes earnings within 
redevelopment budgets. Two questionnaires were administered to participants in the 
simulation game sessions. Each questionnaire was based on a Likert Scale, using a 
five point scale ranging between strongly agree to strongly disagree. A statistical 
software program (SPSS) was used to analyze the results of the questionnaires using 
descriptive statistics. 
Simulation Gaming: Seven three-hour sessions (21 hours) were held in five different 
locations in the Netherlands. All session material and discussion was in Dutch, 
except the first 20 minutes wherein a presentation was conducted in English (see 
validity session for further discussion). Three methods to collect data during the 
3 The use of green bonds has relatively recently entered the private investment market. Green bonds 
are used to raise financing for both mitigation and climate adaptation municipal investments. The third 
sector organization, C40 recently issued a overview of the role of green bonds in the U.S context and 
guidance to policy makers, see http://www.c40.org/blog_posts/new-playbook-guides-cities-through-
green-bond-market. This mechanism is not exclusive to the North American market. In 2014 the City 
of Johannesburg successfully issued a US$143m green bond to support a range of initiatives focused 
on reducing the city’s greenhouse gas emissions.
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sessions were used: 1) each session was audio recorded and a written summary of 
each session was produced by a native Dutch speaker identifying the themes, key 
debates and tensions; 2) the two questionnaires, as mentioned; 3) each group 
produced a brief written report, using the same report template. The next section 
provides a brief overview of the simulation game method.
3.3.2 Simulation Gaming: a brief overview 
Drawing from the literature, this section provides a brief overview of simulation 
gaming and the rationale for selecting the method and the choice of a role play 
format. Chapters 4 and 5 provide an explanation about the simulation game, known 
as the Watervliet Safe Haven game, that was used in the seven sessions.
 Gaming and simulations have a long history (Crookall, 2010; Shubik, 2009) and 
are used in a range of applications and a diverse array of settings from creating 
military strategies, improving business and organizational management, educational 
and social policy development, to urban planning. Drawing from  Mayer et al (2005; 
Mayer & Veeneman, 2003) and (Shubik, 2009) three functions of gaming and simulations 
can be distinguished: firstly as a learning and teaching tool wherein participants can 
learn about the system that is being referenced in the game in relation to reinforcing 
methods of technical training and interpersonal skills; secondly, gaming can be used 
for research because an experimental environment can be developed that enables 
researchers to “…learn about the system from the interactions among the participants 
and from the interaction between the participants…” (Mayer et al., 2005, p. 407); 
more specifically, according to Shubik, to generate or validate hypotheses, match 
experiments and theory, and for the generation of new theory; and thirdly, gaming 
can be used as a tool for policy intervention insofar as both researchers and 
participants can learn about decision-making and policy- making in a compressed 
and simplified environment in comparison to the real “messy” world of policy 
development (Mayer et al., 2005). 
Gaming and simulations are, as described by de Caluwe et al. (2012), quasi-experiments 
insofar as the researcher is able to manipulate variables yet create a realistic environment 
which the participants interact with and enrich by inserting the complexity of ideas, 
experience, and values that cannot effectively be modeled in a laboratory research 
setting. Gaming simulation is, a “...special type of model that uses framing techniques 
to model and simulate a system. A gaming simulation is an operating model of a real 
life system in which actors in roles partially recreate the behavior of the system” 
(Duke & Geurts, 2004). In the context of exploring and testing new ideas in the policy 
development process, gaming offers, as noted by Kuit et al.  “…an experimental 
environment [that] is relatively safe. There is no risk of real institutional damage” 
(Kuit, Mayer, & Jong, 2000, p. 8) moreover, it is a methodology that is able to reflect 
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the complexity of policy making by incorporating “... the technical-physical and 
social- political dynamics…” that is not captured in workshops and brainstorming 
sessions (Mayer, 2009).  For example, one of the key objectives of brainstorming is to 
come up with original or novel ideas (Putman & Paulus, 2009), but in doing so, such 
novel ideas are often substantially normative and not grounded in broader contextual 
considerations. Similarly, the purpose of focus groups, a well established workshop 
format, is to encourage a greater understanding of different attitudes and opinions 
insofar as it is a method that “...is useful for exploring and examining what people 
think...about issues of importance to them without pressuring them into making 
decisions or reaching a consensus” (Liamputtong, 2011, p. 5).
3.3.2.1 Simulation Gaming in this Research
The objective of this research is to build an understanding about how planning 
practitioners would respond to a reformulation and reapplication of property taxes in 
the form of TIF’s as a strategy to facilitate investment in local adaptation measures. 
A methodology was needed that would generate sufficient data about behaviors and 
decisions in relation to, what Kuit el al. describe as, a “….behavior in an unknown 
situation in the future.” (2000, p. 145).  Investigating problems and issues that cannot 
be directly accessed is not uncommon in research and training (Peters, Vissers, & 
Heijne, 1998). Using case studies, information can be gathered that exists today and 
we can conduct speculative interviews (de Caluwe et al., 2012) by asking practitioners 
how they think they would respond to a novel financing instrument; similarly, surveys 
can be used to determine opinions and preferences. However, these strategies risk 
losing the rich information available in the former or risk losing the generalizability of 
the latter.
A key advantage of simulation games is their ability to, on the one hand, simplify 
reality, and, on the other, allow for the inherent complexity that actors infuse into the 
game. If we accept that policy-making is “chaotic and messy’, as Mayer (2009) 
suggests, computer simulations of human systems are inherently weak in relation to 
the purpose of the research objectives given the challenge of modeling “…tacit 
knowledge”4 (Klabbers, 2009; Meijer, 2009). When human participants become part 
of the model they introduce a level of complexity and realness that is limited in 
controlled laboratory settings and computer modeling (Daré & Barreteau, 2003, p. 24). 
Game simulations, therefore, provide a multi-actor platform for actors to experience 
the complexity of the policy making process in a more simplified and controlled 
manner. The simulation game compresses the time-frame of a typical policy making 
4 Novak and Canas described tacit knowledge as the knowledge that experts have but cannot articulate 
well to others, which is acquired over many years of experience and derives in part “…from activities 
of the expert that involve thinking, feeling, and acting” (Novak & Canas, 2006).
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process yet offers a simplified institutional context that has been infused with the 
socio-political and technical endogenous and exogenous influences and tensions 
that actors would typically contend with in their regular professional lives. Gaming 
accepts that the players do not have perfect information, nor are they rational actors 
with comprehensive information about the local context such as, for example, in a 
game theoretic approach (Alexander, 2000). For this reason, using simulation 
gaming for the purposes of this research provides a methodological framework that 
has a conceptual connection with the new institutional theoretical approach described 
in the preceding sections. 
3.3.2.2 Choosing a Game Format 
When confronted with the challenge of designing a game in which to generate data 
for scientific purposes, researchers must make a series of decisions starting with the 
form of the game. Will it be a simulation or a game? Or something in-between? 
According to Crookall, the debate between gaming scholars continues with respect 
to agreeing on a definitive and broadly accepted conception and application of 
game and simulation (Crookall, 2010). Nevertheless, there are differences between 
gaming and simulation. According to Meijer and Hofstede (2003) a “simulation can 
be defined as studying the effectors of human behaviors or decisions on some key 
variables on a model that represents a real-world system. A game can be defined as 
a clearly delineated activity with its own roles, rules, and incentives, carried out for its 
own sake. A gaming simulation is a simulation of a real world system in the form of a 
game. This implies that the roles, rules, and incentives of the game mimic some real 
world phenomenon” (p.24). Sauve et al. provide further guidance by emphasizing 
the artificial nature of a game format in comparison to simulations or simulation 
games, both of which require a strong element of simplification of real-life and 
allowing for a dynamic that allows participants to control the reality in which they 
have been placed. By allowing this, unlike a conventional model that is static (Sauve, 
Renaud, Kaufman, & Marquis, 2007), researchers can study the behaviors of the 
participants within that reference system. According to  Sauve et al. (2010), the 
difference between a simulation and a simulation game is the former is reality defined 
as a system, which is a model that must be faithful to controlling variables. Simulation 
gaming, while it is reality defined as a system, is a model that is comparatively flexible 
and is not faithful in controlling variables. Secondly, a simulation game requires 
participants, a degree of conflict, and a goal to win, which can also be conceived as 
reaching an objective (as is the case of the Watervliet Safe Haven game).
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3.3.2.3 Simulation Game Using a Role Play Format: the choice in this research
A simulation game method using a role play game format is well suited for the 
objective of this research because a simulation game using a role play format 
provides an intermediate step to stretch the institutional parameters (i.e. not a 
simulation that must be faithful and accurate) and is not artificial and based in fantasy 
without a connection to reality. The elements of the game can be represented in 
different formats from computer-based virtual worlds, board games, role play games, 
using a range of materials from metaphors (i.e. beads representing resources) to 
materials that are literal objects from everyday life (i.e. maps). Rather than modeling 
human behavior using computer models, as in agent-base modeling, the social 
element of simulation games is achieved through players taking on a role. Role play 
games are not restricted by the board form, unlike board games. Neither do they 
have the randomness resulting from throwing the dice, or limitations in terms of the 
rigidity of modeling, like computer-based games. Instead they are a format that 
compels participants to develop a dialog within the context of a simplified reality, 
which is purposely designed to reflect the particular institutional context in which 
participants operate in their everyday life.  
 Role play games (RPG) are a learning and research strategy that is an 
established format in the world of policy exercises. Unlike interviews, RPG build in 
contextual factors and tensions that the participant must operate within. It is not a 
one-on-one interview or a survey, within which respondents can provide opinions 
unconstrained by peers. RPG are a live format that is infused with elements of reality 
that the player must contend with, but offer a degree of ‘play’ to participants and the 
space to stretch their ideas, norms, and values. 
 Role play games are based on the relationship between three poles; drawing 
from Dare (2003): observed reality and a controlled experiment that is embedded in 
a conceptual model (i.e. the reference system). Roles provide players with a particular 
function that refers back to the reference system (Os van, 2012) and plays a function 
in the game. The roles can be written to be open and flexible, thereby giving the 
player a degree of freedom in the objectives and constraints, or they can be detailed 
and specific. Similarly, as described by van Os (2012), games can be either rigid 
rule-based games or free-form gaming. In the former type of game, all of the rules 
are defined at the start of the game, typically in the form of a computer program. 
Free-form games are underpinned, based on certain assumptions that are derived 
from the research objectives, but the in-game constraints and objectives are 
generally more free flowing, thereby allowing the players to behave more openly.
 The use of role play as the format for the simulation game used in this research 
offers methodological coherence with the theoretical focus of this investigation 
(Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2002). According to Thoenig (2012), in 
public organizations decisions are based on a some degree satisficing to meet an 
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acceptable form of understanding and general consensus by making “…tradeoffs 
between the content of the problem they [are addressing] and the level of uncertainty 
they face in real time” (Thoenig, 2012, p. 173).  That is to say, public organizational 
actors make decisions based on reaching an understanding between each other, 
which is a kind of role play, about the context they face and in determining the 
possible strategies using values they imagine to be acceptable (both endogenously 
and exogenously derived). Indeed, as Innes and Booher assert, role play is not 
isolated to artificial games, as they argue planning processes in everyday life are 
comprised of citizens and professionals playing a particular role and changing their 
roles accordingly to meet with personal or organizational objectives (Innes & Booher, 
1999). Moreover, in addition to more instrumental motivations, according to their 
research on role play and consensus building, planners and stakeholders often 
balance a range of roles, which have different and potentially competing values, from 
personal to professional, that must be managed and/or strategically deployed.
 Role play gaming, unlike a more traditional workshop format, is a method that 
allows the game designer to purposely intervene to manipulate variables (i.e. with 
some surprises that both create a degree of ‘fun’ but also represent real life scenarios 
that mimic the real world). Participants must collectively overcome these variables 
during the simulation process. In the Watervliet Safe Haven game described in 
chapters 5 and 6, information was provided to participants that added pressure and 
complexity to their discussions. The design of the information, and the means to 
convey it, was based on realistic formats. For example, during game play, participants 
were provided with media reports about public budgets and financial risks, political 
actions from an abutting neighborhood, and flood risk projections and plans 
provided by engineers and planners. A role play format offered a dynamic and 
flexible strategy to empirically observe how the players responded. It used the 
information in relation to conceptualizing the use of property taxes, within the TIF 
construction, and the degree to which they could, as a group, reconcile differences 
of opinion.  
 Quantitative research methods seek to address threats to validity through 
randomization and controls (Maxwell, 1992). However, as shown in the following 
section, validity criteria and strategies to overcome such issues in research using 
simulation games adhere to conventional principles. Also they have developed 
specific techniques that can be applied in the design and empirical cycles of the 
research process. 
3.3.2.4 Validity Criteria in Gaming
The methodological approach taken in this research project is qualitative. This 
approach provides strategies to work with the data in a more interpretative, 
open-ended, and contextualized way than is possible with quantitative approaches 
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(Creswell & Miller, 2000). Simulation gaming is a method that is applied to conduct 
scientific research, as means to generate and collect data (Meijer, 2009). Simulation 
gaming is primarily a qualitative method (Meijer, 2009) that incorporates inductive 
techniques to address threats to validity; such as the iterative review of data to 
discount preliminary ideas, create alternatives, or strengthen hypotheses. As Maxwell 
notes, this approach “is accepted by qualitative researchers from a wide range of 
philosophical positions” (Maxwell, 1992, p. 296). 
Peters et al. draw from Raser’s (1969) four criteria for validity in gaming in their article 
“The Validity of Games” (1998). First, the model of the reference system must create 
an environment that is realistic to the players, referred to as the psychological reality. 
Without such an environment, players tend not to act like they would in reality: e.g. 
they take more risks than they typically would, therefore their behaviors could not 
correspond to the reference system. Secondly, the game ought to demonstrate 
structural validity: the theory and the assumptions that are built into the game must 
be isomorphic to the reference system. Peter et al. suggest that this means that the 
game does not need to mimic precisely the reference system, but rather the objective 
is to simplify the complexity of reality. Similar to the first two criteria, process validity 
supports the development of a realistic environment for the player, such as the flow 
of information, resources, and interactions between the actors. Raser’s focus on 
creating a reference system that is responsive and recognizable to players is 
consistent with Malaby’s contention that making a game “….is about creating the 
complex, implicit, contingent conditions wherein the texture of engaged human 
experience can happen” (p. 107) in order to “….generate interpretable outcomes” 
(Malaby, 2007). Raser’s fourth validity criterion is predictive validity wherein a game is 
considered valid “…to the degree that it can reproduce historical outcomes or predict 
the future” (quoted in Peters et al. p. 24). This last criterion is problematic given it 
seems hardly feasible to achieve statistic probability using gaming, due to the typical 
sample sizes. However, Peters et al. interpret this criterion as relating to the game 
accurately reflecting what happens “in reality” (p. 24). The research described here 
builds on this conception of the predictive validity criterion, by conceiving of it as the 
degree to which the outcomes conform to social norms and values. 
3.3.2.5 Validity in this Research: Strategies used in the Watervliet Safe Haven Game 
Based on the above overview of validity criteria with respect to simulation gaming, 
table 1 summarizes the strategies that were used in the Watervliet Safe Haven game 
(see chapters 5 and 6). The following summary is based on criteria and techniques 
from Peters et al. (1998), De Caluwe et al. (2012), Duke (1980):
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4.0  Conclusion
In this chapter the methodological approach was identified. A description of the new 
institutionalist theoretical approach was sketched out and situated in relation to the 
broader school of new institutionalist thought. This was represented in rational choice 
institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism. It was 
argued that sociological institutionalism, as an approach that emphasizes the 
interactive relationship between formal and informal institutional rules, allows for an 
interpretative space within which actors can exert a degree of agency – yet, such 
agency is situated within an institutionally bounded context. It was further argued that 
this analytical approach provides a conceptual means to consider the ways in which 
planning practitioners navigate the dynamic context of Dutch planning, grappling 
with the question of how, and by which means, to enable municipal investment in 
climate adaptation. This chapter also provided an overview of the research design 
and methods that were used to collect and analyze the data. The latter half describes 
the qualitative research design as a case study strategy wherein data from smaller 
cases, within the broader Dutch case, and simulation gaming, were used to analyze 
the socio-political dimensions of using tax increment financing to facilitate local 
investments. The next four chapters provide a detailed analysis of the findings, 
following the order set out in section 4 of chapter 1. 
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Abstract 
Based on a case study of the Stadshaven port redevelopment in Rotterdam, this 
chapter explores whether existing spatial planning mechanisms and processes can 
be used to facilitate local-level investment in climate-resilient public infrastructure 
and/or whether new processes and mechanisms are required to encourage investment 
in climate adaptation. The study reveals several key findings. Firstly, a lack of 
conventional funding sources or formalized regulatory framework allowed room for 
experimentation with existing mechanisms and flexible strategies. Secondly, project 
planners are currently ambivalent towards introducing new mechanisms as a means 
to overcome implementation challenges. The case provides evidence about the role 
of the governance process, not simply as a means of system coordination that exists 
in isolation from institutional norms and values, but rather as a space for innovation, 
which can contribute  towards reducing the financial gap associated with climate 
adaptation. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Despite efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the scientific community 
agrees that adaptation to climate change is necessary (Swart et al. 2009; International 
Panel   on Climate Change 2013; Adger, Arnella, and Tompkins 2005). Additional 
stresses related to climate change present an emerging challenge for public urban 
infrastructure. The effects of climate change will include multi-hazard simultaneous 
phenomena and ‘creeping’ changes (Birkman et al. 2010) that will become more 
frequent and intense, including rises in sea level, river flooding, and urban heat island 
effects (de Bruin et al. 2009). Local governments are required to facilitate investment 
in, and oversee, conventional public urban infrastructure, e.g., water distribution and 
sewers. Within the context of climate change, research about resilient2 city building 
also suggests that municipalities will benefit from new public infrastructure strategies 
such as permeable pavement, separation of stormwater and sewage, strategic 
application of greenspace and trees, water storage and retention, and improved 
drainage and grading plans to mitigate possible flooding or deluge incidents 
(Makropoulos and Butler 2010; Bobylev et al. 2013). However, in times of fiscal stress, 
any new infrastructural investments, or even retrofitting existing systems, poses a 
substantial financial challenge for municipalities.
 This chapter addresses these issues in the context of the Dutch planning 
system, focusing on two main issues: firstly, can innovative3 practices and uses of 
existing spatial planning mechanisms and processes facilitate local-level investment 
in climate-resilient public infrastructure, and/or, secondly, are new processes and 
mechanisms required to encourage investment in climate adaptation? This chapter 
will also explore institutional changes such as modifications to existing rules, norms, 
and practices by local-level Dutch spatial planners. The assumption of this paper is 
that institutions are complex and dynamic facets of the adaptation implementation 
process, rather than as inert and inflexible. 
 Mahoney and Thelen argued that institutional change often occurs “...precisely 
when problems of rule interpretation and enforcement open up space for actors to 
implement rules in new ways” (2010). This paper considers the interplay between 
local governance processes and the institutions in which the actions are embedded. 
Section 2 introduces an institutionalist conceptual framework, which will be applied 
to analyze empirical findings to build on institutionally-oriented research about 
climate adaptation  (Storbjork and Hedren 2011; Oberlack and Neumarker 2011; 
Gupta et al. 2010; Termeer 2009; Biesbroek et al. 2011; Glaas et al. 2010; Inderberg 
2 Resilience in this context refers to an engineering conceptualization wherein adaptation measures are 
designed to return the impacted area to a steady state after the disturbance (Funfgeld and McEvoy 2012).
3 Innovation refers to the application of existing mechanisms to create novel solutions to meet new 
requirements.
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2011; Burch 2011; Matthews and Sydneysmith 2010; Dovers and Hezri 2010). 
Specifically, it explores the degree to which institutions constitute the ground on 
which modes of practice are played out and values and ideas evolve or are reinforced 
(Schmit 2008). 
 Section 3 outlines the methodology and Section 4 provides a brief background 
about the Dutch national climate adaptation program and key characteristics of 
Dutch planning and land development practice. By connecting program with 
practice, Section 4 also problematizes the anticipated institutional delivery platform 
of local climate adaptation investments, which will likely occur through planning and 
redevelopment processes. Sections 5 and 6 present a case study: the large-scale, 
long-term Stadshaven port redevelopment project in Rotterdam. This case reveals 
the degree to which practitioners are modifying modes of practice and reinterpreting 
rules as a means to facilitate investment in climate resilient public urban infrastructure. 
The chapter concludes with critical reflections and identifies the fundamental tensions 
that are highlighted by the findings of the Rotterdam case study.
2.0 Theoretical Approach 
2.1 Situating the Role of Institutions 
Adaptation to climate change is a relatively new research field (Aakre and Rübbelke 
2010) and scholars have used a variety of philosophical and theoretical approaches 
to explore the issue. Institutions in the climate adaptation literature are described in a 
variety of ways from representing a constraint (Funfgeld 2010; Corfee-Morlot et al. 
2009) to being a ‘double edged sword’ as both a facilitator and limiter (Anguelovski 
and Carmin 2011) and, as inherently conservative, institutions are considered as 
both a strength and a weakness in relation to embedding adaptation into practice 
(Gupta et al. 2010). Scholars tend to view institutions as barriers, rather than facilitators, 
of adaptation to climate change (Runhaar et al. 2012). From this perspective, 
implementation of climate adaptation will require changes in planning and funding 
processes, e.g., through mainstreaming, cross-sectoral policy integration, or application 
of a multi-level governance framework (Uittenbroek, Janssen-Jansen, and Runhaar 
2013). The purpose of the research described in this chapter is to explore the interplay 
between the governance process and the institutional context in which the actions 
are embedded. Biesbroek et al. (2013) called this a ‘realists’ perspective’ because 
the focus is “…geared towards the dynamics of the process in an attempt to 
understand the value positions, interests, and institutions that could reveal ‘why’ 
impasses have emerged” (35). 
 The current study builds on this realist perspective description, and also focuses 
on the spaces that evolve during this process and how they offer opportunities for 
502987-L-bw-Root
Bridging the Financial Gap in Climate Adaptation | 75
action to the actors and organizations that operate within an institutional platform. 
The analysis draws from previous research suggesting that institutional change is 
often a gradual process (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Hall and Thelen 2009; Lowndes 
2005). From this perspective, actors are seen as embedded within institutions; to 
evoke change, actors use existing tools to deal with new problems. That is, there is a 
broader interconnectivity between the often evoked idea that there are both barriers 
and stimuli to implementing climate  adaption. Biesbroek et al. (2011) defined barriers 
to adaptation as “….those conditions and factors that actors experience as impeding, 
diverting, or blocking the process of developing and implementing climate adaptation 
strategies” (182). Barriers may include uncertainty, lack of knowledge about climate 
change, and a lack of effective policy, governance, institutions, and financial 
resources (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). Oberlack and Neumarker (2011), defined 
stimuli in terms of dynamics that support the “drivers of adaptation” (8). However, 
while descriptive metaphors, the concepts do not provide an analytical lens to 
consider the way in which barriers and stimuli play out in different ways and in 
different contexts (Keskitalo, Juhola, and Westerhoff 2011; Westerhoff et al. 2011 ). 
The next section will present an institutional framework to consider how institutions 
play a critical role, and how an institutional platform can shape the context in which 
planning and implementation processes play out. 
2.1.1 Dimensions and Dynamics: A new institutional conceptual framework
Concepts arising from ‘new institutionalism’ can help to clarify the degree to which 
Dutch spatial planning actors are starting to shape an implementation pathway. 
These concepts illuminate the role of institutions in structuring access to resources 
for climate adaptation investments (Agrawal 2010), the agency actors use in applying 
rules, and the degree to which there is scope available to bend or modify rules. 
 New institutional theories provide a range of explanations about how institutions 
behave in relation to uncertainty,  how rules are applied, the types of actors that 
operate within institutional contexts, and the factors that inform institutional change. 
Although the theories differ in how they describe institutional change and inertia, they 
tend to agree that institutions do change. Buitelaar et al. (2007) argued that although 
practices and policies become strongly embedded once institutionalized, “…
institutional change takes place as a result of an ongoing process of social-political 
manipulation and tireless tinkering, a process which can be appropriately labeled as 
‘institutional bricolage’”4 (905). Some scholars working in the field of climate 
adaptation governance have suggested that new institutions and better coordination 
4 Buitelaar et al. (2007) refer to Chase Smith et al (2001, 42) definition of `` institutional bricolage’’: as 
`` the patching together of institutional arrangements from the cultural resources available to people 
in response to changing conditions. A key feature of institutional bricolage is the coming together of 
different (mainstream and alternative) logics and perspectives” (p.895).
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between stakeholders is required to implement adaptation. However, institutional 
change might not necessarily require overt abolishment of institutions or the creation 
of new ones, but may occur via reinterpretation and different applications of existing 
rules and practices (Hall and Thelen 2009). Lowndes (2009) argued that when 
institutional actors face new problems, the ambiguity creates “…critical openings for 
creativity and agency to establish new precedents for action” (12). Changes occur 
within what Mahoney and Thelen (2010) referred to as the “soft spots” (14; see Figure 1) 
between rules, interpretation of rules, and enforcement of rules. Therefore, in contrast 
to the general perception that institutions are inflexible and lack human agency 
which has been described (Lowndes 2001) as “...vulgar institutionalism [that] treat 
institutions as facts of life” (1956), this paper will apply a framework in which 
institutions change and evolve over time. This gradual evolution is largely reflective of 
contemporary socio-political norms, in what Dembski and Salet (2010) referred to as 
“patterns of social rules” (617).
 Figure 1 draws from Mahoney and Thelen (2010), Hall and Thelen (2009), and 
Lowndes (2009) to illustrate the dimensions and dynamics of gradual institutional 
change. This analytical lens can help clarify the interdependency between institutions 
and governance. Rather than being inert, the governance process is seen as 
involving fluidity and agency in terms of the actors, organizations, and between the 
institutional platform in which the formal and informal ‘rules of the game’ are 
embedded (North 1990). 
2.1.2 Institutional Platform: Rules of the Game
Institutionalist approaches5 conceptualize institutions in different ways, in terms of 
their relative economic, political, and sociological perspectives, but as Dembski and 
Salet noted, “...what most institutional approaches have in common is that they aim 
to explain how social rules enable collective action in a world of individual choices” 
(2010, 614). This kind of analysis emphasizes the relative importance of the social 
context that shapes the actions of individuals and organizations. Social practices are 
informed and shaped by norms, values, habits and routines, formal and informal 
rules. Lowndes (2005) referred to the range of ideas, values, and influences, including 
the role of media in framing social issues, as ‘institutional templates’ within which 
actors and organizations function, and are influenced by. Formal and informal 
institutions differ: formal institutions are generally seen as government rules that are 
enforced by the legal system, e.g., laws, constitutions, ordinances, and local land-use 
5 Four schools of thought , representing variants of new institutionalism, are referred to as historical 
institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism, and discursive 
institutionalism (Thynne 2008) . Thynne identifies the logics associated with each institutionalism as 
path-dependence’, ‘interest’ ‘appropriateness’ and ‘communication’, accordingly (p.329).
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plans. Informal institutions have less explicit rules and emerge via repetition and 
solidification of behaviour through perceptions, values, beliefs, and norms (Buitelaar 
et al. 2011). Formal and informal rules interact and shape actions and behaviours at 
organizational and individual levels. Thus, institutions create the conditions 
(constraints and opportunities) that organizations and actors must negotiate to 
achieve their objectives (Lowndes 2005). Metaphorically, organizations and individual 
actors are players within a larger game with implicit and explicit rules that evolve over 
time (Lowndes 2009; Van Hal et al. 2012). 
2.1.3 Governance: (Re)Interpretation and enforcement
In the conceptual model (Figure 1), governance is both a binder and an embodiment 
of the complex interactions between formal and informal rules. Governance is not 
reduced to a technical problem of ‘system coordination’ (Lowndes 2009, 95) as a 
means to improve implementation processes. Rather, governance is complex and 
involves building consensus and engaging in processes to obtain consent to carry 
Figure 1   Dimensions and Dynamics Between the Institutional Platform and 
Governance
Source: Author’s interpretation based on Mahoney and Thelen (2010), Hall and Thelen (2009), and 
Lowndes (2009)
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out objectives in arenas involving diverse and conflicting interests (de Alcantara 
1998). Birkman et al. (2010) described governance as the way in which actors and 
organizations interface and use mechanisms to articulate their interests, exercise 
their legal rights, and mediate their differences. This involves constant interpretation 
of rules, norms, and practices: written and unwritten, formal and informal, explicit 
and tacit (Van Hal et al. 2012). Thus, institutions may constrain or enable actors in the 
governance process to manage conflicting agendas and to set priorities (Storbjork 
and Hedren 2011). 
 Mahoney and Thelen distinguished between ‘rules-in-use’ and ‘rules-in-form’ 
and referred to the ‘soft spot’ (2010, p.14) of (re)interpretation or ignoring rules until 
the rules gain broader legitimacy and become part of a shared understanding. 
Actors may seek to adapt the ‘rules of the game’ to meet the demands of uncertain 
and changing environments and to protect (or further) their own interests. This 
conceptual perspective helps clarify the dynamic interplay between institutions and 
governance in the context of climate adaptation policy-making and implementation, 
by offering a degree of agency to practitioners to effect change while simultaneously 
acknowledging that they operate within an institutional context in which they must 
navigate a complex set of informal and formal ‘rules of the game’ (North 1990). 
Application of this perspective to the Stadshaven project can help clarify the 
interactions between the broader factors influencing actions and the subtle ways that 
project actors are (slowly) finding solutions in the ‘soft spots’ of the governance 
process. 
3.0  Methodology
This chapter explores how municipal-level actors use planning and land development 
processes to facilitate local-level investment in climate adaptation, whether innovative 
strategies are emerging, and the degree to which new mechanisms are required. The 
epistemological assumption behind this research is that local context matters and 
local actors construct meanings that underpin the views that they express (Creswell 
2009). These views are the result of ongoing interactions within their professional 
sphere and through (professional) cultural norms.  By focusing on a single detailed 
case study of the Stadshaven redevelopment plan, we explore the local planning 
context and the broader dynamics that affect responses to climate adaptation. 
 Rotterdam has garnered international attention for its climate adaptation strategy 
(Stead and Taşan-Kok 2013). This chapter goes deeper, describing how the 
Stadshaven project, and the Rotterdam Adaptation Strategy, is a work-in-progress 
that can provide insights as project planners grapple with complex issues related to 
major changes in Dutch planning and land development practice. The Stadshaven 
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project is not necessarily unlike other municipalities that are less engaged with 
climate adaptation, or are attempting to develop a strategy. Although the ambitious 
scale of this project might be beyond the capacity of many municipalities, the 
implementation challenges may be similar. Gerring (2007) referred to this as an 
“influential case” with respect to case selection (p.108). The objective here is not to 
focus on extraordinary pilot projects within the Stadshaven portfolio, but rather to 
focus on the “case that proves the rule” (Gerring 2007, p.108) with regard to the 
interplay between local institutions, governance, and the potential for actors to exert 
agency.
 This chapter combines document analysis (national climate adaptation policy 
and programs; municipal and project policy and programs; local planning and land 
development regulatory frameworks) and semi-structured interviews. From 
September 2011–January  2013, 18 interviews were conducted with senior managers, 
policy-makers, spatial planners, and development managers from the key public 
sector organizations involved in the project (the City of Rotterdam, the Port of 
Rotterdam, the Stadhaven Project Management Bureau, and a non-profit social 
housing corporation). Interviews were also conducted with national senior policy 
advisors from the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, who are responsible 
for national adaptation program development. Key individuals were identified from 
the policy documents, and subsequent interviewees were identified using snowball 
sampling (Farquharson 2005). Interviewees were asked about the degree to which 
investment in climate adaptation is part of the planning and land development 
program; more specifically, they were asked about the mechanisms and processes 
that are being used, or will be used, to facilitate investments in climate-adaptation 
public infrastructure. They were also asked whether new mechanisms are required. 
Interviews were transcribed and coded using qualitative data-analysis software 
(NVivo). Key themes were identified and the themes were further narrowed using the 
conceptual framework described in Section 2.
 The findings clarified the complexities faced by practitioners, reaching beyond 
the information available in public documents (Qu and Dumay 2011). The data were 
sufficient to enable us to contrast and compare differences and similarities in 
viewpoints between organizational actors and to obtain a robust understanding of 
the institutional context and the evolving norms and principles that local actors are 
developing during policy-making and implementation. 
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4.0  Plugging into an Institutional Platform:  
Dutch planning and land development practice 
4.1  Adaptation to Climate Change: Implications for planning and 
land development
In the Netherlands, the national government has accepted evidence that climate 
change will occur, and launched a national adaptation program in 2007  (VROM 
2007, 2007). The Delta Program is responsible for the ongoing development of the 
program (Vink et al. 2012; Termeer, Biesbroek, and van den Brink 2011):  the urban 
Table 1  List of Interviewees
Interviewee  
Numerical Reference 
Role Interview Date(s)
City of Rotterdam & Project Management Bureau
7 Urban Planner August 10/12
15 Climate Adviser August 23/11
16 Climate Advisor July 12/11
8 Climate Advisor August 27/12
4 Water Engineer August 23/12
2 Urban Planner September 27/12
9 Engineer November 5/12
6 Urban Planner August 10/12
10 Project Manager June 4/12 and August 23/12
5 Project Manager November 19/12
Port of Rotterdam
3 Project Manager November 19/12
Stadshaven Project Management Bureau
1 Project Manager August 27/12
14 Adviser August 23/12
Ministry Infrastructure & Environment
11 Project Manager September 15/11 and September 3/12
12 Project Manager September 15/11
Heijplaats Housing Corporation
13 Project Manager January 13/13
18 interview sessions
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component of which is called the New Housing Development and Restructuring 
Program (Deltaprogramma 2010). Policy research about precise implementation 
mechanisms is ongoing, with the objective of developing a clear national policy 
framework in 2014. Based on research conducted to date, local-level climate 
adaptation will be delivered using existing frameworks on spatial investments. The 
focus will be on improved coordination and using existing cost recovery and 
cross-subsidization mechanisms, which are conventionally used in Dutch planning 
and land development practices (Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment 2011) 
(Interviewees 11, 12). Thus, climate adaptation investments are handled in similar 
ways as other public infrastructure investments and must be financed with income 
from the usual value-capturing mechanisms that are applied in Dutch planning. 
However, the economic downturn of 2008 is a fundamental exogenous intervening 
factor beyond the control of municipal actors. One Delta Program document 
indicated that while existing planning and land development approaches and 
instruments available to municipalities could be applied to facilitate local-level 
adaptation investments, in the short term current practices hold less promise as 
development projects are less financially able to contribute to climate adaptation 
measures (Deltaprogramma 2011). The next section provides a brief overview of 
Dutch planning and land development, identifies the key characteristics that define 
modes of practice, and introduces the tensions between control and flexibility within 
the institutional platform and played out in the governance process. 
4.1.2 Planning and Land Development: Planning culture and mode of practice
A defining and unique feature of Dutch planning and land development practice is 
the active role played by municipalities over the past 40 years (Needham 2007; van 
der Krabben and Jacobs 2013). Using a public land development model, 
municipalities (and arms-length development organizations) have played a major 
role in directing the land development process by assembling land, undertaking the 
servicing, and ultimately selling the lots to developers for commercial, industrial, and 
residential purposes (Buitelaar 2010; van der Krabben and van Dinteren 2010). This 
strategy has enabled municipalities to use the market to invest in their communities 
and deliver a range of public goods with a high degree of spatial quality. This public 
land development model is now facing scrutiny because many municipalities are 
currently burdened with substantial land holdings and financial exposure (van der 
Krabben and Jacobs 2013). 
 As a mode of practice that is enabled by formal and informal institutions, the 
public land development model may have produced a planning culture that assumes 
local municipal government has a duel role: to control the planning and land 
development process and to steer the process to achieve planning objectives 
(Buitelaar and Sorel 2010). Planning culture can be defined as “…the collective ethos 
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and dominant attitudes of planners regarding the appropriate role of the state, market 
forces, and civil society in influencing social outcomes” (Buitelaar and Sorel, 985). 
Buitelaar and Sorel argued that this results in an ambiguous overlap: a plan-led 
approach wherein development applicants must conform to legally binding land use 
plans; and a mode of practice that has more in common with the development-led 
approach usually found in the UK (Janssen-Jansen and Woltjier 2010). In practice, 
Dutch planners tend to implement a pragmatic rule application and achieve planning 
objectives using a goal-justifies-the-means approach (Needham 2007). 
 The next section focuses on the Stadshaven project, which serves as a case 
study to illustrate the dilemmas faced by practitioners, who must simultaneously 
grapple with shifting modes of practice as a result of the reduced financial capacity 
of land development, and emerging public policy related to climate adaptation. It shows 
how informal institutions shape responses to climate adaptation that reflect local 
norms and values, and how practitioners may experiment with available formal 
planning instruments to find solutions that facilitate investment. 
5.0  Existing Mechanisms and Evolving Practice: 
Introduction to the case study
5.1 Stadshaven, Rotterdam 
The Stadshaven precinct is located at Rotterdam’s inner harbour, and is the second 
largest inner-city redevelopment in Europe (Daamen and Vries 2012). Rotterdam has 
one of the largest ports in the world, so this area is of considerable economic 
importance to the Netherlands and the European market. The redevelopment plan 
encompasses 1,600 ha of land and harbour basins. The ‘Creating on the Edge’ 
document  (Stadshaven 2008)  describes a planning vision that includes relocating 
the deep sea cargo services out of this inner port area and closer to the North Sea, 
thereby increasing inter-Europe shipping container activity in the Waalhaven area. 
The redevelopment vision also involves adding 5,000 new residential units and 
introducing a variety of commercial uses, innovative start-up businesses, and 
educational facilities into the area (Stadshaven 2011, 2008).The long-term vision to 
the year 2040 explicitly refers to the area as a testing ground to support experiments 
and foster innovative thinking. Based on the idea of sustainable transition, the 
planning vision includes developing energy-neutral climate-proof buildings that do 
not rely on carbon-based energy and are designed in anticipation of temperature 
and sea level rise and extreme events. Water is framed as an opportunity, with the 
possibility for floating communities and climate-adaptive mobility (Stadshaven 2011).
The following analysis of this case study applies the concepts shown in Figure 1. 
It begins by describing how stakeholders are positioning adaptation to climate 
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change and shifting their perspectives on the role of planning and land development 
in the redevelopment process. Next, it focuses on one area of Stadshaven, called 
Heijplaat, to illustrate how they are experimenting with existing rules. 
5.1.2 Influences from the Institutional Platform: Shifting role of planning 
Implementation of the Stadshaven project is planned in phases. The 2007–2015 
phase (Stadshaven 2008) involved a €710M public investment development program, 
based on the public land development model and assumptions about a strong 
housing market that would stimulate and financially support the redevelopment. 
Specifically, public sector actors were to use land to lever investment and steer the 
development process. After the downturn of the national economy in 2008, and the 
reduced demand for housing and commercial properties, the public land 
development model lost its effectiveness. Stadshaven project actors consistently 
referred to this as the ‘old model’ (Interviews 1, 2,6,7,9,10,11,12,14). One area planner 
commented:
Stadshaven is really thinking about how new developments will happen and not 
based on the traditional way where government made everything happen. And 
that is the challenge today, especially in this economic climate where we are in 
the economic crisis that we are facing right now. (Interviewee 2) 
 They contrasted this with the concept of a ‘new model,’ in which the public 
sector assumes a facilitating role and leaves most of the investment to the private 
sector. This shift from government as the driver of the development agenda to 
facilitator is pivotal and represents what some actors described as a fundamental 
“paradigm shift” (Interviewees 14, 7), which also includes moving from large-scale 
comprehensive development planning to incremental development based on a 
small-scale format (Interviewees 7, 10). 
 In 2008, changes to the Spatial Planning Act gave municipalities new legal 
powers to recover the costs of public works. Despite these new formal rules, which 
provide alternatives to a risk-oriented planning model, most municipalities continued 
to use the public land development model (van der Krabben and Jacobs 2013). The 
perception that few options were available to facilitate investment in Stadshaven 
illustrates the organizational logic (Keskitalo et al. 2011) and norms behind the 
original planning approach, which was that  the public sector would drive 
development. Without the apparent means to deliver this planning vision, one actor 
noted, the development program would become more commercial: 
…the one who pays decides…[so] if your role is shifting from the necessity of 
not having the financial resources, you are not in the driver’s seat…you have to 
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loosen up a little, more than a little bit, in terms of what you can demand from 
market parties, in terms of quality, the specific requirements of what you would 
prefer to see happen in a certain area. (Interviewee 1)
 
According to this interviewee, despite the existence of a regulatory framework 
compelling market players to finance the costs of public goods (including climate 
adaptation measures) using cost-recovery mechanisms, Stadshaven planners do 
not have the degree of influence they once had. The implication is that investments 
would be required to demonstrate added value as recognized by the market, and 
such benefits would be extracted according their market value. Thus, investment 
would be based on the objectives of market players, and might or might not align 
with the broader public policy objectives. Van der Krabben and Jacobs (2013) 
referred to this problem as the ‘two hats dilemma’ that Dutch municipalities often 
face, i.e. the dilemma between achieving spatial planning goals or favouring 
economic considerations. 
 This shift in practice represents a change in the governance process: away 
from a “command and control” model (Interviewee 9) toward a new model in which 
the government must  achieve public policy goals without providing financial resources 
(Interviewees 9, 11, 12); in other words, from a supply-oriented model to a demand- 
driven model. This shift is exemplified by how planning actors are now approaching 
the overall timing of the development process. Rather than a stepwise systematic 
implementation process, the strategy is now to facilitate a slow transformation by 
working with existing businesses and strategically attracting new businesses in an 
incremental process (Interviewees 2, 3). Project actors were anxious about applying 
a new model, but rewriting the institutional rules for planning and land development 
offered an appealing opportunity (Interviewee 6, 9) for organizational and individual 
ingenuity (Interviewee 6). Lowndes referred to this as “....a critical opening for 
creativity and agency to establish new precedents for action” (2009, 12).
 
5.1.3 Climate Adaptation as a Market Opportunity: Ideas, values, influences
Its adaptation to climate change marks Stadshaven, and Rotterdam more generally, 
as a leader in innovation. The overall vision is to reposition Rotterdam’s negative 
image as a working-class port city. According to one senior policy adviser,  local 
politicians exploited this reputation to attract subsidies from the national government. 
This tactic made the city dependent on funds from the national government and 
was a strategy that was counter-productive to attracting investors (Interviewee 6). 
Conversely, other interviewees (Interviewees 1, 4,6,7, 8, 9,14) commented that the 
new focus on climate adaptation, including high-profile pilot projects such as floating 
communities, the Rotterdam Climate Campus, and the RDM Campus, will help 
Rotterdam develop a more positive image. One senior policymaker said: 
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Rotterdam is really reframing it as a chance and if we can find the technical 
solutions then we are going to export them all over the world …everybody is 
coming to Rotterdam to see how we do it. (Interviewee 8)
The Stadshaven project is based on the assumption that climate adaptation is vital 
to sustainable development and a prosperous economic future (Interviewee 1). By 
signalling its commitment to climate adaptation, the objective is to attract long-term 
investors for various commercial opportunities. Rather than generating fears related 
to water safety issues, which could cause global and national investors to invest in 
other major ports like  Hamburg and Antwerp, the focus is on technological innovation 
and planning foresight (Interviewees 1, 6). Therefore, adaptation to climate change is 
linked with broader values associated with a strong economy, local employment, 
and the city’s international reputation as a pioneer in technological innovation.
 Development of the Rotterdam climate adaptation policy framework is ongoing. 
A number of showcase projects are currently underway, but it is still unclear how 
climate adaptation fits into spatial planning processes and what  identification of 
concrete actions are needed to address specific issues, such as urban heat island 
effects (Interviewees 7, 8). According to one development manager, the focus on 
creative and innovative strategies has generated “…all sorts of measures, but they 
have not yet made a plan on how we do it” (Interviewee 3). Rather than providing 
details for implementation, the policy vision is a broad strategic document that has 
played an important function in building intra-organizational support (Interviewee 8). 
It is a formal way to collect inter-departmental information about how the policy could 
be operationalized, based on input from various city departments and stakeholders, 
and connected to other processes. This strategy was developed based on the 
general consensus among policymakers that climate adaptation does not have 
enough substance or urgency as a standalone issue (Interviewees 8, 11). It has 
evolved into a process-oriented activity based on consultation and building 
relationships and support for the strategy (Interviewees 7, 8). Policymakers now 
recognize that this process has been fundamental to building legitimacy and 
clarifying how the strategy could be embedded into a large complex organization. In 
other words,  the policy-making process began as a lineal exercise to determine the 
costs and benefits of adapting to climate change, and has evolved into an 
organizational learning process, showing how governance can help build consensus 
and address differences between organizational actors. This intra-organizational 
incremental strategy runs parallel to the high-profile pilot projects (e.g., floating 
communities) and external international communication and networking efforts. 
Thus, external and internal organizational dynamics are functioning simultaneously, 
which informs the institutional platform and, in turn, the governance process. 
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5.1.4 Playing with the Rules
The Stadshaven Structure Vision was jointly prepared by the City of Rotterdam and 
the Port of Rotterdam and was approved in 2011. The Structure Vision (structuurvisie) 
defines the strategic planning vision and sets out the general policy underpinnings; 
this is joined by a legally binding land use plan (bestemmingsplan). The Structure 
Vision and the land use plan for each area of the precinct (not all of the land plans are 
finalized) do not yet contain revised local safety standards or specific benchmarks 
related to climate change have (Interviewees 4, 7, 8). This is not surprising, because 
the target for finalizing the Rotterdam Adaptation Strategy is sometime in 2013, but it 
is interesting that in contrast to most climate adaptation studies, which identify the 
need for new tools to bridge the implementation gap, a consistent theme is emerging 
among project actors: the idea that new regulations are not required to implement 
adaptation. Instead, the focus is on mainstreaming climate adaptation objectives into 
existing sectoral practices, such as water and spatial planning (Interviewee 8). 
Interviewees argued that the existing spatial planning framework, including the structure 
vision, zoning, and environmental impact assessment, is sufficient, and all that is 
really required is broadening the scope of the existing mechanisms (Interviewees 3, 
8, 4). Interviews revealed three main themes. First, existing mechanisms are not 
being maximized and more creativity is required to use the available legal means 
(Interviewees 4, 8). Second, too many inflexible regulations are already in place, 
making it difficult to advance spatial planning goals, and adding more regulations 
would widen the implementation gap (Interviewees 3, 5, 8, 10). Third, incentives to 
encourage developers, such as fast-tracking approvals and allowing more building 
density, would be more effective than new regulations (Interviewees 1, 6). One senior 
policy advisor stated that “positive sanctions” and “voluntary compliance” through 
negotiation would be more effective than “command and control” approaches 
(Interviewee 6). A lack of support for conformance-oriented solutions was also 
evidenced by the interest in developing performance-based criteria, wherein 
development projects would be required by regulations to attain a certain level of 
performance, e.g., in relation to on-site water management or heat comfort, but 
without the local authority specifying the types of interventions. The practical 
challenge at the moment is that no accepted performance indicators in relation to 
climate change are available (Interviewees 6, 8). 
 The next section will move from a meso-level analysis to a micro-level analysis 
by focusing on the small residential village of Heijplaat, in the Waalhaven area of 
Stadhaven. 
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5.2 Heijplaat: Planning a climate-resilient neighbourhood
Most of the houses in the village of Heijplaat are owned by a social housing 
corporation, Woonbron. When Woonbron indicated their intention to demolish 200 
dwellings and redevelop the southern half of the village, the City of Rotterdam set the 
following condition of approval: the applicant must increase the height of the 
development site by 1 metre, which would also require replacing all underground in-
frastructures. The rationale behind this requirement was that the area is located in a 
flood-prone zone. City staff took into consideration future climate risks associated 
with rising sea levels, more intense rainfall, and increased discharge of water from 
rivers (Arcadis 2012), but lacking local benchmarks, adopted provincial standards 
based on water risk standards that are applied to areas that are located inside of dike 
protected areas. 
 The cost of increasing the height of the land was estimated at €5.6 million; 
Woonbron dismissed the approach as financially unfeasible and argued that 
increasing the height of the land was an unjustified strategy that was disproportion-
ate to the estimated damage that might be caused by nuisance flooding events 
(Interviewee 13). Woodbron also argued that the height difference between the 
redeveloped area (intended for ownership housing) and the abutting lower-income 
rental housing could emphasize differences in the community and drive a social 
wedge between residents (Interviewee 13). The next section focuses on the 
governance process and how traditional planning instruments were used, which 
included the use of market contracts. 
5.2.1 Experimenting within Institutional Parameters
In March 2011, the village of Heijplaat was designated as a pilot project for a cli-
mate-adaptive building strategy. The strategy was based on a multi-dimensional 
approach to flood risk management, to limit flooding events, reduce damage, and 
promote recovery (Arcadis 2012). Flooding in the area is not considered to be 
life-threatening; it is expected to cause modest physical damage and neighbourhood 
inconvenience. Reconceptualizing the main issue from safety to nuisance/
inconvenience opened up space to experiment with other solutions based on 
tolerance and acceptance of living with water (Interviewees 8, 13). The revised plan 
will improve the projected flood risk of 1:10 years to 1:250 and 1:4000 years by using 
a resilient building-design approach: the average height of the land will remain at 3.0 
NAP6  but the flood risk impact will be reduced by introducing measures to limit 
damage. For example, building facades must be water-proofed to a height of 3.60 
NAP, and utility connections within the houses must be located at 3.90 NAP. 
6 A NAP [Normaal Amsterdams Peil] of ‘0’ is the average sea level of the North Sea, which is a 
topographical reference point used in the Netherlands.
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Regulations also specify a climate-resilient public space and flood-proof roads and 
sidewalks, ensuring the neighbourhood is resilient to water infiltration, rather than 
fortified against it (Interviewee 13). The physical plan will be supported by a 
communication strategy to improve awareness about flood risks and develop 
evacuation and recovery plans. The revised plan for the village is currently in its final 
stage of approval. It includes various points of departure from conventional practice, 
while still remaining within the realm of traditional planning. For example, the plan 
must ensure adherence to water safety standards from the EU, national and provincial 
governments, and the City of Rotterdam. It is part of the Stadhaven Structure Vision, 
providing a localized solution within a broader framework.
 The Heijplaat case illustrates how local governance and institutional actors can 
affect how formal rules are applied, and help devise responses that are based on 
local values and ideas. This kind of solution is linked with an evolution in thinking 
about the climate-adaptation policy-making process. One interviewee said: 
… first we said ‘no wet feet’ and then we thought, well maybe in some locations, 
wet feet are not that bad and maybe measures to avoid wet feet are so extremely 
expensive that maybe we should change our way of thinking [and] change our 
way of looking at water, water annoyance, and accept some water on the street 
once in awhile. [It is] a kind of calculated risk…and it was kind of a paradigm 
shift. Dealing with wet feet isn’t the ultimate goal anymore. (Interviewee 8)
 
While this kind of resilience-based approach requires more tolerance about potential 
water intrusion, it is an alternative to the original idea, which would have led to a 
difference in elevation between higher- and lower-income residents.  This example 
also demonstrates the critical need to incorporate formal regulatory requirements 
along with less-structured negotiation processes. The City of Rotterdam used 
provincial flood height benchmarks (Interviewee 13), and simultaneously 
demonstrated willingness to experiment by reconsidering the initial requirements. 
This enabled a mutually beneficial process: the social housing organization was able 
to proceed with the development application, and the City of Rotterdam was able to 
improve the flood plan and reduce the vulnerability of the village. 
 Heijplaat is a small-scale example of how evolving perspectives about tolerance 
to water intrusion could be implemented in practice (Interviewee 8). Unlike other 
stalled development projects, it provided an opportunity to create a balance between 
spatial planning goals, climate adaptation objectives, and the interests of different 
stakeholders (Interviewee 3) – whether it is successful remains to be seen. In the 
short term, the market risk rests with the housing corporation, in relation to the market 
value of the land, and the degree to which the explicit climate risk claims in planning 
documents and sales contracts negatively affect the project. In the long term, the 
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climate risk rests with residents, in relation to the performance of the design 
specifications and whether occasional inconvenience due to nuisance flooding is 
acceptable. 
6.0 Conclusions 
This research explored how innovative practices can develop from existing 
mechanisms, and the degree to which new processes and mechanisms need to be 
included in the planning and land development process to facilitate investment in 
climate adaptation at the local level. The findings revealed the innovative potential of 
legal rules (van Rijswick and Salet 2012), and also that innovative practice is enabled 
by the dynamics and interplay between the institutional platform and governance 
process. For example, the Heijplaat case involved typical stimuli (political support, 
internal champions, problem awareness) as well as a number of barriers that can act 
as major impediments to climate adaptation implementation (lack of financing, a 
weak formal policy framework). Stakeholders overcame these barriers using existing 
mechanisms and processes: they found solutions in the soft-spot created by shifting 
modes of practice, a broad agreement about the value of climate adaptation to 
Rotterdam, and emerging norms about tolerance to water. This soft-spot, along with 
the application of ‘rules-in-use’ and ‘rules-in-form,’ indicates that existing mechanisms 
have a degree of adaptive capacity. One senior policy said, “…I think it is more the 
way we use the rules and tools and the cultural change than that we have to 
dramatically change the rules and tools” (Interviewee 6). Thus, cultural changes can 
enable or constrain organizational actors. From an institutional perspective, this 
finding illustrates the tension between informal and formal rules that inform practice, 
and are, in turn, informed by actions in practice. The policymaking and implementation 
process is iterative, and innovation occurs through building consensus, addressing 
conflicts, and utilizing mechanisms to (slowly) achieve collectively agreed-upon 
objectives in relation to climate change. 
 The findings also revealed that stakeholders do not support new formal 
mechanisms, such as regulations and additional requirements. The general 
reluctance about new regulations reflects a dynamic within Dutch planning: on the 
one hand, there is the desire to open spaces to establish new forms of action 
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010); and on the other hand, conventional Dutch planning 
culture tends to straddle between a plan-led and a development-led approach. The 
latter has provided Dutch planners with a degree of steering capacity (Buitelaar and 
Sorel 2010) to achieve spatial planning objectives. In the context of adapting to 
climate change, project actors are unsure of what types of concrete measures are 
required and how much investment is needed (Interviewees 3, 4, 7, 8). The desire to 
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steer the process is illustrated by the general perception that adaptation 
implementation will be encouraged by allowing room for reinterpretation of the 
existing framework – as opposed to additional regulations. This finding also suggests 
that project actors are unclear about what additional rules are needed to propel 
concrete actions. Instead, they are developing a shared understanding and a set of 
normative rules as a precursor to introducing formal regulatory actions. 
 The focus on Rotterdam’s high-profile climate adaptation initiatives and as a 
technical  innovator, draws attention away from the governance-related insights that 
can be gained. Although the Stadshaven project is benefitting from freedom to 
experiment, Rotterdam’s planning actors are constrained by the same factors that 
other Dutch planners face: reduced financial resources and a shifting role of the 
public sector in spatial planning. Moreover, for other municipalities that are developing 
an adaptation strategy and wondering how to implement policy ambitions, we learn 
that Rotterdam is also continuing to define the implementation pathway. The Stadshaven 
case provides informative evidence about the role of the governance process: it is 
not simply a means of system coordination and does not exist in isolation from 
institutional norms and values; it also provides a space for innovation, which can 
contribute towards reducing the financial gap associated with climate adaptation.
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Abstract
The aim of the chapter is to assess the institutional (mis)fit of tax increment financing 
for the Dutch spatial planning financial toolkit. By applying an institutionally oriented 
assessment framework, we analyze the interconnectivity of Dutch municipal finance 
and spatial planning structures and practices. Empirical findings from the case study 
highlight several insights: 1) application of TIF would be more constrained by socio- 
political than technical dimensions; 2) such an instrument may not achieve the policy 
goal of shifting financial risk away from local government given the corporatist 
 characteristics of Dutch planning culture; and 3) despite apparent institutional space 
to consider alternative instruments, enduring norms tend to be resistant to change.
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1.0 Introduction: Policy context
In the Netherlands local government has historically played a central role in the 
physical planning process, including land acquisition, site preparation, and public 
infrastructure provision.  Following World War II, the public land development model 
became the cornerstone of the Dutch spatial planning and development process. By 
acting as an active player in the land market, municipalities were able to embed and 
recover the costs of local public infrastructure, such as underground infrastructure 
and utilities, and parks and play areas in the land price (Lowe, van der Krabben, & 
Priemus, 2003). However, even before the recent economic crisis in 2008, the 
financial risk and steering role in the process taken by municipalities was in question 
(van der Valk, 2002). Moreover, despite changes to the Spatial Planning Act in 2008, 
designed to encourage greater involvement in land development by market-players, 
municipalities continued to participate as active players themselves (Halleux, 
Marcinczak, & van der Krabben, 2012; Needham, 2007).  As a supply-led model, 
Janssen-Jansen argues that due to the substantial revenues municipalities were 
able to realize,  over-zealous participation in the land market  has resulted in a 
distorted real estate market2 and oversupply of offices (Janssen-Jansen, 2012). 
 The degree of financial risk and substantial land holdings held by municipalities 
has been widely reported and criticized in the media since 2008. Discussions have 
since ensued about alternative models and consideration of instruments that do 
not rely on growth nor are driven by the public sector. Numerous studies have been 
commissioned by the national government, including a website hosted by the 
National Office for Entrepreneurial Netherlands called the Financial Structure 
Toolbox3 and reports by consultancies and research institutes (ECORYS, 2010; 
Heijkers, van der Velden, & Wassenberg 2012; Ministry, VNG, & NEPROM, 2009; 
Planbureau, 2014; Planbureau & Urhahn, 2012; VROM, 2010) that identify planning 
and financial instruments from other countries as possible tools in the Netherlands to 
stimulate investment and broader participation from market players in the planning 
and development process (Heurkens, 2012; van der Krabben & Needham, 2008). 
The range of possible instruments tend to be reviewed based on general character-
istics and possible regulatory restrictions. The analyses often lack a full account of 
the wider  institutional context, which would include both legal and socio-political 
considerations. The analyses also tend not to identify more general limitations that 
municipalities may face in relation to operationalising the majority of financing 
instruments. Constraints may extend beyond regulatory issues, such as limited local 
2 A 2014 Urban Land Institute real estate report also states that the substantial oversupply and high 
vacancy rates on the office market (at 18%) has made Amsterdam an unattractive location for investors.
3 www.rvo.nl/onderwerpen/innovatief-ondernemen/innovatiefinanciering/toolbox-financierings-
constructies
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knowledge and financial resources that are often needed in order to  lever alternative 
funding sources (ie such as different bonds products in the private market). Finally, 
little attention is given to cultural matters, such as norms and values, that play a role 
in defining policy instrument selection.  The latter consideration is particularly 
important when considering instruments from other countries, which have their own 
particular policy context. 
 Tax increment financing (TIF), commonly used by North-American cities, has 
also been cited as a possible mechanism for Dutch municipalities (Heurkens, 2012; 
L. Janssen-Jansen, G. Lloyd, D.  Peel, & E. van der Krabben, 2012; Offerman & van 
de Velde, 2004), however, few studies have analyzed the use of TIF in the Netherlands 
from an institutional perspective. Research about TIF in the Netherlands generally 
focuses on four themes: firstly, identification of generic technical features; secondly, 
the degree to which the mechanism is a sufficient incentive to draw private investment, 
given the public-sector  driven nature of land development in the Netherlands 
(Heurkens, 2012); thirdly, the inherent risks involved in relying on projected market 
growth (Janssen-Jansen, 2012); and, fourthly, more broad criticisms related to the 
purpose of property taxes, e.g., the argument that property taxes are meant to 
function as a modest buffer to fill budget gaps left by inefficient distribution of transfer 
payments from the national government (L. Janssen-Jansen, G. Lloyd, D. Peel, & E. 
van der Krabben, 2012). These points touch on conventional issues (pro’s/con’s) 
associated with TIF, but taken separately we do not get robust understanding about 
the degree to which TIF is a potential institutional fit, considering technical, social, 
and political dimensions inherent in policy instrument selection. 
 Against this background, this paper explores tax increment financing (TIF) as a 
potential financial instrument to facilitate investment in localized public infrastructure4, 
as an alternative and/or in conjunction with existing physical planning instruments in 
the land development process conventionally used in the Netherlands. Needham 
makes a distinction between physical instruments and financial instruments (1982) 
that can be used to influence the development process. The former type of instrument 
acts on land and buildings in relation to development approval and building 
processes and the latter, as described by Needham, “...acts directly upon the 
financial circumstances within which people make decisions” (1982, p. 4). Particular 
types of measures include grants, taxes, and levies.  Using this typology we 
understand TIF to be a financing instrument that can be used by local authorities to 
4 Investments include conventional urban infrastructure for such things as water supply, sanitation, and 
solid waste management (Alm 2013) as well as new investments and new types of physical public 
infrastructure that might be needed to deal with the adverse effects of climate change, such as 
permeable pavement, renewal of existing systems to separate storm water and sewage, elevation of 
urban areas, strategically deployed green space and tree planting, additional space for water storage 
and retention, and enhanced above-grade drainage and grading plans (Bobylev, Hunt, Jefferson, & 
Rogers, 2013; Makropoulos & Butler, 2010).
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influence the development process. We categorize tax increment financing 
accordingly because it is an instrument that is designed to capture the expected 
future property tax value increment generated from local area investment, rather than 
(necessarily) utilizing physical instruments such as land acquisition5. 
 TIF is explored in the context of Dutch planning, land development, and the 
broader municipal financing system.  There is a substantial body of research to draw 
from in relation to TIF.  The literature tends to offer polarized perspectives about TIF 
(see section 2) that draws attention to the varying applications and diverse 
experiences.  The exploration presented in this paper focuses on TIF as a financial 
instrument, which can be applied and managed well or poorly, and the degree to 
which it is institutionally applicable to the Dutch municipal financing system in relation 
to the socio-political dynamics within the Dutch context. Secondly, integral to 
considering the application of TIF in the Netherlands is the degree to which the use 
of property taxes for localized public infrastructure investments would be supported 
institutionally in terms of structures and norms. Drawing from Alm (2013), we identify 
property taxes as a potential revenue stream for local infrastructure based on  three 
distinct characteristics; first, property taxes are a relatively long-term stable income 
source; second, property taxes provide a degree of local control; and third, it is an 
income stream that tends to focus taxpayers attention to the benefits and costs of 
local service provision.
 The chapter addresses the following inter-connected questions: what are the 
dimensions and dilemmas of directing income from property taxes to support 
investment in area specific public infrastructure?  Beyond technical considerations, 
what institutional considerations are involved in relation to operationalising tax 
increment financing in the Netherlands? The remainder of this paper is structured in 
six sections. We begin with a  brief description of tax increment financing by 
highlighting the key characteristics of this instrument and the conventional financing 
models typically associated with TIF’s. Given the extensive literature on TIF, the 
purpose of section 2 is not to repeat the debates but rather to summarize the key 
attributes and critiques of this instrument that are often cited. Section 3 and 4 outline 
the methodological approach and introduce the institutionally influenced analytical 
framework that is applied to the case study. In the second half of the paper, we 
present a case study of the Netherlands with a focus on the intersection of Dutch 
municipal financing, spatial planning, and land development structures and 
processes (section 5). In Section 6 the assessment framework is used to analyze the 
potential application of TIF in the Netherlands. The final section provides concluding 
comments and suggestions for future research.
5 This is not to suggest that it is an “either/or” argument as TIF can be used in conjunction with physical 
instruments by local authorities.
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2.0  Tax Increment Financing: a primer
Tax increment financing (TIF) is a bounded value capturing instrument6 designed to 
“earmark the related increment of property tax in a proclaimed area to fund public 
investments” (Alexander, 2012). While the duration varies, a TIF is typically based on 
a 25-year time-span in a prescribed designated community improvement area. It is 
fundamentally premised on the idea that the provision of new infrastructure in the 
designated area will increase property values. Additionally, the future incremental 
property tax value can be captured and redirected to finance area-specific public 
infrastructure investments (Briffault, 2010). The policy rationale for creating a TIF 
district is based on the ‘but for’ test, i.e., private sector investment would not occur or 
it would not occur in a planned way within an acceptable timeframe, if it were not for 
government intervention and use of public resources (Squires, 2012).
 TIF originated in California in 1952 and is now widely used in most American 
states to address stalled local area investment (Lefcoe, 2011). It has also been 
adopted in major Canadian cities within the last ten years and more recently in the 
UK, where the explicit  objective was to increase autonomy and provide a range of 
revenue generating tools at the local level (Squires & Lord, 2012). Financial risk 
represents a substantial issue for municipalities that create a TIF designation area. 
The degree of financial risk is connected to the financing strategy, which generally 
involves one of three approaches (Pricewaterhouse Cooper, 2008): 
1) Market-Backed:
 a.   Revenue Bonds: the municipality issues bonds secured against the projected 
tax increment. Revenue bonds can be used wherein the city and taxpayers 
are not at risk if TIF revenue is less because bond purchasers shoulder the 
risk.
 b.   Developer-Funded: the developer borrows to provide the initial capital. The 
municipality then reimburses the developer using the actual tax increment 
which the developer uses to repay its borrowing. This method shifts the risk 
from the municipality to the developer.
2) Municipality-Backed:
 a.   General Obligation (GO) Bonds: like revenue bonds, the municipality issues 
bonds secured against the projected tax increment but the financial risk is 
backed by the municipality’s general revenue; which means if the TIF revenue 
is less than expected, the financial risk rests with the municipality. 
6 Value capturing tools are described as “…a group of instruments that enable the increased value of 
land and property as a result of public investments……to be captured directly or indirectly, so that 
it [the value] can be used for financing the activities that are responsible for the increased value” 
(van der Krabben, 2008, p. 654) e.g. to finance those parts of the plan that are not cost effective 
(Priemus, 2007).
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 b.   The municipality borrows using bank financing to provide the initial capital. 
The authority then repays its borrowing from the actual tax increment.
These conventional TIF financing models illustrate different risk management 
strategies that can be utilized. According to Kitchen (2006),  in principle, revenue 
bonds can be used to fund infrastructure if the investment generates a revenue 
stream back to the bond (such as water, sewer levies, or in the case of TIF, property 
taxes). The risk of using this type of bond may be expensive “… if creditors perceive 
that the revenue stream is a less certain source of revenue when compared with 
general revenues that are backed by general obligation bonds” (Kitchen, 2006). 
Research on tax increment financing in the US has found that municipalities tend to 
take more risk than private sector actors, largely because they are highly motivated 
to stimulate local economic development (Le Roy, 2008). In Canada, municipalities 
have been more risk adverse and often utilize what is referred to as tax rebate 
strategies with developers. For example, in the Province of Ontario this model is 
referred to as a “tax increment equivalent grant”7. In this model, developers take the 
financial risk by advancing the investment and are subsequently reimbursed when 
the future tax value materializes. 
 Tax increment financing is the subject of extensive research that we can draw 
from to consider both the strengths and weaknesses of this instrument. Some 
researchers have identified governance flaws and misuse in relation to public policy 
objectives, resulting in benefits to developers and cross-jurisdictional tax revenue 
absorption issues (Weber, 2003). Others have criticized the degree to which a public 
policy rationale even exists to justify government intervention and the associated 
financial risk or whether expediential investment attracts business or simply displaces 
businesses from one area to another (Chapman & Gorina, 2012; Weber, 2010). The 
degree to which TIF is overused by cash-strapped municipalities is also a major 
issue, given the potential to freeze a percentage of the general tax base for a 
sustained duration (Youngman, 2011).
 On the positive side, other researchers have referred to the instrument’s leveraging 
effect: a TIF designation may send a positive signal to market players, in turn attracting 
private investment in public benefits to support important public policy goals (McGreal, 
Berry, Lloyd, & McCarthy, 2002). By recouping value over time rather than providing tax 
7  In the Province of Ontario, provincial regulation under Section 28 of the Planning Act provides for the 
granting of public resources to private actors. The program uses  property taxes: “A Tax Increment 
Equivalent Grant could be described as financial assistance equal to all  or a portion of the municipal 
property tax increase (increment) following the completion  of a project which has resulted in an 
increase in the assessed value of a property.  Municipalities estimate using a market-base assessed 
value” (www.mah.gov.on.ca/AssetFactory.aspx?did=9077 accessed May 14, 2014). Also see Ministry 
of Municipal Affairs and Housing “Municipal Financing Tools for Planning and Development” available 
at: www.mah.gov.on.ca/Asset674.aspx.
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breaks, which eliminates tax revenue flow, or by adding upfront costs (i.e., fees and 
levies) in the development phase, a TIF can act as a ‘self-financing’ tool for urban 
infrastructure by facilitating efficient use of public resources and enabling local 
control over local resources (Alexander, 2012; Squires & Lord, 2012).
 Rather than attempting to reconcile these positions, this paper rests on the 
assumption that TIF is a financial instrument in which local investment is capitalized 
in the property and the future property tax increment is captured over an extended 
period, thereby involving a degree of cost and benefit distribution between 
contemporary and future users. This mechanism earmarks a revenue stream for 
investment in a range of spatially bounded public investments (underground services, 
brownfield, parks, etc.). Finally, it is a locally-based mechanism embedded within a 
regulatory framework based on defined criteria, public consultation, and approval 
from designated authorities. The degree to which certain TIFs meet or fail to meet 
expectations, or whether TIF districts undertook a thorough risk assessment or 
exemplify sound management and good governance, is an issue for local 
administrators. Here, the relevant issue is the degree to which TIF could potentially 
be used as a new tool in the Dutch financial toolkit. In order to achieve this intention 
an institutionally oriented assessment framework will be applied to the empirical 
findings arising from the case study described in section 5.  
3.0 Methodology  
The Netherlands is a dynamic institutional context within which we can scale the 
analysis of a potential financing mechanism to the local level. In order to address the 
inherent challenge of analyzing the degree to which there is an institutional fit of a 
financial instrument that does not exist in the Netherlands, the research design 
reflects what Needham (1982) cites as an  “empirical exploration” (p.23). For our 
analysis, we used qualitative research methods including semi-structured interviews, 
document analysis (municipal and project policy and programs; local planning and 
land development frameworks; and reports and policy documents related to Dutch 
municipal financing), and a telephone questionnaire, as described below. 
1) From May–October 2013, we administered a nation-wide questionnaire via a 
telephone interview. The request was sent to 43 Dutch municipalities8 from 
8 The municipalities that were asked to participate in the questionnaire are all members of an organization 
called Platform 31. Members of this organization are, according to the organization’s website, “...actively 
involved in the development of the city and region” (www.platform31.nl/partners). The members include 22 
of the 25 largest Dutch municipalities (Central Bureau of Statistics http://www.cbs.nl). 
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which 34 senior municipal tax officials agreed to participate (79% participation 
rate). At the time of the interviews, all participating municipalities were, or had 
been, engaged in redevelopment initiatives. The purpose of the questionnaire 
was threefold: 1) to determine whether any of the municipalities applied expected 
future property tax value increment in redevelopment project budgets; 2) to 
assess how they perceived the role of property taxes; and 3) whether they were 
knowledgeable about TIF. The questionnaire was not intended to determine 
whether respondents considered TIF to be applicable to the Netherlands. 
Because few empirical data are available about whether Dutch municipalities 
use property tax income as means to invest in local public infrastructure, the 
results of the questionnaire provide an important benchmark by confirming 
conventional practices and the unique use of the projected future property tax 
increment by the City of Nijmegen (see section 5). 
2)  Between December 2012 and January 2013, we conducted six in-depth 
semi-structured interviews (each lasting 1-1.5 hours) with senior public officials 
in the national government, with researchers including economists, financial 
experts in academia, and those in the banking sector. Questions focused on the 
technical and socio-political dimensions of Dutch municipal financing, 
specifically key sources of municipal income, limitations and degree of flexibility 
in the use of property taxes, approval requirements, and financing strategies 
(especially municipal borrowing and risk assessment practices). Questions 
about the socio-political dimensions focused on the debates associated with 
the Municipal Fund (see section 5), such as the role of property taxes, the tension 
between decentralization and the desire for local autonomy, and the reve-
nue-generating mechanisms that are currently available. Interviewees were also 
provided with a description of TIF and asked to comment, based on their 
expertise, whether the mechanism would be constrained by technical and so-
cio-political issues. 
 3)  Between December 2012 and April 2013, we conducted a detailed study of the 
Nijmegen Waalfront redevelopment project in which, uniquely for the 
Netherlands, the City of Nijmegen uses projected future property tax increment. 
Four interviews were conducted. Two senior project tax officials, a planning 
economist, and a project director were interviewed about the technical and so-
cio-political dimensions related to the use of future property tax increment in the 
Waalfront redevelopment budget. They were asked about the underlying 
rationale, the original approval, the administration process, and the current 
status. They were also asked to comment on how property taxes are 
conventionally used and the relationship to the Municipal Fund system. The 
findings initially suggested that the City of Nijmegen was an exception, given the 
deviation from the norm with respect to the use of property taxes, but more 
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careful analysis revealed that it should be more accurately identified as what 
Gerring (2007) referred to as an ‘influential case’ with respect to case selection: 
it is a “case that proves the rule” (p.108) because it substantiates the role of 
broader institutional norms and values, despite the apparent atypical local 
practices. 
We identified key individuals from the policy documents and identified interviewees 
using snowball sampling (Farquharson, 2005). The interviews were transcribed and 
coded using qualitative data-analysis software (NVivo). Key themes were identified 
and the themes were further narrowed using the conceptual framework described in 
section 4. The data from the multiple interviews provided a solid basis for us to 
contrast and compare the differences and similarities in viewpoints to generate a 
robust understanding about the institutional contexts and the evolving norms and 
principles in relation to public municipal finance, and to assess the potential and 
applicability of TIF as a mechanism to facilitate investment in localized public infra-
structure in the Netherlands.
 To address the research questions, the next section describes the assessment 
framework that was used to analyze the case study. 
Table 1  Interview List
Interviewee  
Nr. Reference
Sector and Job Position Date Interviewed
1 Economist, Academia Dec.  6, 2012
2 Senior Bank Sector Representative Dec.  11, 2012
3 Senior Official Ministry, National Government Dec.  13, 2012
4 Financial Director, NGO Dec. 13, 2012
5 Senior  Municipal Tax Official Dec.  17, 2012
6 Senior Municipal Tax Official Dec.  17, 2012
7 Economist, National Research Institute Jan.  8, 2013
8 Municipal  Planning Economist Jan.  28, 2013
9 Private Planning Consultant April 14, 2013
10 Municipal  Development Director April 19, 2013
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4.0  Conceptual Approach 
4.1 Institutions: Structures and Norms
We began with the conceptual approach that institutions are important to public 
finance and spatial planning given formal institutions structure access to resources 
and provide a degree of agency that is exerted by actors in how rules are applied. 
According to Fischel  (2000), property taxes cannot be examined in isolation from the 
institutional context, i.e., the municipal setting is dependent on it as a source of 
income. Similarly, according to Alexander (2005), for spatial planners, “…all planning 
takes place within a specific institutional context or often in sets of different and 
varying ‘nested’ institutional contexts as indeed do all societal activities” (p.210). 
Institutions embody what North referred to as the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990) in 
terms of the dynamic process of how people interpret and use rules, norms, and 
practices – written and unwritten, formal and informal, explicit and tacit  (van Hal & 
van Bueren, 2012). Institutions are often described as either formal or informal: formal 
institutions are generally understood as government rules that are enforced by the 
legal system and are expressed as  laws, constitutions, ordinances, and local 
land-use plans. Informal institutional rules are less explicit and emerge via repetition 
and solidification of behaviour through perceptions, values, beliefs, and norms 
(Buitelaar, Galle, & Sorel, 2011). Together formal and informal institutional rules 
interact and ultimately shape actions and behaviours of organizations and individuals. 
The interaction is dynamic and creates the conditions (constraints and opportunities) 
that organizations and actors must negotiate on a perpetual basis to achieve their 
objectives (Lowndes, 2005). Metaphorically, organizations and individual actors are 
players within a larger game with implicit and explicit rules that evolve over time 
(Lowndes, 2009; Root, van der Krabben, & Spit, 2014) .  A dynamic tension exists 
between the technical and socio-political institutional rules: they are not static and 
evolve through endless tinkering and manipulation (Buitelaar, Lagendijk, & Jacobs, 
2007) . By highlighting the role of institutional norms and values, the analysis of TIF’s 
deviates from a purely technical analysis. Our assessment focuses on the relative 
importance of the socio-political context that shapes, and is shaped by, the social 
norms and values and modes of practice, and in turn shapes the formal structural 
components that regulate decisions – in this case, the coupling of municipal public 
finance and spatial planning in the Netherlands.
4.2  Types of Governance: 
The theoretical aim of this research is to gain a deeper understanding about the 
normative underpinnings of the institutional system (Pierre, 2011) that structure and 
inform municipal investments in localized public infrastructure in the Netherlands. We 
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cannot advance the analysis without explicitly considering governance and how it is 
conceptualized in this research.  In our analysis the concept of governance is 
conceived as both a binder and an embodiment of the complex interactions between 
formal and informal rules (Root et al., 2014). Similarly, as Lowndes argues (2009), 
governance should not be reduced to a technical problem of ‘system coordination’ 
as a means to improve implementation processes. Governance is a complex 
process, which involves building consensus and engaging in arenas that have 
diverse and conflicting interests as a means to gain consent to carry out objectives 
(de Alcantara, 1998). Birkman et al. (2010) described governance as the way in which 
actors and organizations interface and use mechanisms to articulate their interests, 
exercise their legal rights, and mediate their differences. Thus, institutions may 
constrain or enable actors in the governance process to manage conflicting agendas 
and to set priorities. 
Pierre (2011) argues that governance takes a number of forms. In doing so, the form 
of  governance provides substantial information about objectives and the goals of 
municipalities as well as “…the key constituencies sustaining governance [and the] 
institutions created to pursue the governance objectives” (p.25). In the Netherlands, 
policy-making and decision-making is often described as being based on the ‘polder 
model’, which is uniquely Dutch in title and culturally specific with its consensus style 
 decision-making. Pierre distinguishes between four models of governance9. In the 
interest conserving space, we limit the description of the typology to the model that 
is the most useful to our assessment framework: the corporatist model of governance, 
which provides a close characterization of Dutch consensus-style of planning 
governance (van der Valk, 2002).  According to Pierre’s analytical typology of 
governance models, the defining feature of the corporatist model is the significant 
involvement of civil society organizations both in urban politics and in relation to 
involvement in the delivery of public policy objectives (p.49). The degree of social 
organization and involvement in influencing decision-making and shaping policy 
preferences at the local level characterizes this model. While the model has a range 
of attributes, the salient feature is the degree to which this type of governance is 
driven by what Pierre refers to as the “...distributive aspects of urban politics” (p.57). 
This aspect of corporatist governance means that “...maintaining fiscal discipline 
often becomes a significant problem. In other to achieve compromises which are 
acceptable to all major represented interests, public spending frequently tends to 
exceed what is financially possible...” (p.65). This aspect of the corporatist governance 
model is insightful because it contributes to our analysis about the applicability of TIF 
9 Pierre (2011) identifies four analytical types of urban governance models: Managerial, Corporatist, 
Pro-growth, and Welfare governance. 
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in the Netherlands. More particularly, if applied in the Netherlands we might expect 
that municipalities to continue to take a risk position due in part to the durability of 
norms and values, and how such norms and values are operationalized and 
replicated structurally. In other words, understanding the configuration of the Dutch 
planning and public finance governance tells us why the application of property 
taxes (a seemingly modest proposal) is complex and why the answer to the 
applicability of tax increment financing is connected to a larger institutional system. 
We turn now to the case study. We begin with a more in-depth characterization of 
Dutch planning and land development practice than provided in section 1 as the 
central backdrop for the analysis of the case study. The subsequent two sections 
focus on the empirical findings prior to the assessment on the applicability and 
limitation of tax increment financing in the Netherlands.
5.0  The Netherlands: Intersection of municipal 
financing, planning, and land  development
5.1 Dutch Planning and Development Practice 
As a mode of practice that is enabled by formal and informal institutions, the public 
land development model may have influenced Dutch planning culture10 insofar as 
there is an assumption that local municipal government has a duel role: to control 
the planning and land development process and to steer the process to achieve 
planning objectives  (Buitelaar & Sorel, 2010). Responding to the housing shortage 
after World War II, municipalities proactively serviced land in order to facilitate the 
building process (Needham, 2007). Leväinen and Korthals-Altes (2005) note that 
municipalities considered that “…it was their duty to supply serviced land as it was 
needed” (p.140). The original focus on housing supply evolved into a conventional 
approach to direct, control and heavily intervene in the land development process by 
assembling land, undertaking the servicing, and ultimately selling the lots to 
developers, for both commercial, industrial, and residential purposes (Buitelaar et al., 
2011; van der Krabben & Jacobs, 2013). The perceived advantage of this model is 
that it has provided a substantial amount of public control to achieve spatial planning 
goals, as well as an approach that has delivered a range of public goods, from 
municipal infrastructure, parks, recreation facilities, and an overall high standard 
within the public realm; this was achieved by levering the residual value through the 
land development process and reinvesting the funds into a range of public 
10 Planning culture can be defined as “…the collective ethos and dominant attitudes of planners regarding 
the appropriate role of the state, market forces, and civil society in influencing social outcomes” 
(Buitelaar & Sorel, 2010) (p.985). 
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infrastructure investments; moreover, when the market was strong, they were able to 
make a profit (van der Krabben & Jacobs, 2013).
 Buitelaar and Sorel argue (2010) that the Dutch planning culture is ambiguous: 
although  formally is it recognized as a plan-led planning model, in practice it has 
more in common with the development-led characterization usually found in the UK 
(Janssen-Jansen & Woltjier, 2010).  As noted in section 1, the vulnerabilities of this 
model have been revealed by the 2008 economic crisis and substantial debate and 
research has been undertaken to consider possible alternatives.  However, mar-
ket-oriented activities undertaken in planning and development processes to finance 
local public goods ambitions are also coupled and enabled by the broader municipal 
financing system. The next section introduces the municipal finance system. 
5.2  Dutch Municipal Finance 
5.2.1 Key Income Sources
The system of government in the Netherlands is characterized as a decentralized 
unitary state (Toonen, 1987). This means that municipalities are responsible for 
administration of local level activities and have relative autonomy in plan-making and 
expenditures. Though municipalities are able to undertake independent initiatives, 
the hierarchy of the central government is  reflected in the financial governance 
structure and distribution system of municipal income (Dussen, 1992). The main 
source of income for municipalities is from the Municipal Fund11, which is managed 
at the national level (M. Allers, 2011).  In 2011, together with general and specific 
grants, that source represented 49% of municipal income. Distribution of funds is 
based on a 60 point equalization formula-based  system, which is, in part, based on 
the local tax base but, more importantly,  based on the actual need of the municipality 
(Interviewees 1 and 6). The formula is a method to allocate the means to municipalities 
throughout the country to provide an equal level of services, yet conceptually 
providing local governments with autonomy in how that is achieved (Boerboom & 
Huigsloot, 2007). The Municipal Fund is a system rooted in socio-political norms 
based on ideas about fairness and equality  (Interviewees 1, 7, 3, 4). As noted, the 
objective of the formula-based approach is to provide financial sources based on 
need and, importantly, based on the available budget; which is to say, all 
municipalities experience a level of grant reduction, or increases, subject to 
availability of resources at the national level. Recently, due to austerity measures at 
the national level less funding is available from the Municipal Fund to deliver the 
same level of programs and services (Interviewees 4 and 1).
11 In Dutch, it is referred to as the ‘Gemeentefonds’.
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At 31%, income from activities in the land market is the second source of municipal 
income (Allers, 2012).  As has been identified in the preceding section, this income 
source has  been profoundly impacted by the economic downturn. In addition to 
modes of practice and planning structures that  use the market to achieve planning 
goals,  easy access to capital by two nationally backed lending institutions12 have 
also enabled municipalities to engage in the land market. In addition to having limited 
restrictions on borrowing, as a financial director of a prominent NGO noted, 
municipalities will call BNG (see footnote 11) “…and  ask for €10M and in two minutes 
they will have €10M” (Interviewee 4),  municipalities have been able to heavily borrow 
and still balance their annual budgets (Interviewee 2). Though Dutch municipalities 
are required by law to balance their internal budgets annually, in practice the accrual 
accounting system has allowed municipalities to carrying debt from year to year 
(Allers & Merkus, 2013). A second structural reason that may have facilitated active 
engagement in the land market is the connection between so-called ‘bail out’ rules 
of the national government and the lending practices of the aforementioned banks. 
The current system was introduced in 1960 by the Financial Relations Act (Wet 
Financiële Verhoudingen). Article 12 of the Act provides for an additional grant from 
the Municipal Fund (not from the national government budget) if a municipality is not 
able to support its debt and is under threat of bankruptcy (Allers & Merkus, 2013). As 
explained by several interviewees, because municipalities are sheltered from 
bankruptcy under Article 12, banks are also protected and willing to provide 
municipalities with access to low cost borrowing. With respect to municipal borrowing, 
project-specific risk assessments are typically not carried out by the lending 
institutions (Interview 2). This structure and practice results in very little incentive and 
experience, given the risk and required expertise, to seek private financing in the 
bond market (Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 7); sharply stated by one interviewee: “..why float a 
bond? There is no need. We have money ‘on tap’”(Interviewee 1). A third element, 
that incentivizes market activities, is that profits derived from market activities are not 
included in the Municipal Fund grant formula; this means that while increases in the 
local tax base can potentially result in less grant funding, municipalities are not 
required to claim land market-based profits in the Municipal Fund formula (Interviewee 1). 
Apart from market activities and intergovernmental grants, Dutch municipalities have 
a modest income stream from taxes, fees, and levies (15% of municipal income). 
Property tax is the largest component of municipal income at approximately 7% (M. 
A. Allers, 2011), which represents only 1.5% of the national tax revenue (Allers et al., 
2013). The Netherlands uses a market assessment system to determine property tax 
payments: in 2013 the national average property tax rate for residential dwellings was 
12 BNG and Waterschapsbank are the two Dutch banks that specialize in loans to local government. 
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0.1% and the non-residential rate was 0.38% (Allers et al., 2013). Although these rates 
are low, municipalities have more freedom to determine how these funds are used 
compared with grants from the Municipal Fund. Municipalities are also able to 
increase the property tax rate independently, without a limit; the only structural 
limitation is set by the national government. In 2008 the national government 
introduced a national ceiling on the total rise in property tax revenues for all 
municipalities; in previous years an absolute cap was imposed on municipalities 
rather than on a national aggregate. As Vermeulen and Allers comment, despite the 
national ceiling being binding, “..paradoxically, however, individual municipalities can 
raise property taxes as much as they like” (Vermeulen & Allers, 2013).  Nonetheless, 
the salient point is that the national government plays a role in defining property tax 
rates and there is a structure in place to keep property taxes low. 
5.2.2 Role of Property Taxes 
As in other European countries, property taxes in the Netherlands are a conventional 
source of income for municipalities. While there is a structural disincentive to raise 
taxes represented in the national ceiling, from a political perspective, politicians in 
the Netherlands, like politicians in other countries (Slack & Bird, 2014), prefer not to 
raise taxes (Interviewee 1, 3). This is particularly true in the Netherlands because 
national-level politics are inextricably linked to municipal politics. One financial 
director from a third section association commented that national politicians are very 
concerned about local taxation rates because if “…municipalities raise the taxes too 
high it will interfere with voters at the national level…” (Interviewee 4). Several 
interviewees noted that reliance on the Municipal Fund also creates a disincentive for 
local politicians to fully utilise taxation mechanisms, including raising property taxes. 
One public finance expert said that it is more expedient to blame the national 
government when funds are insufficient to support local programs and services 
(Interviewee 1). Accordingly, insufficient funding is also a problem for national 
politicians because most Dutch citizens feel that resources should be equally 
distributed between municipalities. As suggested by a financial director, Dutch 
people “….don’t and won’t accept too many differences….everybody from the 
northern part, to the southern part, to the western part should have access to more 
or less the same thing” (Interviewee 4). Another public finance expert said that to 
ensure equity, the formula-based approach is used to equalize potential differences in the 
distribution of Municipal Fund resources (Interviewee 1). The national government’s goal 
is to provide the financial means and sufficient autonomy to local governments to 
achieve service and program objectives based on local circumstances (Boerboom 
& Huigsloot, 2007). Property taxes, therefore, according to a senior ministry official 
and a financial director, are meant to act as a “…buffer to equalize for the small 
problems in the distribution of the [Municipal Funds]” (Interviewee 3) and not to pay 
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for local services (Interviewee 4). More specifically, taxpayers do not make an explicit 
connection between their property taxes and investments in local services. A national 
research institute economist commented that there is “…a path dependence in the 
sense that most of the revenue comes from the central government. People do not 
see the connection between local taxes and local services and there is no willingness 
to change” (Interviewee 7). A senior ministry official said, “…you have to have a big 
change…you have to lose the idea that local taxes are just to close the gap, they 
have to have a much bigger important role in local decision-making.” (Interviewee 3). 
Thus, property taxes play a minor role in the overall municipal financing system while 
the national distribution system plays the primary role.
The disconnect between property taxes and financial support for local area-specific 
infrastructure investments has significant implications for the implementation of TIF. 
The results of our questionnaire conducted with 34 senior municipal tax officials from 
across the country reveal that none of the municipalities used property taxes in a 
manner that reflect a TIF construction. With respect to using property taxes in the 
context of tax increment financing, 56% expressed doubt as to whether it was a 
promising new financing instrument. Reasons cited include: 1) the assertion that 
using property taxes for area specific development purposes is inconsistent with its 
perceived function as an income for general purposes; 2) pre-designating future 
property tax earnings on a multi-year basis reduces flexibility offered by property tax 
income, and; 3) commitment of future revenue represents a financial risk, despite 
the modest income stream generated by property taxes. Respondents identified 
other available instruments to generate local revenue that they preferred: imposing 
fees on outdoor advertising; utilizing business improvement districts, with annual 
levies on local businesses within the designated area; and focusing on cooperation 
with market players, such as real estate developers and social housing corporations. 
Conversely, 44% stated that they were interested in finding out more about tax 
increment financing. According to those respondents, the shift away from land 
development means that alternative ideas and strategies are needed. 
This section has identified the key revenue streams and outlined conventionally 
accepted social-political norms based on ideas about fairness and equality and the 
technical administrative infrastructure that has been developed to support municipal 
financing institutional structures. However, we turn to an example in our case study 
that illustrates how local practitioners and decision-makers utilized the existing rules 
in alternative ways and, as a result, defied accepted norms in relation to property 
taxes.  Its unique application of the expected property tax value increment as a 
component of the redevelopment project budget provides an opportunity to analyse 
the reasons for the decision and the outcomes. 
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5.3  Unconventional Practice: Future property tax increment 
5.3.1 Waalfront Redevelopment Project 
Nijmegen is located on the east side of the Netherlands. In 2003, the City Council 
approved an ambitious plan to redevelop 33 hectares of industrial waterfront lands in 
close proximity to the city centre. In 2007, the redevelopment budget was based on 
profits from the sale of land (49%), external subsidies (21%), and from the city’s own 
budget (18%). The city’s contribution included reallocation of expected grants from 
the national government (10%), an agreement between the political parties with 
respect to internal allocations (2%), and the use of expected income from property 
taxes that would be generated as a result of the redevelopment (6%). The amount of 
future property taxes was capped at €15.7m.  until 2022 (Nijmegen, 2003, 2006a, 
2006b). The use of property taxes was considered unprecedented, particularly 
because the revenue would be directed toward a specific area and earmarked for 
land acquisition and land development costs (Interviewees 5 and 8). 
5.3.2 Key Lessons and Reflections 
Project actors cited three key reasons for why future property taxes were applied to 
the project budget, which can be characterized as typical TIF ‘but-for’ rationales as 
described in section 2. First, the project had to be self-financing because it could not 
rely on the general city budget. The plan was expected to generate new taxes, which 
would be absorbed into the redevelopment budget (Interviewees 5, 6, 8, 10). Project 
planners did not expect general city budget to be impacted because the ‘future’ 
income had not been designated for other programs and services. Accordingly to 
one project tax official, “the mechanism was chosen because the plan generates 
money and it generates taxes, we wanted the plan to finance itself…and that is why 
the [property taxes] are put back into the plan because otherwise it would not be 
finance-able” (Interviewee 6). The degree of political interest to move  the project 
forward, because it was considered an important city-building initiative, was a critical 
factor according to project actors. However, without the property tax increment the 
project would be a “no-go” (Interviewee 8). In short, to balance the budget and 
improve the project’s feasibility, future property tax was identified as the source to 
close the 6% gap. 
The economic downturn profoundly affected the Waalfront project. In 2012, the plan was 
substantially revised in response to the drop in housing demand and the associated 
drop in land prices(Kunst, 2012; Matthieu, 2012; Nijmegen, 2012). The project duration 
was expanded from 2020 to 2030, and the master planning approach that initially 
drove the project evolved into an incremental approach. According to project planners, 
this means that  each project phase will not be advanced until income is available to 
support the project costs (Interviewees 6, 8, 10). Unlike in recent years, when there 
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was political support for debt financing, politicians are no longer willing to absorb 
financial risk (Interviewee 10). Revisions to the development plan have reduced the 
estimated project value due to fewer market housing units and more social rental 
housing units. Project planners anticipate that there will be less revenue to support 
the project’s capital budget and the additional interest costs related to financing land 
and property acquisitions. A project director stated that because there will be “….less 
in quantity in price and value [and because] we have already [budgeted] €15M…we 
will have to donate the €15M but not from the building of houses..but we have to find 
another source…it is a high risk profile”. The City Council subsequently acknowledged 
that substantial project losses are expected, and in November 2013 staff and external 
advisors recommended using funding from the city’s reserve fund (van der Ploeg & 
Bruls, 2013).
The Waalfront case illustrates several key points. First, it is technically and politically 
possible to apply future property tax streams to local redevelopment budgets in the 
Netherlands. However, a decade later the original political perspective has profoundly 
changed. As a planning economist noted in reference to assuming the future 
property tax increment into the project budget, “….nowadays, they say: how is it 
possible that they would have done this?.... now they (politicians) have decided that 
the €15.7 M is the end. We don’t do it again…it is a one-time experience” (Interviewee 8). 
Local politicians have returned to more conventional perspectives regarding the use 
of property taxes, according to municipal officials, because they are not in favour of 
containing revenues generated by property taxes to a specific area, but rather for 
general uses that provide broader benefits (Interviewee 10). At an estimated 6%, the 
use of property taxes was comparatively minor relative to the budgeted revenue of 
49% from land development, yet it is clear that the reliance on real estate performance in 
Dutch spatial planning practice is at a crossroads. The Nijmegen case demonstrates 
that municipal officials did push the parameters of conventional practice, but are 
now returning to conventional practice. The next section applies the assessment 
framework that was introduced in section 4 to address our research questions. 
6.0  Institutional Dimensions: Assessing the potential 
of Tax Increment Financing in the Netherlands
The aim of this chapter was to probe the applicability of TIF in the Netherlands to 
facilitate investment in localized public infrastructure. The approach was to consider 
the interconnectivity between structural issues and the socio-political dynamics that 
may play critical roles in operationalising the mechanism in the Dutch planning 
context. Table 2 focuses on the fundamental issues that either makes TIF an 
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institutional ‘fit’ or ‘misfit’ in relation to application in the Netherlands. The objective is 
not to identify strengths and weaknesses of TIF’s in general, but rather to identify the 
particular institutional characteristics of the Netherlands in relation to TIF as a 
financial instrument for local investment.
The existing planning regulatory framework provides an essential structure to embed 
a TIF approval process. The planning system is understood as legitimate and 
contains pre-existing mechanisms to ear-mark revenue for area specific investments. 
Property taxes are a local revenue that, while modest, are reasonably flexible in 
their usage by municipal decision-makers. Similarly, when considering the socio- 
political dimensions, evidence suggests that the entrepreneurial practices of Dutch 
municipalities, coupled with a proactive perspective regarding the provision of local 
public goods based on activities in the land market, implies that government 
intervention using the market is acceptable. This perspective is fundamental to the 
application of TIF.   
But if we dig deeper, by applying an institutional analysis we see that the applicability 
of TIF in the Netherlands is confronted with both technical and socio-political 
dimensions that may impede its application. Beyond conventional concerns about 
relying on positive real estate performance,  the need for a TIF specific approval 
process/risk assessment framework or the potential risk of burdening future adminis-
trations with debt due to the unrealized tax increment, the low taxation rate is a 
substantial matter particularly given it is constrained politically and structurally. That 
is to say, even though research has found that a TIF designation is an effective device 
to signal government commitment to area investment that can result in economic 
development and increasing property values (Man & Rosentraub, 1998),  the current 
low tax rate limits the application of this mechanism as a significant revenue 
generator.  Secondly, if we consider conventional TIF financing models, which seek 
private financing in the bond market, the market-back models are not likely applicable 
in the Netherlands. As described in section 5, municipalities, generally speaking, are 
able to access low cost financing that is backed by a national guarantee under Article 
12 of the Financial Relations Act.. This is a structural disincentive for municipalities to 
seek more risky, complex, and expensive funds in the private bond market or to 
require, or persuade, market-players to do so.  From a normative perspective, we find 
that there also might be a mismatch between TIF and its use in the Netherlands. 
Property taxes are a minor player insofar as the evidence points to their role as a 
buffer for “soft” programs and services, not “hard” public infrastructure investment in 
a capital plan. In the minds of taxpayers, according to several interviewees 
(Interviewee 1, 4,7), there is a weak connection  between expenditures related to the 
latter investments and local property tax revenue. 
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Table 2   Tax Increment Financing: assessing the applicability for Dutch planning 
and local public infrastructure investment
Institutional Dimensions: Institutional Fit Institutional Misfit
Technical:  
formal dimensions
• Operational
• Regulatory
• Financial
• No restrictions imposed 
on property tax use 
• Existing planning 
process and regulatory 
framework provides basic 
governance/approval 
structure
• Instruments already 
exist (ie cost-recovery 
mechanisms) to earmark 
revenue for local area 
investments 
• Low property tax rate and 
macro cap in place to 
contain property tax level 
based on the national 
aggregate
• Low cost financing and 
national government 
guarantee backed 
lending practices could 
be a disincentive to 
use future property tax 
income and to seek 
funds in the private bond 
market
Socio-Political:  
informal dimensions
•  Values and norms 
Modes of practice
• Responds to debates for 
more local revenue tools
• Dutch planning and 
development practice is 
akin to development-led 
model 
• Government intervention 
to facilitate provision of 
public goods is accepted 
practice
• Potential to constrain 
future political decision-
makers and ability to 
use general budget as 
“buffer” for “soft” local 
programs and services 
• Municipal Fund premised 
on equity of services. TIF 
(market mechanism) = 
winners and losers
• Weak connection 
between local services 
and provision using local 
revenue
• Slow pace of actualizing 
property tax value out 
of step  public sector 
practice of steering 
development process
• Financial risk based 
on property value not 
aligned with current 
spatial planning  
discourse
• Public sector inclination 
towards absorbing 
risk implies possible 
TIF models to allocate 
risk to market players 
less applicable in the 
Netherlands
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Despite the issues identified in Table 2, the Nijmegen case provides empirical 
evidence that it is technically and politically possible to use a future property tax 
increment as part of a larger redevelopment project budget. The findings also 
suggest that there is sufficient space within the institutional context for municipal 
actors to exert agency and reinterpret how existing instruments are used – in this 
case, property taxes. However, rather than proving to be an exception, the Nijmegen 
example demonstrates that project actors are now facing scrutiny over the use of 
property taxes, despite the limited financial commitment in comparison to the overall 
project budget. The findings provide an evidence-based counterpoint to conventional 
practice, but rather than representing an exception to the rule, it illustrates the 
durability of conventional modes of practice.
 This research on TIF as a potential financing instrument in the Netherlands was 
carried out during weak economic times. As an instrument for the foreseeable future, 
the notion of basing an investment strategy on future economic growth may be 
perceived of as out-of-step with shifting ideas about municipal financial risk. Indeed, 
current debates in the spatial planning sector are focused on identifying alternative 
strategies that do not rely on real estate value (Savini, Salet, & Majoor, 2014). 
Nevertheless, it is perhaps not the speculative nature of TIF financing models, but 
rather that the slow pace of  actualizing property tax value that might be out of step 
with public sector practice of driving the development process. Similarly, if one of the 
positive attributes that is noted in the TIF literature is the ability to shift a degree of 
financing risk to the private sector, in the Netherlands, there is a historic tendency of 
the local authorities towards absorbing risk. Therefore, if a policy objective of using 
TIF would be to shift financial risk to marketplayers , it is a mechanism that provides 
ample space for municipalities to continue with similar practices that are currently 
done with existing tools. That is to say, we cannot assume that by introducing a new 
tool that modes of practice would necessarily substantially change. 
7.0  Reflections and Conclusions
By scaling the assessment of TIF to the Dutch institutional context, this case study 
illustrates the complexity of operationalising a potential financing mechanism. It also 
emphasises the need to pay attention to socio-political dynamics rather than limiting 
analyses to technical considerations. As a potential new financing instrument for the 
Dutch planning and land development toolkit, the application of TIF may be 
constrained by socio-political dimensions in comparison to technical dimensions. If 
we return to our original ascertain that TIF is simply a financial instrument, which has 
certain characteristics, we can reflect on the degree to which the institutional context 
informs how it would be used. Indeed, rather than acting as an instrument to 
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incentivize investment by providing the structural means for market-players to absorb 
financial risk, such as market-backed TIF financing models (section 2) , the corporatist 
nature of Dutch planning culture implies that the instrument may not inherently 
facilitate such a shift in practice. Nonetheless, rather than ruling out TIF as a possible 
mechanism, the findings illustrate the degree of flexibility that is available with the 
Dutch municipal context to reinterpret the use of existing mechanisms. As suggested 
by Theonig, (2012) public affairs are co-constructed and public organisations are 
constantly restructuring in terms of social norms. Together with austerity measures 
from the national level and discourse around the current planning model we might 
expect that perspectives may gradually shift thereby creating more space in the use 
of existing revenue streams, such as property taxes, in alternative applications. 
 The intersection between the legal administrative apparatus of municipal 
financing and spatial planning acts as the backdrop to the governance process, 
which shapes how investment in localize public infrastructure is done at the local 
level in the Netherlands. The findings contribute to the literature by empirically 
analyzing the degree to which TIF is applicable to the Dutch institutional context. In 
doing so, the results provide  both theoretical and practical  insights about the role of 
structures and norms. From a theoretical perspective, research about TIF in relation 
to the Netherlands tells us about the dominate dimensions and dilemmas that shape 
planning and municipal finance. In a recent article, Savini et al (2014) present a well 
developed analytical review about the three dilemmas of planning, in terms of the 
inherent tension and uneasy coexistence between intervention, regulation, and 
investment. The economic crisis, they contend, highlights the failures of the modernist 
project to control, regulate, and predictably manages the investment process.  The 
current juncture, they argue, represents an opportunity to re-calibrate towards a 
demand-led planning model with an emphasis on “…participatory, bottom-up, and 
adaptive planning…” (p.3) processes. While careful to identify the weaknesses of 
offering simple answers about how to “navigate the dilemmas”  (p.14), there is a 
predisposition to emphasize the potential of governance (with less government). Yet, 
we ought not to ignore Pierre’s (2011) contention that often broader governance 
perspectives tend “...to play down structures, but that doesn’t mean that they 
disappear” (p.21). Further research should empirically test the degree to which an 
institutional space13 is actually opening in the Netherlands and how such change is 
actualized in structures, planning practice, and policy instruments to deal with current 
and future challenges. In doing so, such an investigation should explore the degree 
to which a new financing tool makes a difference or whether enduring institutional 
norms offer a steadfast resistance to change. Indeed, for Dutch municipalities, that 
13 As noted in section 5.2.2, 44% of the questionnaire respondents expressed interested in finding out 
more about tax increment financing. This finding suggests an interest in alternative instruments and an 
opening of a potential institutional space. See appendix 4.
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are still looking for alternative financing mechanisms for public infrastructure 
investments, the ‘negative outcome’ of using a TIF model in the Nijmegen project, 
and the overall negative assessment by those public officials of the instrument, 
means that they must still continue with their search for an alternative to the public 
land development model. 
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Abstract
Urban physical public infrastructure is a frontline defense mechanism to manage and 
mitigate climate-related impacts. Market instruments are often cited as possible 
means to spread risk and reduce financial burdens on the public sector. The authors 
argue that existing research tends to focus on the technical issues of instruments 
and neglects considering institutional dynamics that may enable or constrain local 
market-based financing mechanisms. In this chapter, three core dilemmas (values 
uncertainty, planning horizon, and indirect benefits) are used to analyze the 
responses of practitioners to a possible financing instrument. The findings indicate 
that the practitioner’s responses to tax increment financing were largely shaped by 
the adaptation dilemmas and not the characteristics of the instrument per se. By 
mapping the dilemmas onto whether they would recommend it, participants imposed 
a financial barrier on climate adaptation investments. The authors conclude that a 
key imperative in the design of policy instruments is to pay attention to the congruency 
of informal institutions at the ‘street level’ in order to be in-step with the current 
sociopolitical conditions. The findings also point to four key attributes that a local 
market-based instrument would need to be aligned and responsive to the Dutch 
planning and development context.
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1.0 Introduction
Physical public infrastructure is a frontline defense mechanism to manage and 
mitigate climate-related impacts at the urban level. Mounting evidence has 
demonstrated that climate change will require cities to make investment decisions 
and allocate resources to modify existing physical infrastructure, which includes 
conventional ‘grey’ infrastructure such as roads, power grids, piped sewer, and water 
systems, by introducing new strategies that reduce vulnerabilities and increase 
resilience to changing weather patterns (Carteret al., 2015). Revised designed 
specifications, robust capital planning, and new types of infrastructure will be 
required to address adverse impacts, such as permeable pavement, renewal of 
existing systems to separate storm water and sewage, elevation of urban areas, 
strategically deployed green space and tree planting, additional space for water 
storage and retention, and enhanced above-grade drainage and grading plans, 
(Makropoulos & Butler, 2010; Bobylev et al., 2013). Cost-benefit research (Hallegatte 
et al., 2012) generally indicates that preventing damage through a commitment to 
upfront capital costs will alleviate higher costs in the future, such as replacing or 
repairing damaged properties or costs related to social and economic disruption. 
Despite the data, adaptation remains a periphery issue on local government budget 
processes, overshadowed by competition for scarce resources of immediate 
concerns that can be more readily reconciled with prevailing values, planning cycles, 
render clear benefits and respond to direct service demands. In other words, 
policymakers are confronted with and confounded by a range of dilemmas about 
how to finance long-term climate adaptation infrastructure.
1.1.  Market-based Financing Instruments: Limits or Opportunities 
for Local Planning?
The question of how to finance investments in climate adaptation at the local level is 
not unique to the Netherlands. For example, a 2009 study comparing national 
adaptation strategies across Europe found that no national strategies considered 
how policy objectives should be financed (Swart et al., 2009). More recently, 
according to a 2013 report issued by the European Environmental Agency, while 
municipalities have some limitations, particularly with respect to interjurisdictional 
issues (such as broad-scale flooding impacts), local governments are well positioned 
to undertake concrete implementation actions using municipal resources and/or 
raising funds from other sources (Isoard & Winograd, 2013). In addition to regulatory 
solutions, scholarly and policy-oriented research suggests that market-based 
mechanisms hold some promise to create conditions for efficient and appropriate 
solutions (Buchner et al., 2011; Heuson et al., 2012; Mathews & Kidney, 2012). Other 
researchers have analyzed possible incentives to attract private investment at the 
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local level, which minimally includes a policy framework that is simple, predictable, 
and protects property rights (Merk et al., 2012). In the aggregate, the research tends 
to be normative and focused on the technical issues of possible instruments and a 
dearth that considers behavioral aspects or the role of context. That is, there is little 
empirical research that focuses on the institutional dynamics that may enable or 
constrain the application of local-level market-based financing mechanisms in 
relation to climate adaptation.
Our investigation takes planning and development actors in their institutional context 
as our starting point to assess the potential of using market-based mechanisms to 
facilitate investment in climate adaptation. In doing so, we ask: is a local-level 
market-based mechanism applicable for facilitating investment in climate adaptation? 
The intention is to generate an actor-centered conceptual understanding about the 
role of institutional dilemmas in shaping perspectives about the potential application 
of a market-based financial instrument. The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 
sketches out the conceptual framework based on three policy-related dilemmas 
connected to climate adaptation. These dilemmas get to the heart of the institutional 
matters concerning financing local-level climate adaptation and are illustrative of 
how conceptualizations about costs and benefits are embedded within norms and 
values. Section 3 introduces the Dutch urban planning context from which the 
empirical data are drawn. As a ‘policy lab’ of urban adaptation, we use simulation 
gaming to explore the role of the adaptation dilemmas in shaping policy instrument 
selection in the Netherlands. The methods section includes an overview of simulation 
gaming and the scenario that was used to engage practitioners; secondly, this 
section describes the financial instrument, known as tax increment financing (TIF), in 
which participants were asked to ‘test drive’. Section 4 summarizes the core findings 
and subsequently applies the institutional dilemmas conceptual framework to 
analyze the empirical data in more detail. Section 5 offers concluding remarks and 
points to directions for further research.
2.0 Conceptual Framework
2.1.  Institutional Dilemmas: Clustering Uncertainty and  
Reducing Complexity
In 2003, Adger (2003) explicitly connects the critical role and complex nature of 
institutions in relation to adapting to climate change by stating ‘… the effectiveness of 
strategies for adapting to climate change depends on the social acceptability of 
options for adaptation, the institutional constraints on adaptation, and the place of 
adaptation in the wider landscape of economic development and social evolution’ 
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(388). Actions, in whatever form, to address climate adaptation are nested within a 
broader institutional context that is shaped and reshaped by formal and informal 
institutional rules, norms, and practice. Institutions are often described as either 
formal or informal: Formal institutions are generally understood as government rules 
that are enforced by the legal system and are expressed as laws, constitutions, 
ordinances, and local land-use plans. Informal institutional rules are less explicit and 
emerge via repetition and solidification of behavior through perceptions, values, 
beliefs, and norms (Buitelaar et al., 2011). Informal and formal institutional rules are 
dynamic and the subject of constant negotiation by organizations and the actors that 
operate within them (Lowndes, 2005; Buitelaar et al., 2011). Institutionalists also 
acknowledge the role of narratives as a means for people to determine the outer 
parameters of informal institutions through developing shared understandings and, 
thus, reducing uncertainty (Lowndes & Roberts,2013). Narratives also reduce the 
problem of complexity by clustering knowledge and positions, which function as 
heuristics (Matthews, 2013). Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) define heuristics as: 
‘a strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of making decisions 
more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex methods.’ (454). In that 
sense, clustering knowledge into bite-sized pieces functions as a heuristic to simplify 
multifaceted problems and to act as shortcuts for organizational decision-making. 
So, how do policymakers and practitioners make sense of the complexity associated 
with climate adaptation? What ‘short-cuts’ and rationales do they use to overcome 
complex problems? We identify three dilemmas that are addressed in the literature 
(Adger et al., 2009; Haug et al., 2010; Walker et al., 2011; Mees et al., 2012; Preston et al., 
2013): value uncertainty, planning horizon problems, and indirect benefits. Figure 1 
illustrates our conceptual framework based on three spheres: (1) climate adaptation 
as a planning issue; (2) uncertainty and complexity as a decision problem; and (3) 
the decisions problems are bundled into thematic clusters of the institutional 
dilemmas. These institutional dilemmas are emblematic and a composite of signals 
from the institutional context in which they are derived from and, thus, function as 
heuristics.
The remainder of this section outlines the core features of the institutional dilemmas
that form the conceptual backdrop for the analysis set out in Section 4.
2.1.1. Values Uncertainty
Uncertainty is a fundamental and broadly accepted conundrum of adapting to 
climate change. Uncertainties relate to the complexity of the climatic system, the 
types of impacts that can be expected, and the effectiveness of adaptation strategies 
to mitigate the wide ranging impacts (Giordano, 2012; Hallegatte et al., 2012). An 
interconnected issue is the problem of value uncertainty. Adaptation choices are 
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guided by a sense of value and the lack of agreement about how current generations 
value climate adaptation, let alone future generations, limits our ability to address 
anticipated problems (Adger et al., 2009; Walker et al., 2011; Preston et al., 2013). 
Hulme (2009) argues that multiple ways in which individuals, organizations, societies, 
and cultures have historically valued and understood climate is a challenge, to say 
the least, to reconcile. While Hulme focuses attention on the global project to 
govern climate change, local planning offers a granular level of value uncertainty. 
Adaptation to climate change is intertwined with value conflicts associated with land, 
environmental protection, health, safety, and resource allocation (Walker et al., 2011).
The lack of agreement on value (material or otherwise) is a core governance 
challenge. The lack of agreement results in climate adaptation at the local level 
largely remaining within the government domain, with an undefined set of institutional 
arrangements. The values uncertainty dilemma positions adaptation as a choice 
between priorities and the need to make trade-offs between what is ‘valued’. As 
Adger et al. (2009) state, ‘it all depends on goals, values, risks, and social choice’ 
(338). Yet without a set of collective values to demarcate choices, values compete in 
the political arena and, according to Preston et al. (2013), a ‘… persistent bias toward 
maintaining economic values over social, cultural, or environmental values’ places 
limits on adaptation (1020). Different approaches to overcome what can be conceived 
of as the ‘value gap’, such as no-regrets strategies or mainstreaming adaptation into 
existing processes and policies, are intended to reconcile the values uncertainty 
dilemma.
Figure 1   Institutional dilemmas in planning for climate change: value uncertainty, 
planning horizon, and indirect benefits
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2.1.2. Planning Horizon
A second dilemma to adapting to climate change is that the planning horizon is 
substantially out-of-sync with conventional planning approaches. Indeed, addressing 
uncertainty in long-term infrastructure investment planning is not a new phenomenon; 
however, adaptation to climate change adds further temporal and spatial complexity. 
The planning horizon dilemma is often portrayed as a tension between ethical and 
classic rational deliberative planning. Alexander (2000) describes the objective of 
classic rational deliberative planning is ‘… for the actor to decide on the ends of 
future action and what the course of the action would be most effective’ (247). Ethical 
arguments suggest that future generations ought to be appropriately considered and 
sufficient investments made to avoid or limit the adverse impacts of climate change 
(Preston et al., 2013). From a rational deliberative planning perspective, complex 
data analyses in cost-benefit research are conducted to assert that investments by 
current generations will render benefits in the near term and over the long term, 
particularly given that the life span of land-use planning and infrastructure decisions 
ranging anywhere from 30 to 200 years (Hallegatte, 2009). The objective of 
cost-benefit analysis research is to demonstrate that investments need not require 
large upfront sums, but can be achieved through improved coordination of capital 
planning and maintenance regimes. As argued by Hallegatte (2009), committing to 
additional infrastructure costs in anticipation of future climate changes, ‘… may be 
the only way of avoiding large building and infrastructure retrofitting costs in a few 
decades’ (241). Other arguments suggest there is a strong economic rationale for 
using insurance to avoid imposing a financial burden on the current generation 
(Harrison, 2010), given climate adaptation is a problem with such range of 
uncertainties. Despite the different positions, it is clear that assembling a package of 
policy instruments is not a straightforward technocratic undertaking for two core 
reasons: the long-term planning horizon of climate adaptation is not calibrated to the 
comparatively short-term capital planning processes and, secondly, political cycles 
of local government are even shorter than these planning processes. Instead, the 
dilemma is about making choices between, as Walker et al. commented, ‘… relatively 
short-term, no-regrets types of strategies’ that are likely to be suboptimal overtime 
(2011).
2.1.3. Indirect Benefits
In the context of local government, municipalities face political pressures in relation 
to the degree to which local benefits are rendered in connection to financial risk and 
the use of local resource. According to the benefits view of public finance (Musgrave 
& Musgrave, 1989), the costs of local public services ought to be based on the 
preferences of the benefiting residents. This view establishes a link between the 
willingness to pay and the constraints placed on local governments by taxpayers to 
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deliver an acceptable package of local services and programs (Fischel, 2000). In the 
benefits model of public finance, the principle of equity is achieved if those who 
benefit from the service also pay for the service. The benefit can be direct or indirect, 
but a benefit must be derived from the expenditure. The dilemma for adaptation 
investments is the degree to which clear benefits can be established. Walker et al. 
argue that facing a choice, ‘… people who are asked to make economic sacrifices 
today—that may benefit future generations but will not benefit them directly—may 
lack the incentives to implement long term adaptation strategies’ (Walker et al., 2011). 
A lack of observable direct benefits is also cited as a reason why the market is 
comparatively inactive as a player in adaptation, in comparison with the public sector. 
Several reasons may account for this, including assumptions about the potential 
constraints, financial, technological, and spatial, that adaptation requirements may 
impose on private actors and, secondly, the time-lag between bearing the costs and 
the reaping of benefits of investments (Mees et al., 2012).
We now turn to an overview of the research context and description of the method 
employed in this study.
3.0 Methodology
This section briefly describes the Dutch case, the simulation game method, and 
provides background about TIF and the simulation game specifically designed for 
use in this research.
3.1.  Urban Adaptation to Climate Change in the Netherlands:  
A Policy Laboratory
In the Netherlands, the national government has accepted projections that climate 
change will take place, as evidenced by the national adaptation program that was 
launched in 2007 and ongoing development by the Delta Program. The Netherlands 
is regarded as a front-runner in climate adaptation, particularly with respect to water 
management, and has attracted international attention with flood risk management 
approaches such as ‘Room for the River’ and playing a role in the global networking 
‘Connecting Delta Cities’ initiative. The Delta Program is responsible for developing 
recommendations for adaptation to climate change in the Netherlands (Termeer et 
al., 2011). The urban-focused component, under the New Housing Development and 
Restructuring Program (Deltaprogramma, 2010, 2012a, 2012b), sets out a direction 
that local-level climate adaptation-related infrastructure improvements will be 
delivered using existing spatial planning investments frameworks, which includes 
coupling adaptation investments with market redevelopment activities overtime 
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(Delta Programme, 2014). This outlook is consistent with the characterization of 
Dutch spatial planning as having transitioned into an era that is heavily focused on 
market-based processes and principles (Heurkens, 2012). Numerous studies have 
been commissioned by the national government in the search for possible market 
models and policy instruments that could be transferred to the Dutch context.2 In the 
foreseeable future, however, it is unclear how Dutch municipalities will be able to 
finance adaptation measures given the stagnate development sector (Deltaprogramma, 
2011). Thus, given the active policy process driven by the Delta program and search 
for the new ‘holy grail’ of planning instruments and financing models, the Netherlands 
represents a kind of policy laboratory and a fertile research context in which to 
explore new approaches to financing climate-proofing local-level public infrastructure.
3.2. Simulation Gaming: An Experiential Method
Despite recognition as a forerunner in water-related climate adaptation, policies and 
governance approaches that are specific to urban adaptation are still in the early 
stages of formation, which presents a challenge for empirical research (van Buuren 
et al., 2015). Exploring the application of a policy instrument, firstly, not used in the 
Netherlands, and secondly, not conventionally applied to the problem of investing in 
adaption also presents a challenge for social scientists. The question of whether TIF 
(see Sections 3.3.1 and 3.4.3.2 for background) is a potential instrument for local 
policymakers to raise funds to support long-term investments in climate adaptation 
could, on the surface, be assessed based on technical criteria. However, this 
approach offers a narrow bandwidth on which to address this complex question. The 
application of simulation gaming, as an actor-centered method, is an effective means 
to consider the sociopolitical characteristics that play a role in policy instrument 
selection. As identified in the preceding section, grasping such issues as the 
planning horizon mismatch, the indirect benefits problem between current investors 
and future users, and lacking a cohesive set of social values on climate adaptation 
presents planning practitioners with intractable problems. Drawing from simulation 
gaming literature (Daré & Barreteau, 2003; Mayer & Veeneman, 2003; Klabbers, 
2009; Mayer, 2009; Meijer, 2009; Shubik, 2009; Crookall, 2010), this method was 
selected because, as a highly interactive format often used in policy-making, it allows 
researchers to study the behaviors of participants using a specifically designed 
reference system. Thus, it provides a format to develop an understanding about 
complex ‘… tacit knowledge’ (Klabbers, 2009) embedded within practitioner’s 
perspectives that is based on experience, but often difficult to articulate.
2 See research a website hosted by the National Office for Entrepreneurial Netherlands called the 
Financial Structure Toolbox. and reports by consultancies and research institutes VROM, C. (2010), 
ECORYS (2010), Ministry, o. I. A., VNG & NEPROM (2009), Planbureau (2014), Planbureau and Urhahn 
(2012), and Heijkers et al. (2012).
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3.3.  ‘Test Driving’ a Financing Policy Instrument: A Novel  
 Policy Instrument
As implied by the metaphor included in the title of this article, participants of the 
simulation game were asked to ‘test-drive’ a financing instrument. The metaphor 
makes an explicit connection to the simulation game scenario that provided a setting for 
participants to experience a novel instrument. The aim was to introduce participants 
to an instrument that they had no practical experience within a multidimensional 
format. Thus, the simulation game session provided a decision-making environment 
to debate and develop opinions without the risk of professional or institutional 
damage. Given the research objective, participants were asked to consider the use 
of TIF as a means to facilitate investment in climate adaptation. We conceived of the 
assignment as an institutional challenge wherein participants were confronted with 
considering whether existing formal structures and informal institutional norms/
values could accommodate TIF. The simulation game was designed to focus on 
normative issues, rather than technical aspects that may (or may not) impede the 
application of TIF in the Netherlands. The purpose of the research was to qualitatively 
explore the sociopolitical dimensions of operationalizing TIF and to consider how 
participants distinguished their arguments about the applicability of a particular local 
income stream—namely property taxes.
3.3.1. TIF: A Short Overview
TIF is a bounded value capturing instrument (van der Krabben & Needham, 2008) 
designed to ‘earmark the related increment of property tax in a proclaimed area to 
fund public investments’ (Alexander, 2012). While the duration varies, a TIF is typically 
based on a 25-yeartime span in a prescribed designated community improvement 
area. It is premised on the idea that the provision of new infrastructure in a designated 
area will increase property values. TIF is used in most American states to address 
stalled local area investment (Lefcoe, 2011). It has also been adopted in Canada 
within the last 10 years and more recently in the UK, with the policy objective of 
adding revenue generating tools at the local level (Squires & Lord, 2012).
Extensive research has focused on the strengths and flaws of TIF. Some researchers 
have identified governance flaws and misuse in relation to public policy objectives, 
resulting in benefits to developers and cross-jurisdictional tax revenue absorption 
issues (Weber, 2003). The latter issue is particular to the way in which school districts 
are funded in the U.S. Others have criticized the degree to which a public policy 
rationale exists to justify government intervention and financial risk or whether 
expediential investment attracts business or simply displaces businesses from one 
area to another (Weber, 2010; Chapman & Gorina, 2012). The purpose was not to 
investigate the strengths and weaknesses of TIF per se. The assumption is that given 
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the underlying long-term incremental characteristics of climate change, instruments 
conventionally used in planning processes in the Netherlands that focus on capturing 
immediate return on land value are poorly designed to motivate long-term investment 
commitments. Secondly, autonomous adaptation by municipalities might be 
enhanced if resources were available at the local level, and thus not dependent on 
actions from higher orders of government. During the gaming sessions, players 
focused on the core issues of whether (1) channeling the extra property tax earnings 
above the pre-investment tax base into a specific area, rather than into the general 
city budget, was acceptable or not and (2) whether utilizing an instrument that is 
premised on market growth is appropriate given Dutch municipalities are currently 
risk adverse in response to a stagnate planning and development sector. The 
following section identifies the empirical backdrop that underpinned the simulation 
game scenario and the specific information on TIF that was provided to participants 
during the simulation session.
3.4. The Watervliet Safe Haven Simulation Game
In the design of the simulation game, we drew from Peters, Vissers, and Heijne’s 
advice that designers should construct a game ‘… so it is plausible that participants 
behave more or less the same way as they would in reality’ (1998). The following 
offers a summary of the systems analysis (Peters & Westelaken, 2014) that underpins 
the Watervliet Safe Haven simulation game. The design of the scenario draws from 
scholarly and policy-related research associated with Dutch planning and development, 
municipal public financing, and the Dutch climate adaptation program (Root et al., 
2014, 2015).
3.4.1. Understanding the Institutional Context
As described in Section 3.3, the New Housing Development and Restructuring 
Program (Deltaprogramma, 2010, 2012a, 2012b) has set out a direction that 
local-level climate adaptation-related infrastructure improvements will utilize existing 
spatial planning processes and instruments to lever investment over the long term. 
The concept of how planning and development processes will be used has been 
modified since the original conception. The 2008 economic crisis had a profound 
impact on the Dutch development sector, which stalled many residential and office 
projects across the country. By way of background, in the Netherlands there has 
been a historic reliance on real estate value based on what is referred to as the public 
land development model (Needham, 2007; van der Krabben & Jacobs, 2013). The 
approach is largely considered unviable in the foreseeable future. It was a model that 
enabled municipalities to use the market to facilitate community-level investments to 
deliver a range of public goods (Hartmann & Spit, 2015). This practice resulted in 
speculative land acquisitions and development projects, which ultimately have left 
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many municipalities burdened with substantial land holdings, financial exposure, 
and over-supply of houses and offices in their communities (Janssen-Jansen et al., 
2012; van der Krabben & Jacobs, 2013). 
In 2011, the Delta Program acknowledged that using existing planning and land 
development approaches and instruments to facilitate local-level adaptation 
investments, in the short term, are problematic because many development projects 
are struggling to remain financially buoyant (Deltaprogramma, 2011). Recently, the 
2015 program for urban areas and local adaptation set out a governance agenda 
that focuses on building a coalition of stakeholders as a step toward gradually 
embedding adaptation into conventional planning and development practice (Delta 
Programme, 2014). The approach is an incremental and network-oriented strategy 
that assumes adaptation is a long-term process that will require broad multi-sectoral 
participation. The Delta Program’s shift is also consistent with the discourse in the 
planning and development sector around the idea of ‘organic development’ 
(Buitelaar et al., 2014). The concept proposes to shift Dutch spatial planning from 
comprehensive master planning and large-scale redevelopment to exploring 
strategies that enable incremental small-scale initiatives incorporating multiple 
stakeholders and shared financial risk models.
The foregoing provided a high-level summary of the institutional context that Dutch 
spatial planning and development practitioners are currently confronted with. The 
Watervliet Safe Haven simulation game draws together these elements into a 
scenario. The next three sections, firstly, provide a brief description of the scenario 
that participants were faced with, secondly, the sequencing and management of the 
simulation materials, and, thirdly, the phasing of the game implementation.
3.4.2. Simulation Game: Description
•  Scenario: the ambitious mayor of a fictional city in the Netherlands (aka. Watervliet) 
invites senior municipal staff and private planning and development practitioners 
to advise City Council on whether to include TIF in the financing strategy for a 
large redevelopment planned for the city center.
•  Climate Adaptation Investments: Watervliet needs to replace existing infrastructure 
in the central city due to current flooding problems and future projections that 
expect the flooding impacts to drastically increase due to climate change by 2050. 
The Mayor was keen to introduce a green and blue infrastructure as a strategy to 
mitigate flood impacts. The Mayor argues such investments will demonstrate to 
investors that Watervliet is a dynamic city to invest in.
•  Key Issues: the project is underfunded by approximately 10%; no funding from the 
national government is expected; the project is the subject of criticism from local 
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media; the Mayor sees the initiative as an important legacy project.
•  Objective: Each team must make a recommendation to the Watervliet City Council 
about whether TIF should be used to close the project’s financial gap.
3.4.3. Simulation Game Sequencing and Materials
Seven three-hour sessions were held in five different locations in the Netherlands. 
The simulation game session was advertised via a range of social networking sites, 
including sites that focus on Dutch spatial planning issues and climate change-related 
subjects. The result of the outreach strategy was a sampling of 59 experienced 
spatial planning practitioners and policymakers. The sectoral mix of the participants 
was a balanced representation of both private sector practitioners and participants 
that worked for municipalities. The majority of participants were spatial planners, 
representing process managers, project developers, policymakers, and advisers.
The simulation game sessions were undertaken in several stages. The following is a 
brief description of pre-game stage and phases within the simulation game itself.
3.4.3.1. Pre-Game
•  One week prior: participants received an information package that contained the 
following:
•  Letter from the researchers confirming logistical details and role description
•  Simulation Material:
•  Invitation from the Mayor of Watervliet
•  Letter from national government
•  Two fictional newspaper articles from a local newspaper
3.4.3.2. Upon arrival to the Simulation Session
•  Questionnaire: participants completed it on an individual basis
•  Watervliet redevelopment project budget
•  Brochures explaining TIF and ‘green’ infrastructure
Given the objective was to elicit perspectives about the application of TIF, participants 
were provided information both in written form and in the presentation by the ‘mayor’ 
of Watervliet. The information identified the perceived key strengths and weaknesses 
of the instrument and conventional policy rationales. For example, participant was 
informed that a perceived strength is that by recovering value overtime upfront costs 
are not added (i.e., levy’s) to the development phase and/or immediate profit return is 
not required. Conversely, it was identified that if used extensively by a municipality, 
TIF can result in freezing the general tax base for up to 25 years, thus impacting 
on general revenue that supports other public programs and operations. Other 
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arguments that support the TIF suggest that the instrument provides a positive 
market signal, thereby acting as a catalyst for private sector investment to create jobs 
and expand the city’s tax base. Participants were also informed that given TIF’s rely 
on a ‘market test’, cash-strapped municipalities are often driven by a public 
investment program that is based on the ‘highest & best uses’, to the exclusion of 
other public goods. Three basic financing vehicles using TIF, broadly identified in the 
literature (Pricewaterhouse Cooper, 2008), were also described. These three models 
were offered for session participants to consider given they are relatively straightfor-
ward in relation to representations about the degree of risk between the public and 
private sectors, as follows: (1) bond-funded: The municipality issues bonds secured 
against the projected tax increment, using revenue or general obligation bonds; (2) 
municipality-funded: the municipality borrows to provide the initial capital; and (3) 
developer-funded: the developer borrows to provide the initial capital—the 
municipality then reimburses the developer using the actual tax increment which the 
developer uses to repay its borrowing. During the gaming sessions, participants 
considered the advantages and disadvantages of the models, in addition to offering 
further variations to shift and/or share financial risk between the public sector and 
market-players.
3.4.3.3. Simulation Session 
The simulation game was structured around three distinct phases. The intent was to 
produce sufficient flow that mimic the policy process to create psychological fidelity2 
(Lukosch & Bekebrede, 2014), which includes unexpected events that are beyond 
the control of the participants (Duke, 1980). The phases were designed to provide 
participants with sufficient information on which to base their recommendation and 
to provoke discussion as participants sorted through a thinking process, including 
introducing a degree of tension. No formal facilitation or intervention by the 
researchers was included. As a group self-driven process, it allowed sufficient room 
for participants to work with the materials and to structure the debate without 
influences arising from the researchers. Yet, the events introduced new information, 
thereby focusing players’ attention on particular issues, and the distinct phases 
structured the process around the task of devising a recommendation.
Phase One: Began with a presentation by the Mayor to the group. The purpose of the 
presentation was to describe the scenario to participants, thereby setting up the 
problems and tensions. The problems and tensions are nested in the scenario, in 
what Duke refers to as ‘the pulse’ (1980). According to Duke, the pulse compels 
players to focus on shared phenomena. The Mayor kept in the role throughout the 
duration of the simulation in order to maintain what Klabbers (2009) refers to as ‘the 
magic circle’. This phase of the simulation was styled on a meeting of professionals 
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wherein the Mayor briefs participants about the project and the new financial 
instrument that they have been invited to analyze and make a recommendation to the 
Watervliet City Council.
Phase Two: Participants engaged in a ‘brainstorm’ session wherein they discussed 
whether property tax, as the income source of TIF, was the right income stream to 
support localize investments in climate adaptation, whether it was a potential 
instrument for the Watervliet Safe Haven Project, and whether there was a way to 
tailor the instrument that is specific to the Dutch sociopolitical context. During this 
phase, the Mayor provided three pieces of information: (1) a press release from the 
City’s public relations department announcing the relocation of a large investor into 
the redevelopment project area; (2) a newspaper article announcing further budget 
cuts from the national government for city services; and (3) a petition from citizens 
from the abutting neighborhood protesting that they also experience flooding and it 
is unfair that only a community with market potential will receive long-term investment 
to address flooding issues.
Phase Three: The group was asked to make their final recommendation using a 
report template. A laptop was provided, and the report template was projected onto 
a screen to facilitate group interaction and discussion over the reasons and final 
recommendation.
4.0 Summary of Findings
4.1. Using a Market-based Mechanism: Institutional Dilemmas
In the remaining sections, we turn to answering the research question: Is a local-level 
market-based mechanism applicable for facilitating investment in adaptation? The 
response to the question is done by mapping the institutional dilemmas from the 
conceptual framework onto the core findings. The aim is to provide an account about 
why participants largely agreed that TIF was inappropriate for climate adaptation and 
to contextualize those perspectives.
4.1.1. Value Uncertainty Dilemma
The simulation scenario confronted all participants with a redevelopment project that 
required investments in new climate resilient public infrastructure. The scenario was 
presented as an opportunity to make strategic localized investments, based on a 
modest budgetary commitment, aimed at reducing future negative impacts of 
climate change and adding urban design features that improved the built environment. 
The pre-game questionnaire indicated that 81.5% strongly agreed to agree that there 
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was enough scientific information to affirm that the climate is changing. The large 
majority of 83% strongly agreed or agreed that local government should plan now for 
long-term climate change. Despite the agreement about climate change, participants 
were not in agreement about when to invest in climate adaptation. The questionnaire 
found an average split of 29% between those that agreed that it was unclear when to 
invest, those that were uncertain, and those that thought it was clear when 
municipalities should invest. The majority, at 67%, agreed that more information is 
necessary in order for local government to take action. The questionnaire results 
were consistent with the dialog during the simulations insofar as participants agreed 
that climate change is a spatial planning policy concern, but perspectives varied 
from fully accepting that investment in adaptation must be part of contemporary 
planning practice to those that argued adaptation to climate change was not a critical 
issue requiring urgent attention.
Participants generally characterized investment in climate adaptation as a type of 
unclaimed public good that requires the government, as opposed to market-players, 
to play the primary role. This perspective rested on three questions that informed 
participants’ discussions, which are also ubiquitous quandaries in climate adaptation 
policy-making: (1) What are the roles of the public and private sectors?; (2) What are 
the risks of investing and the risks of not investing?; and (3) Who benefits from 
investments and are such benefits fairly distributed? Participants generally argued 
given the answer to these questions remain unresolved, the government ought to 
play the lead role in facilitating investment in climate adaptation at the local level (i.e., 
from local, province, national, and waterboards3). The second core issue related to 
the degree to which property taxes should be used for ‘hard’ investments in a specific 
area. In the Netherlands, property taxes play a minor role in financing local 
investments and services due in part that the municipal financing system is largely 
based on two processes: (1) transfer payments from the national government (Allers, 
2012) and (2) public land development practices have been fundamental to facilitating 
investment in community-based public (van der Krabben & Jacobs, 2013). The Dutch 
financing system is designed to keep the property tax rate low across the nation 
(Vermeulen & Allers, 2013) and to act as a modest buffer in municipal budgets. 
Simulation participants also voiced concern about whether channeling incremental 
property tax income into a specific area was ‘fair’. This perspective was voiced more 
strongly by municipal participants based on an overarching concern that the 
application of TIF would create unequal adaptation results: meaning those in 
economically disadvantaged neighborhoods would not likely enjoy attention from 
3 According to Lukosch and Bekebrede, psychological fidelity relates to the degree to which a game 
matches the emotional and cognitive perceptions of the players, which includes, the play process and 
flow of the game (2014).
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the market. As stated4 in the Amsterdam session: ‘In my perception we [in the 
Netherlands] have a nicer inclination, the kind of value investment financing using 
TIF, as in America, … there is something fundamentally cold-hearted about using a 
tax measure’
The findings from the simulations are consistent with ideas that are part of an 
emerging narrative in the Dutch spatial planning sector. Over the last several years, 
practitioners, advisors, and researchers have argued that Dutch spatial planning 
ought to change from a ‘supply’ model to a market ‘demand’ model (Buitelaar, 2010). 
Such a model, it is argued, should be based on municipalities facilitating public good 
investments (rather than financing) and working with stakeholders on ‘bottom-up’ 
driven planning process (rather than comprehensive master planning). Participants 
were largely able to align their perspectives (values certainty) by building on a 
nascent narrative about the transition of Dutch planning toward demand-led practices. 
This was possible because TIF can be characterized as a demand-led instrument 
that is fundamentally premised on positive market response to public good types of 
investments. Such an affirmative narrative was weakly articulated in relation to climate 
adaptation because the provision of such investments appeared to represent an 
‘old-fashioned’ supply-led model. Which is to say, the narrative connected to climate 
adaptation confirmed and reinforced the values uncertainty dilemma.
4.1.2. Planning Horizon Dilemma: Mismatch with the Market
A consistent concern between participants and the groups, as a whole, was the 
market-based speculative nature of TIF. Imagining applying a financial instrument 
that is premised on future earnings from the real estate market was perceived as 
out-of-step with current political perspectives in the Netherlands. For market-players 
operating in the post-economic crisis conditions in the Netherlands, participants 
argued developers are in a good position to resist absorbing additional project costs 
or risks. The reasoning behind the government remaining as a key actor was twofold: 
Firstly, participants consistently argued that adaptation likely carries additional costs 
and any such investments will not be sufficiently valued in the market place. This 
finding is consistent with Tennekes et al. (2013) who suggest there is no guarantee 
that adaptation investments will generate higher market value, within the time frame 
conventionally required by investors. Secondly, the findings also indicate that if the 
investments are not valued in the market place, then the investments become a 
nonrecoverable project cost using conventional processes in the Dutch planning 
regulatory framework. This perspective was stronger with municipal participants than 
4 ‘Dutch water boards (Dutch: waterschappen) are regional government bodies charged with managing 
water barriers, waterways, water levels, water quality and sewage treatment in their respective regions.’ 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Water_board_%28Netherlands%29
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nongovernmental participants. The former cited the unlikelihood of political support 
for such a market- based instrument, given market-driven strategies have resulted in 
substantial financial challenges for municipalities across the Netherlands (Janssen-
Jansen & Lloyd, 2012). As stated by a Nijmegen participant, ‘… it is, of course, the 
classic mistake that municipalities have ever made. The purchase of land and hope 
that it will be worth something. The risk lies with the municipalities’. Private sector 
participants were less pessimistic suggesting that the advantage of TIF was that it 
might fit well with conventional Dutch planning and development practices because 
it is consistent with conventional practice of using residual value from the land 
development process to cross-subsidize a range of public goods (van der Krabben 
& Jacobs, 2013). The difference between those perspectives is that the latter 
participants tended to focus on the possible flexible ways in which TIF could be 
applied to facilitate investment and spread risk between more a diverse range of 
players—but not for climate adaptation investment, just in general.
The evidence indicates that session participants situated the planning horizon 
dilemma as a mismatch between two issues: Firstly, there was uncertainty about the 
investment phase and the degree to which the market would respond sufficiently to 
render projected value. Secondly, the strong prerogative was to cite the lack of 
political support to make explicit adaptation investments: In the context of shrinking 
municipal budgets and competing investment priorities, climate adaptation has 
insufficient urgency to justify immediate action. As stated by a Den Haag participant: 
“We have been working on climate adaptation for a few years and we are convinced 
that climate change adaptation is a topic that generates no extra money. Politicians 
are not prepared to give extra money because the urgency is still too limited. We do 
not think of additional budgets. We think of linking them with clever restructuring of 
existing urban areas. We still have decades of time”.
As crystallized by the above quote, lacking political support and resources, there is 
little incentive for undertaking immediate substantive actions. Rather, the strategy 
to overcome such barriers is by incrementally integrating adaptation measures. 
An incrementalist strategy assumes it can withstand political cycles and gradually 
integrate climate adaptation into planning and operational routines overtime.
4.1.3. Indirect Benefits Dilemma
We begin this section with two unambiguous quotes made by simulation game 
participants in different sessions:
•  “… if you want housing corporations to invest in climate proofing, that requires a 
lot of upfront investment. The benefits will not flow back to the corporation, so it is 
an uneconomic road” (Amsterdam session).
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•  “I can tell you from experience that most of my buyers and renters do not care 
much for the word heat-stress or flooding. Everyone thinks we’re safe here. So, I 
do think there is a big difference between customer perception and actual risks 
you run. If it does not happen often the client thinks that they are not going to pay 
for it” (Rotterdam session).
Section 2.1.3 identified a core principle of the benefits model of public financing as 
needing to successfully make a clear connection between local expenditures and 
local benefits. This principle is evident in sentiments expressed in the above quotes, 
which clearly illustrate the dilemma and burden of proof that is required by 
policymakers to demonstrate the direct benefit of adaptation investments. When 
considering using finite local resources participants argued that if investments are 
made in climate adaptation funding will not be available for other investments. 
Participants, thus, conceived of the problem as having to make decisions between 
investments that will result in direct benefits and adaptation investments, it was 
argued, that will result in benefits sometime in the future to unknown beneficiaries.
 A strategy to address the indirect benefits dilemma focused on how risks, costs, 
and benefits could be spread between direct beneficiaries and the public and private 
sector. For example, as stated by participants:
•  “The question is, for private property owners, can you use similar incentives for 
them to invest in measures to retain more water, perhaps also recovering 
investments with tax value … you make a combination … because I think it is 
important that we all shoulder the burden and that we do not say—‘corporations, 
you do it’”(Amsterdam session).
•  “The question is, who will stick their neck out? You do not expect the market to do 
that, because it does not invest in loss. Do not expect that the government is 
going to do, because it is in the red and is also limited. How are we going to divide 
or limit the risk?” (Nijmegen session)
The groups developed variances of how TIF could be applied to balance financial 
risk between current stakeholders and future beneficiaries. Unsurprisingly, a concise 
answer as to how different stakeholders could participate in risks and benefits 
remained unanswered. Drawing from Tenneke et al., discussions about the types of 
mechanism that could reconcile the indirect benefits dilemma are, in fact, highly 
charged political discussions. By debating the technical merits of TIF as a potential 
instrument to facilitate investment in local adaptation participants teased out and 
engage with contentious issues about ‘… institutionalized distributions of burdens 
and benefits’ (Tennekes et al., 2013).
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5.0 Conclusions and Final Remarks
Lack of funding is often cited as a substantial barrier to making investments in local 
climate adaptation. Yet, as asserted by Measham et al. (2011), lack of funding is a 
‘surface constraint’ (906) and too simplistic of an explanation as to why investments 
in climate adaptation lose out to other priorities. Similarly, in asking whether a 
local-level market-based mechanism is applicable for facilitating investment in 
climate adaptation, we find evidence that, on one level, TIF has more limitations 
than application opportunities to finance climate adaptation at the local level in the 
Netherlands. This is due primarily to current economic and political dynamics 
percolating in Dutch planning based on the reluctance to rely on speculative earnings 
from real estate. Yet, these reasons may also represent ‘surface constraints’ because 
the disinclination to use TIF was not specific to TIF as an instrument per se. The three 
key dilemmas (values uncertainty, planning horizon, and indirect benefits) are evident 
in the narrative of the participants, which shaped how participants responded to both 
(1) investing in adaptation and (2) in the use of local income, which is to say, property 
taxes. While participants found a degree of value certainty about climate change, 
they struggled to reconcile the degree to which municipalities ought to underwrite 
long-term investments or whether the market will recognized the added-value in the 
foreseeable future.
We began the article by asserting that investment in urban public infrastructure will 
be required in the coming years to mitigate the impacts of climate change at the local 
level. The findings have produced insights about the relationship of the dilemmas in 
shaping practitioners perspectives about a possible financing instrument. In doing 
so, the analysis points to the limited acceptance that a market-based financing 
instrument is, currently, likely to have in the Netherlands. In contrast, participants 
appeared to be generally interested in TIF for conventional area investments, with 
some reservations, insofar institutional space was made available to imprint an 
incrementalism and customize TIF into a ‘made in the Netherlands’ instrument. As a 
participant commented, “…. ‘made in the Netherlands’, the Dutch way, can we 
imagine that kind of TIF? [Yes], for example, stringing together a number of business 
cases, which are smaller, short-term, and therefore are more manageable in terms of 
risk and return” (Amsterdam session).
These contrasting perspectives suggest that by mapping the dilemmas onto whether 
they would unreservedly recommend TIF, participants imposed a financial barrier on 
adaptation investments. Thus, we learn that the potential financial gap was not 
necessarily actual, but rather an outcome based on the dynamics of the institutional 
context and the perceived constraints that were informed by the climate adaptation 
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dilemmas. A key imperative in the design of financing instruments would be to pay 
attention to the congruency of informal institutions at the ‘street level’ (Buitelaar et al., 
2011). In order to be in-step with the current Dutch sociopolitical conditions, we 
extrapolate that market-based financing instruments need to be aligned with several 
attributes. These attributes represent a composite of the final recommendations 
made by the seven simulation groups. To overcome the project’s financial gap, we 
learned that the design of a market-based instrument would need to align with the 
following principles: incrementalism, long-term financial risk management, risk sharing 
between stakeholders, and be bundled with a diverse package of instruments.
5.1. Final Remarks and Further Research
The state of local climate adaptation policy and planning practice is in its formative 
years, hence local policy instruments are often crudely formulated (i.e. governmental 
actions using regulation and/or subsidy) in comparison with the range of options that 
have been applied to address complex social and physical planning problems—i.e., 
sophisticated governance strategies from regulatory to financing and management 
models between government and nongovernmental entities, and communication 
strategies aimed at behavioral changes, which have been refined through repetition 
and learning. While the history of urban planning provides evidence of policies and 
processes that resulted in unanticipated and undesirable outcomes (Jacobs, 1993), 
these are the instruments of modern planning. Indeed, the research findings reflect 
Savini’s (2013) observation that the paradox of urban planning is while, on the one 
hand, it is viewed as a technocratic undertaking, in practice, however, the dilemma is 
that despite the intention to rationally ‘steer’ change, in reality planning ‘… entails a 
series of compromises over different trade-offs, based on politically and arbitrary 
constructed visions of the specific problem at stake’ (336). Secondly, the findings do 
not provide an answer to those practitioners with a thirst for instruments that will 
simplify the climate adaptation process. Rather, the analysis identifies an urban 
planning puzzle wherein a technical fix is only part of the answer to facilitating 
investment in climate adaptation. Simulation gaming is a method that provides a 
strategy to sort out the governance puzzle. By examining the interactions between 
participants and how they made the interconnections between, to some degree, 
disparate issues (i.e., application for property taxes, investment in local climate 
adaptation, and TIF), it proved an effective method to uncover the possibilities of 
achieving an institutional fit.
Methods that enable exploration and organizational learning are a growing area of 
interest in the field of governance-oriented climate adaptation research (Baird et al., 
2014; Jordan & Huitema, 2014). Given the potential cost of failures in the messy world 
of policy-making, simulation gaming is a platform that enables participants to 
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‘join-up’ the components of a scenario in a confined and ‘safe’ place in comparison 
with real-world practice. Further research could aim to explore how planning 
practitioners interact with different policy instrument arrangements and the degree to 
which the characteristics of the institutional dilemmas could be overcome, including 
reducing organizational uncertainty and enforcing affirmative narratives about 
integrating climate adaptation measures into routines. Indeed, a principle of heuristics 
is the fluidity in how strategies to reduce complexity in decision-making are selected 
and learned on an ongoing basis through social processes (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 
2011).
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Abstract
To overcome barriers to climate adaptation, it is often cited that local governments 
ought to mainstream measures into existing policies/processes, yet the answer 
remains incomplete about how this process is achieved. Using a new institutional 
approach, this study analyzes how practitioners use formal and informal rules to 
enable or constrain the use of a market-based municipal financing instrument as a 
possible means to mainstream public infrastructure investments. Based on 21 hours 
of simulation gaming sessions with professional planners, the findings indicate that 
the instrument would be confronted with the enforcement of various rules thereby 
erecting a financial barrier to implementation.
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1.0  Situating Mainstreaming: an institutional nexus
To overcome the barriers of adapting to climate change it is often cited that local 
governments ought to integrate adaptation initiatives by mainstreaming adaptation 
measures into existing policies and programs (Carter et al., 2015; Moser & Ekstrom, 
2010; van Buuren, van Vliet, & Termeer, 2015). This concept is broadly perceived to 
be the way in which, over the long term, adaptation actions will be implemented. 
Similarly, Eisenack et al (2014) and Westerhoff et al (2011 ) assert that barriers to 
climate adaptation, which includes mainstreaming, are relative to specific situations 
and local conditions. Barriers may include  uncertainty and lack of knowledge about 
climate change, unclear governance arrangements and ineffective policy frameworks, 
institutional inertia, and financial and technological limitations (Moser & Ekstrom, 
2010; Uittenbroek, Janssen-Jansen, & Runhaar, 2013). Yet, these generic categories 
remain imperfect as conceptual tools to explain how barriers and stimuli to main -
streaming play out in different ways in different contexts (Berkhout, 2012; Birkmann, 
Garschagen, & Setiadi, 2014; Keskitalo, Juhola, & Westerhoff, 2011). Moreover, 
despite the broadly acknowledged subsidiary principle associated with climate 
adaptation, limited scholarly attention on mainstreaming has focused on the 
institutional conditions that may constrain or create opportunities to use locally 
scaled municipal financing instruments as a means to mainstream local adaptation 
investments (Measham et al., 2011). 
 A considerable amount of mainstreaming-related research focuses on 
developing analytical frameworks and sets of indicators as a means to order the 
complexity of  the policy making process. The implication is that once the complexity 
is sorted out, mainstreaming climate adaptation will be integrated into organizational 
routines. The underlying assumption is that a certain organizational order exists 
wherein adaptation actions can be placed into the organizational slipsteam. Others 
argue that climate change is one of many factors that shape an organization’s 
response to adaptation, but it is unlikely to be the primary issue that drives adaptation 
actions (Berkhout, 2012; Tompkins et al., 2010), which is to say policy-making is 
extremely complex and often a muddled process (Susskind, 2010). In this chapter 
mainstreaming climate adaptation is conceptualized as occurring within policy- 
making processes that are polycentric wherein actors are inter-dependent, political 
support underpins solutions, and facts and values are often intertwined and used 
strategically (Kornov & Thissen, 2000). A recent definition of barriers to climate 
adaptation offered by Eisenack et al (2014) is akin to that conceptualization. Eisenack 
et al provide an institutionally oriented approach that focuses on the conditions in 
which policy-makers and practitioners (“adaptation actors”) are operating that may 
either enable or constrain actions. Depending on how a particular barrier is perceived, 
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there is, according to the positive2 framing of the definition, the potential to overcome 
it: a “…‘barrier to adaptation’ is (1) an impediment (2) to specified adaptations (3) for 
specified actors in their given context that (4) arise from a condition or set of 
conditions. A barrier can be (5) valued differently by different actors, and (6) can, in 
principle, be reduced or overcome. In this definition, conditions are the attributes of 
adaptations, actors, and their context.” (p.868). Drawing from this definition, we focus 
on the interdependency of the three variables:  adaptations, actors, and their 
institutional context. The chapter is concerned with three questions in relation to 
these variables: How do institutional rules (formal and informal) shape practitioner’s 
perspectives about the applicability of certain policy instruments? Secondly, are 
practitioners willing to reinterpret and reshape such rules in order to mainstream 
climate adaptation investments? Thirdly, how do practitioners learn the extent to 
which rules can be changed and which rules cannot?  We take this actor-oriented 
approach to build a richer understanding about the underlying conditions that may 
help explain the variations to mainstreaming climate adaptation and the recombined 
forms of adaptation barriers that emerge during policy-making processes (Tribbia & 
Moser, 2008). Thus, we consider the degree to which mainstreaming climate adaptation 
using locally scaled financing instruments, which could be part of strengthening 
local adaptive capacity, is enabled or constrained by socio-political structures and 
norms (Berkhout, 2012). While our study focuses on the Netherlands, but we believe 
that the findings and approach is pertinent from an international perspective.
 The findings described in this chapter illustrate the degree to which adaptation 
actors are willing to exert agency to facilitate investment in climate adaptation when 
confronted with institutionally situated constraints and/or enabling factors (Bell, 2011). 
We situate the analysis in the realm of financing localized investments. While it appears 
that planning practitioners currently operate within a limited institutional space when 
considering possible policy instruments, the findings point to the potential for new 
ways of using existing instruments.  Applying an institutional approach, the objective is 
to analyze the dynamics of mainstreaming local level adaptation investments in public 
infrastructure using municipal income, based on an instrument known as tax increment 
financing (TIF).  Rather than assessing TIF’s as an instrument per se3, the analysis 
concentrates on the income stream that is earmarked by the instrument, namely, 
property taxes. A pre-existing literature, mainly based on the US experience with this 
financing instrument, provides a wide range of debates on this subject. 
2 Eisenack at al characterize the definition used in “Explaining and Overcoming Barriers to Climate 
Change Adaptation” (2014) as a positive insofar as it aims to be descriptive or explanatory rather than 
normative.
3 See Root, van der Krabben, and Spit (2015) “Between Structures and Norms: Assessing TIF for the 
Dutch Spatial Planning Toolkit” for a detailed analysis on the potential application of tax increment 
financing in the Netherlands.
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 Turning to the organization of the paper, the following section identifies the 
conceptual framework that guides the empirical analysis. Section 3 outlines the 
simulation gaming method and the game that was designed for the purpose of this 
research: the Watervliet Safe Haven Game. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the findings 
based on how participants applied informal and formal rules during the simulation 
game sessions. The final section draws three key conclusions and suggestions for 
further research.
2.0   Mainstreaming Adaptation: considering the role 
of organizational uncertainty 
In a recent article Lourenco et al (2014) asserts that “despite the need for ‘better’ 
[climate change] science, [it] is not in itself a sufficient condition of ‘better’ decisions” 
(p.149). Likewise, we suggest that identifying alternative governance arrangements 
or promising policy instruments based on ‘best practice’ experiences from different 
policy contexts misses the point about the challenge faced by policy-makers to 
integrate new policy requirements into existing processes, with or without the 
additional uncertainty posed by adaptation to climate change. Climate adaptation 
research primarily focuses on the degree to which the types of uncertainty associated 
with climate adaptation is a substantial barrier (ie when to invest, what types of 
solutions, who should invest, etc). The degree to which uncertainty is a ubiquitous 
condition of the policy-making process is hardly identified. More knowledge to 
support a decision, according Kornov and Thissen (2000), does not necessarily 
correspond to optimal decisions. In practice, organizational actors seek to reduce 
uncertainty in policy and decision-making processes by using science-based 
‘objective’ knowledge and ‘subjective’ knowledge (Kornov & Thissen, 2000). The 
latter is based on norms and values that are tested in the course of engaging in deci-
sion-making processes. Such processes delineate the informal institutional rules 
about the acceptability of particular decisions4. Institutional rules are not arbitrary 
insofar as “…rules are shared understandings among those involved that refer to 
enforced prescriptions about what actions (or states of the world) are required, 
prohibited, or permitted... all rules are the result of implicit or explicit efforts to achieve 
order and predictability...”  (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010).  For example, an organizational 
actor may ask: what will be appropriate to do in a situation like this (Kornov & Thissen, 
4 There are both formal (plans, regulations, agreements) and informal (unwritten codes, customs, 
patterns of behavior) rules (Lowndes, 2005). Lowndes makes a distinction between organizations  and 
institutions wherein institutional rules play a role in shaping the behavior of organizations, which is to 
say, institutions create the conditions (ie constraints and opportunities) in which organizations must 
negotiate in order to achieve their objectives (Lowndes, 2009).
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2000)?  Rules, thus, are not necessarily explicit nor rigid. The fluidity of informal rules 
requires actors to constantly consider and reconsider how the organizational world 
functions “…because experience and thereby learning is incorporated into rules, 
exploration of rules and changes in [informal] rules are an important source for 
understanding decision-making in organizations” (Kornov & Thissen, p.193). In 
seeking to determine what institutional rules are applicable, organizational actors 
must collaborate, which includes engaging in a degree of conflict, by addressing 
differences of opinion, considering roles and responsibilities, and dealing with power 
differences to make agreements in order to realize common goals (Huitema & 
Meijerink, 2010).
 Returning to Eisenack et al’s definition of barriers to climate adaptation, the 
construct proposes a triangulated relationship that is particular to the specific 
adaptations, the actors, and context. There is, therefore, an interaction and inter-
dependency in policy formation processes and, thus, we argue, in the mainstreaming 
of climate adaptation. Further, barriers are also not conceived as fixed insofar there is 
an allowance for agency in the institutional context to engage with other actors to 
shape and (re)value a barrier.  Similarly, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) contend that 
institutional rules are not fixed and can be reinterpreted by organizational actors. 
According to this proposition, the reinterpretation process could reshape a barrier to 
eliminate it as an obstacle or, conversely, to erect a barrier that did not previously 
exist.  For example, Mahoney and Thelen make a distinction between what is referred 
to as “rules-in-use” and “rules-in-form” and the existence of a “soft gap” of (re) 
interpretation or ignoring rules until the rules gain broader legitimacy and become 
part of a shared understanding. Accordingly, significant policy windows of opportunity 
(Kingdon, 1993) may not be required for actors to effect change. Lowndes also 
argues, “critical junctures”  to provoke change are not necessarily needed, but rather 
when institutional actors face new problems the ambiguity is an opportunity in itself 
because the lack of definition of a new problem creates  “…critical openings for 
creativity and agency to establish new precedents for action” (2009). 
Based on the theoretical insights thus described, we draw on this institutional 
approach to analyze how actors use institutional rules to enable or constrain ideas 
about how to establish a climate adaptation mainstreaming pathway.  To do this, we 
analyze the institutional interdependencies focusing on  adaptations, actors, the 
context and the degree to which actors test and explore the parameters of institutional 
rules in determining whether applying a market-based financing mechanism (TIF), 
based on a municipal income stream (property taxes), could be used to mainstream 
local adaptation-related investments. 
 The next section describes the simulation game method and the Watervliet 
Safe Haven game development process (see Appendix 1 for simulation gaming 
methodological overview and data collection methods).  
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3.0 Method: Simulation Gaming for Research 
3.1  The Method
In the world of policy exercises simulation gaming is a recognized method used to 
test new ideas and strategies. The game type used in the research described herein 
is characterized as a policy game. Duke and Geurts (2004) describe this game type 
as “…explicitly created to aid policy makers [to] study specific issues of strategic 
management, and it allows the players to experience the complexity of the strategic 
problems in their environmental setting” (p.38). Contrary to the scientific method of 
natural science, where controlling variables is required to validate and generalize 
findings to larger populations (Klabbers, 2006),  a characteristics of simulation game 
is that it offers the ability to, on the one hand, simplify reality, and, on the other, allow 
for the inherent complexity that actors infuse into the game. Thus, for policy makers 
and practitioners engaged in the policy and plan-making processes, simulation 
gaming provides a setting to communicate ideas about complex systems and 
engage in an experience that cannot effectively be modeled in  a laboratory research 
setting and, importantly, it is relatively safe insofar as there is not a risk of professional 
or institutional damage in experimenting with novel ideas (de Caluwe, Guerts, & 
Klienlugtenbelt, 2012). 
An experiential method  (Straatemeir, Bertolini, & Brommelstroet, 2010), such as 
simulation gaming, is suited to observing practitioner’s responses to abstract 
concepts (ie climate adaptation and a novel financing instrument). Secondly, we 
accept that policy-making is “chaotic and messy”, as Mayer (2009) suggests, and 
given the complexity of the issue, we accept that practitioners do not have perfect 
information on which to base decisions nor are they utility maximizers, in the sense of 
game theoretic modeling (Alexander, 2000). Practitioners do, however, have a 
significant amount of knowledge and information that needs to be teased out. 
Simulation gaming is a method that provides a strategy to elicit  tacit knowledge 
(Klabbers, 2009; Meijer, 2009). Tacit knowledge is  knowledge that experts have but 
cannot articulate well to others and is acquired over many years of experience 
deriving in part “…from activities of the expert that involve thinking, feeling, and 
acting” (Novak & Canas, 2006). This type of knowledge is important to  improving 
knowledge about the complexity of mainstreaming climate adaptation.
3.2  Simulation Game Development Process  
The simulation game design described herein  follows the widely held view (Lukosch 
& Bekebrede, 2014) that a simulation game ought to be constructed “...so it is 
plausible that  participants  behave more or less the same way as they would in 
reality” (Peters, Vissers, & Heijne, 1998).  Using a role play format (see Appendix 5) 
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the simulation was based on the relationship between three poles: observed reality 
and a controlled experiment that is embedded in a conceptual model (see Figure 1) 
(Daré & Barreteau, 2003).  The game development process is described in the 
following three sections, starting with a short summary of the climate adaptation 
policy-making context in the Netherlands wherein we describe the interdependency 
between the ambitions of the Delta Program and Dutch spatial planning and 
development practice. Together, these elements form the institutional context on 
which the conceptual model was designed. The method section concludes with a 
description of the simulation game scenario before turning to the findings arising 
from the Watervliet Safe Haven simulation game sessions in section 4. 
3.2.1  Building the Watervliet Simulation Game Scenario: the institutional context 
Mainstreaming Adaptation in Planning and Land Development Practice:
The Delta Program is responsible for developing recommendations for adaptation to 
climate change in the Netherlands (Termeer, Biesbroek, & van den Brink, 2011).  The 
urban focused component, under the New Housing Development and Restructuring 
Program (Deltaprogramma, 2010, 2012a, 2012b), has set out a direction that 
local-level climate adaptation-related infrastructure improvements will be delivered 
using existing spatial planning investment frameworks and through coupling 
adaptation investments with redevelopment activities overtime (Delta Programme, 
2014). The concept of how mechanisms and processes will be used has been 
modified since the original conception. The 2008 economic crisis had a profound 
Figure 1   Watervliet Safe Haven Simulation Game Design: Conceptual Model
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impact on the Dutch development sector, which stalled many residential and office 
projects across the country. By way of background, in the Netherlands there has 
been a historic reliance on real estate value based on what is referred to as the public 
land development model (Needham, 2007; van der Krabben & Jacobs, 2013). The 
approach is largely considered unviable in the foreseeable future.  It was a model 
that enabled municipalities to use the market to facilitate community-level investments 
to deliver a range of public goods (Hartmann & Spit, 2015). This practice resulted in 
speculative land acquisitions and development projects, which ultimately have left 
many municipalities  burdened with substantial land holdings,  financial exposure, 
and over-supply of houses and offices in their communities (Janssen-Jansen, 2012; 
van der Krabben & Jacobs, 2013). 
 In 2011, the Delta Program acknowledged that using existing planning and land 
development approaches and instruments to facilitate local-level adaptation 
investments, in the short term,  are problematic because many development projects 
are struggling to remain financially buoyant (Deltaprogramma, 2011). Recently, the 
2015 program for urban areas and local adaptation, set out a governance agenda 
that focuses on building a coalition of stakeholders as a step towards gradually 
embedding adaptation into conventional planning and development practice (Delta 
Programme, 2014).  The approach is an incremental and network-oriented strategy 
that assumes adaptation is a long-term process that will require broad multi-sectoral 
participation. The Delta Program’s shift is also consistent with the discourse in the 
planning and development sector around the idea of ‘organic development’ 
(Buitelaar, Sorel, & Galle, 2014). The concept proposes to shift Dutch spatial planning 
from comprehensive master planning and large scale redevelopment to exploring 
strategies that enable incremental small scale initiatives incorporating multiple 
stakeholders and shared financial risk models. This conceptualization also runs 
parallel to similar research that seeks to identify new financing mechanisms and 
alternative business models that could marshal and stimulate a stagnate development 
market5. 
 The foregoing provided a summary of the findings of the systems analysis 
(Peters & Westelaken, 2014) that underpins the simulation game model. The model 
design draws from scholarly and policy-related and research associated with Dutch 
planning and development, municipal public financing, and the Dutch climate 
adaptation program (Root, van der Krabben, & Spit, 2014; Root et al., 2015). The 
5 Numerous studies have been commissioned by the national government, including a website hosted 
by the National Office for Entrepreneurial Netherlands called the Financial Structure Toolbox and 
reports by consultancies and research institutes (ECORYS, 2010; Heijkers, van der Velden, & 
Wassenberg 2012; Ministry, VNG, & NEPROM, 2009; Planbureau, 2014; Planbureau & Urhahn, 2012a; 
VROM, 2010) that identify planning and financial instruments from other countries as possible tools in 
the Netherlands to stimulate investment and broader participation from market players in the planning 
and development process (Heurkens, 2012; van der Krabben & Needham, 2008a).
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Watervliet Safe Haven game, thus, sought to conceptually model the challenges and 
tensions that Dutch spatial planning and development practitioners are currently 
confronted with, which includes fiscal constraints and greater program and policy 
delivery requirements at the local level (Roodbol-Mekkes & Brink, 2014). 
3.3 Watervliet Safe Haven Game: Scenario and Game Objective  
3.3.1 Scenario Description: the fictional city of Watervliet
The ambitious mayor of a fictional city in the Netherlands, named Watervliet, issued 
an invitation to both senior staff at the City of Watervliet and private planning and 
development practitioners. The mayor was forming two teams to advise City Council 
on the redevelopment plan for the city centre. A large-scale plan was announced to 
revitalize the area by building new housing and commercial space, and to replace 
aging underground infrastructure. Replacing the infrastructure was identified as 
vitally important because the central city is increasingly experiencing flooding and 
future projections anticipate serious flooding impacts due to climate change by 
2050. The Mayor was also very keen to introduce an array of green and blue 
infrastructure as a strategy to mitigate flood impacts. The Mayor argued that such 
infrastructure strategies, rather than conventional ‘grey’ infrastructure6 is an opportunity to 
improve the liveability of  the central area, to profile the City as fore-thinking and 
innovative, and to demonstrate to investors that Watervliet is a dynamic city to invest 
in. The initiative was praised by a senior minister in the national government as an 
exemplary project with a smart strategy to address climate change. However, despite 
such support, funding would not be available from the national government. The 
Mayor’s project vision faced a modest financial gap and, as a result, was criticized in 
the local newspaper.  The Mayor thought the budget gap could be closed by using a 
financing instrument often used in the United States, Canada, and more recently, in 
the UK  to finance the climate adaptation-related infrastructure that could not be paid 
for during the development phase. The instrument is called tax increment financing 
(TIF). It is not an instrument that is used in the Netherlands, though there are not legal 
barriers for municipalities should they want to.  Tax increment financing (TIF) is a 
bounded value capturing instrument7 designed to “earmark the related increment of 
property tax in a proclaimed area to fund public investments” (Alexander, 2012). 
While the duration varies, a TIF is typically based on a 25-year time-span in a 
prescribed designated community improvement area. It is fundamentally premised 
6 “Grey” infrastructure refers to conventionally used roads, power grids, piped sewer and water systems.
7 Value capturing tools are described as “…a group of instruments that enable the increased value of 
land and property as a result of public investments……to be captured directly or indirectly, so that it 
[the value] can be used for financing the activities that are responsible for the increased value” (654) 
e.g. to finance those parts of the plan that are not cost effective during the development phase (van 
der Krabben & Needham, 2008b).
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on the idea that the provision of new infrastructure in the designated area will increase 
property values and the future incremental value can be captured and redirected to 
finance area-specific public infrastructure investments (Briffault, 2010)8. The Mayor 
suggested that this instrument could be the key to closing the budget gap and 
moving the project forward.
 
3.3.2 Simulation Game: Participant Objective
The objective of each team is to consider whether TIF should be used in the project, 
as part of a bundle of financial strategies that comprise the project budget. Each 
session group had to reach a consensus, to the degree possible, on whether to 
recommend that the Watervliet City Council should use TIF for  the Watervliet Safe 
Haven redevelopment project budget, in which form it should take, or whether TIF 
ought not to be used in any form. 
4.0  Research Findings
4.1  Mainstreaming Local Climate Adaptation Investments Using 
Municipal Income: Shaping the institutional rules 
The aim of this research was to determine whether TIF is a potential instrument to 
mainstream climate adaptation investments. The key variable in this query is whether 
using property tax would be determined to be appropriate. On the surface the 
principles and practices associated with TIF are not significantly in opposition to 
conventional approaches used in the Netherlands, for example: 1) taking advantage of 
projected future earnings by engaging in the land market; 2) a strong entrepreneurial 
spirit demonstrated by public and private sector actors and, 3) a demonstrated 
acceptance of government intervention in the market to facilitate investment in public 
goods (such as physical and social infrastructure) (van der Krabben & Jacobs, 2013). 
By digging below the surface of what appears to be a modest question, the use of 
property taxes as a means to raise funding for climate adaptation investments is a very 
complex one. We focus on the way in which participants generated an understanding 
about the use of property taxes when confronted with developing a recommendation 
about TIF. The findings highlight that the potential acceptance of the TIF and application 
for climate adaptation investments is inextricably connected to debates that are 
shaping the discourse about the future of the Dutch planning and development 
model. Practices that use the market to deliver public goods have been put in doubt 
and, in relation to climate adaptation investments, additional uncertainty is expressed. 
8 Please refer to the extensive research on TIF (Lefcoe, 2011; Root et al., 2015; Squires, 2012; Weber, 
2010) and  explanations about the diverse range of financing vehicles using tax increment 
financing,(Pricewaterhouse Cooper, 2008).
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4.2   Making Climate Adaptation Investments: Defining roles and 
responsibilities 
The simulation game confronted all participants with a climate adaptation scenario 
wherein there was an opportunity to make strategic localized infrastructure investments 
aimed at reducing the negative impacts of climate change. The interventions offered 
integrated urban design solutions that were explicitly profiled as adding only a modest 
budget cost. The results from the questionnaires indicate that, overall, participants 
agreed that climate was changing (81.5% strongly agreed or agreed) and the majority 
(83% strongly agreed or agreed) that local government should plan accordingly. 
Perspectives, however, were varied from fully accepting that investment must be made 
immediately to those that argued adaptation to climate change in the Netherlands 
was not a critical issue, uncertainty about when to act, and provided a view that 
adaptation does not require urgent attention (an average split of 29%). The foremost 
attention was focused on two fundamental questions: 1) what are the roles of different 
stakeholders? and, 2) who benefits from investments and are such benefits fairly 
distributed? The strongest and consistent view, despite variations, between all of the 
simulation sessions was that government ought to take the financial risk with investments 
associated with climate adaptation. The reasoning behind the role of government was 
twofold, firstly, a general lack of confidence in the real estate market in the foreseeable 
future and, secondly, participants consistently argued that adaptation likely carries 
additional costs and any such investments will not be sufficiently valued in the market 
place. If the investments are not valued in the market place, then the investments 
become a project cost that cannot be recovered using conventional processes, as it 
was argued. The implication is that responsibility and actions remain within the sphere of 
the government. Municipal participants tended to accept that if the government does 
not act, nothing will happen. As stated in a Nijmegen session, “I think the government 
needs to invest in climate adaptation. Otherwise, nothing happens …but how do we 
pay for it?”. The majority also concurred that there was little political support to make 
investments, particularly if investments are framed explicitly as climate adaptation, 
given the perceived lack of urgency for local climate adaptation actions.
 This section identified and reinforces findings in the climate adaptation literature 
that the public sector is perceived as the primary actor respecting climate adaptation 
actions (Mees, Driessen, & Runhaar, 2012). To take the analysis further, the simulation 
gaming reveals further considerations regarding the dynamics and the degree to 
which participants were willing (or unwilling) to reinterpret rules and exert a degree 
of agency to apply an existing income stream as a means to mainstream local 
adaptation- related investments. We turn now to a discussion about ‘the rules’ of 
property taxes.  As previously stated, understanding the institutional landscape of 
property taxes is critical to understanding the institutional fit of tax incremental 
financing in the Netherlands. 
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4.3   Openings for Reinterpretation? Enforcing and shaping formal/
informal rules
4.3.1 The Rules of Property Taxes
The findings from the simulation game support research about the municipal public 
finance system and the overall role of property taxes in the Netherlands (Allers, 2011, 
2012; Root et al., 2015). In principle, the majority of the participants stayed within the 
norm of conventional views arguing that the purpose of property taxes was to fill 
municipal budget gaps to support programs and services if inter-governmental 
transfer payment from the Municipal Fund9 were insufficient. Property taxes are 
generally understood to act as a buffer for municipal budgets and applied for general 
budgetary purposes. Earmarking and channelling incremental property tax income 
into a specific area confronted participants’ norms about equity and sense of 
fairness, which is a principle embedded in the Municipal Fund. This perspective was 
voiced stronger by municipal actors based on an overarching concern that the use of 
TIF would create unequal results, particularly for those in economically disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. Notwithstanding these views, as argued by Lowndes (2005) ambiguity 
creates spaces for institutional actors to reinterpret rules and to test those reinter-
pretations against norms and values. The next two sections identify how participants 
enforced rules, as a means to maintain the status quo, and how others actively engaged 
in reinterpreting informal and formal rules to explore the institutional fit of TIF.
4.3.2 Enforcing Rules
For those that focused on TIF as a single stand-alone instrument they tended to 
assume that the government would end up taking the financial risk and, thus, were 
more likely to view the instrument unfavourably. Several variables likely explain this 
view. Firstly, as noted in section 3, Dutch municipalities have experienced substantial 
losses as a result of the 2008 downturn in the market. Municipal borrowing practices10 
 and appetite for risk have been substantially criticized in both popular media and 
scholarly research (Allers & Merkus, 2013).  Secondly, in addition to views that were 
sensitive to public discourse about the need to curb municipal financial risk taking 
activities, participants utilized formal institutional rules as a means to enforce those 
arguments. For example, one group voiced the concern that generating more taxes 
(i.e. increasing the tax base) may result in less funding from the national government’s 
Municipal Fund. As stated by a participant, “...in the current Dutch situation, it might 
be a recommendation that if we use the TIF tool we might create higher property tax 
9 The main source of income for Dutch municipalities is an inter-governmental transfer system called the 
Municipal Fund (Allers, 2011).
10 Dutch municipalities are sheltered from bankruptcy under Article 12 of the Financial Relations Act [Wet 
Financiële Verhoudingen] BNG and Waterschapsbank are the two Dutch banks that specialize in low 
cost borrowing to municipalities.
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revenue, but it means a lower overall benefit. Which are linked to each other. So we 
will be punished…” because less funds will be received from the national government 
(Nijmegen session). The argument assumes that municipalities would receive less 
funds from the national government if the local tax base increases. This argument 
underpinned the group’s strong recommendations against TIF. It was the sole 
recommendation against using TIF, as summarized: “… we can say that we think it is 
not a good tool, because subsidies will be reduced from the Municipal Fund and 
there will be no surplus”.  The degree to which a municipality would receive less 
funds from the Municipal Fund requires, however, detailed calculations on a 
case-by-case basis due to the wide discrepancies between municipalities in relation 
to ‘need’, as defined by the granting formula, and the local tax base11. Nonetheless, 
this position was presented as an undisputable fact, which was persuasive enough 
to create a group consensus. Other groups also cited the potential lack of control 
over local property taxes insofar as the national government could, potentially, 
interfere by imposing a ceiling or even eliminating property taxes as a source of local 
income. According to this assertion, those municipalities using TIF would be left 
without an income stream to support the associated debt. This is not a unique 
concern and is identified in the property tax research literature as an oft cited issue of 
local governments that are seeking greater local financial autonomy (Slack & Bird, 
2014). Another reason identified by participants why TIF may not be appropriate is 
also often found in the literature on TIF. It is argued that speculating on future property 
tax value will tie the hands of future politicians on budgetary matters due to being 
lumbered by the debt taken on by previous administrations. Finally, the low property 
tax rate was cited as a substantive obstacle. Participants were largely in agreement 
that the current rates are unlikely to generate significant revenues to support the 
financing required to fund infrastructure improvements. 
4.3.3 Reinterpreting Rules
Conversely, for those participants that found space for reinterpretation, they 
conceptualized TIF as a tool that could be bundled in a broader package of planning 
instruments. In that case, there was less of an assumption that local government 
should necessarily act as the financial backstop. Rather, there was greater interest in 
considering the advantages and disadvantages of the TIF financing models (Price-
waterhouse Cooper, 2008) as strategies to structure and distance financial risk away 
from municipalities. Citing the potential for co-creation and co-financing as key 
11 For example, specific and general grants to municipalities from the Municipal Fund are based on a 60 
point formula. In addition to a diverse set of needs, including demographic, environmental, and 
economic needs,  a component of the calculation is based on the residential and commercial tax 
base. In other words, the tax base is a component of the grant formula, but a range of other factors play 
a role in granting process.
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advantage of the instrument, it was argued that TIF could form part of a new 
alternative model to conventional practice, rather, for example, than municipalities 
taking on risk through land acquisition and infrastructure provision.  TIF could be an 
instrument that “unlocks” stalled areas with a focus on “value creation” (Den Haag 
session). This perspective was framed in relation to an approach currently of interest 
in the Dutch planning sector referred to as ‘organic development’ (Planbureau & 
Urhahn, 2012b). As a demand-oriented approach, the concept of organic development 
takes as a starting point that municipal planning processes ought not to be the key 
driver or shoulder the risk of the development process, but rather the focus should 
be on building consensus with multi-stakeholders and pursuing new ways of 
investing that manages long term financial risk. As a Den Haag participant stated, 
instruments like TIF need to be considered because this way of working is “…not 
[about] the crisis, it is the new reality”. Accordingly, the use of TIF could be aligned 
with the trend towards incremental planning based on reduced expectations that the 
land development process is capable of levering sufficient value during the 
development phase to deliver public goods. Real estate and property improvements, 
on the other hand, can build value over a longer term, which, according to the theory 
of the instrument, can be harnessed under a TIF designation (Briffault, 2010). Finally, 
although a modest income stream, using property taxes in a project-specific strategic 
way might (in time) be understood to be less politically risky for two reasons:  1) TIF 
is not designed as a new tax (imposing a new tax is politically unpalatable) and, 2) 
TIF could be conceived as less riskier than  land acquisition and pre-economic crisis 
master-planning approaches. However, at the moment, many participants emphasized 
that the current political environment is unlikely to be receptive to any instrument that 
may appear to encourage municipal risk taking.  
4.3.4 Investing in Climate Adaptation: Shaping the rules
Shaping and defining the institutional rules for climate adaptation is new territory 
(Termeer, Dewulf, et al., 2011). In the Netherlands, there are no formal rules that 
expressly relate to long term climate change projections that municipalities must 
comply with. The ambition of the Delta Program is to define the institutional landscape 
and establish a formal policy framework. The application of a market-based instrument, 
such as TIF, as means to mainstream local level investment in climate adaptation is 
currently confronted with an institutional context that is unstable and ill-defined. Both 
in terms of the delivery system (the planning and development process) and the 
policy landscape (climate adaptation as an un-embedded policy issue). Despite 
differences in how simulation participants imagined applying TIF, there was a general 
sense that a new instrument could be designed to spread risk between stakeholders. 
This view was limited to applying TIF for general public goods investment purposes, 
not climate adaptation. 
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 Using TIF for climate adaptation specific investments returned to the role of 
local government in underwriting financial risk. Long-term investment strategies, like 
adaptation, that lock-in financial risk was understood to be out-of step with current 
directions in Dutch planning. For example, while earmarking is often considered to 
be an advantage of TIF, as a designated income stream to fund community-based 
public goods, participants voiced preferences for keeping budgetary options open 
rather than pre-defining how future tax earnings would be allocated. Participants 
emphasized the degree to which earmarking the future tax increment would be a 
potential disadvantage by reducing budgetary flexibility during the project life-cycle. 
This concern was mostly directed towards climate adaptation and could be an indication 
about the ambivalence towards long-term commitment to such investment types. 
 The findings from the dialog, questionnaires, and recommendations produced 
by the simulation game participants provide evidence that they attempted to shape a 
set of the institutional rules to apply TIF as a strategy to mainstream local climate 
adaptation investments. The shape of the rules broadly reflects current discourse in 
the planning sector. This is illustrated by the line of thinking that long term climate 
adaptation investment should be undertaken in phased manageable pieces and 
sufficient flexibility should be retained in order to manage financial risk at the local 
level. But, mostly, local government, not market-players, ought to play the primary 
investor role. 
4.3.5 Learning About the Rules: Acquiring instrumental and tacit knowledge
Simulation gaming is a method that is oriented towards social learning (Klabbers, 
2009), both in terms of technical information (such as learning operational 
procedures) and developing knowledge of an emotional nature (such as learning 
games for children with developmental challenges). For the simulation game 
participants, our ambitions were not focused on determining whether social learning 
had occurred as defined by Reed et al:  “…social learning may be defined as a 
change in understanding that goes beyond the individual to become situated within 
wider social units or communities of practice through social interactions between 
actors within social networks” (Reed et al., 2010). According to this definition, social 
learning is truly achieved if the learning extends beyond the individual and is 
transferred into a deeper level of understanding and behavior change. Instead, we 
focused on the possible learning effects at the level of the individual as the building 
blocks for organizational learning. We draw from Reed et al’s characterization of two 
types of learning through social interaction. The first type is instrumental in nature 
wherein participants can acquire new knowledge and skills; the second type of 
knowledge, as previously noted, is what the gaming literature refers to as tacit 
knowledge that occurs through the exchange of ideas,  persuasion through 
argumentation, and through negotiation of rules and norms (Reed et al., 2010). 
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 The questionnaire findings provide evidence on several fronts in relation to the 
degree to which participants acquired instrumental and tacit knowledge. The results 
are based on five point Likert scale12 wherein participants were asked the degree to 
which they agreed with statements that inquired about whether: 1) they thought the 
recommendation that they made to the Watervliet City Council was realistic; 2) the 
simulation was sufficient to make a realistic advice; 3) the simulation learning about 
a new instruments; 4) the simulation enabled learning about the views of peers. The 
findings illustrate a consistent affirmation that participants broadly agreed that the 
simulation game process enabled them to gain instrumental knowledge by learning 
about a new instrument. Secondly, and with a stronger emphasis, the experience 
enabled them to gain tacit knowledge by learning about the response of their peers 
to the new instrument in a contextualized format. 
 We hypothesize that participants expressed these learning effects for several 
reasons. Rather than a discussion about the pro’s and con’s of investing climate 
adaptation, or passively receiving information about the technical characteristics of 
TIF, by triangulating: 1) climate adaptation, 2) a new policy/financing instrument, and, 
3) area redevelopment the simulation game provided a multi-dimensional format. 
The participants were able to intellectually and emotionally engage with peers 
regarding the institutional fit of TIF, given the policy-making conditions. Secondly, 
drawing from the gaming literature, one of the characteristics of gaming is that the 
process provides a setting for the ‘faces of knowledge’(Klabbers, 2009). Accordingly 
to Klabbers, “…the faces of knowledge provide the context of problem framing 
linking two heterogeneous elements together: normative elements (norms, values, 
beliefs) by the social organization and the situation or conditions: empirical or 
experiential elements that express assertions about how people connect objects 
and actions to explain services of events” (Klabbers, 2014, p21). The findings from 
the Watervliet Safe Haven game indicate that participants gained the type of 
knowledge described by Klabbers. This knowledge would have been difficult to 
preconceive or to model in the research design. That is to say, in the context of the 
game, as individuals and as a collective, participants generated and transferred 
knowledge through social interaction about the formal and informal rules of 1) using 
a market mechanism and, 2) about using property taxes as a strategy to mainstream 
local adaptation investments. 
 The questionnaire results also point to an interesting finding about the gaming 
process. While participants largely agreed that the advice provided in the 
recommendation to the Watervliet City Council was realistic, participants also 
indicated a weaker agreement about the degree to which the simulation model was 
sufficiently realistic on which to make their advice. While this appears to be 
12 With ‘1’ representing strongly agree to ‘5’ being strongly disagree
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inconsistent with the fact that participants agreed that that the advice was realistic, 
we surmise that because the Watervliet game scenario described a large-scale 
development intervention, based on a master planned approach, participants are 
likely identifying that this type of large-scale planning model is no longer valid. This 
perspective was also expressed by a number of participants informally after the 
simulation session. We think this response provides further validation to the findings 
described in this section.  
 The final section returns to the three research questions to summarize the core 
conclusions and provides suggested directions for further research.
5.0  Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
 
The science is clear: anthropogenic induced climate change poses new governance 
problems for cities (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013; McCarney, Blanco, Carmin, & Colley, 
2011). The concept of mainstreaming has been identified as a possible strategy to 
routinize adaptation measures, but the answer remains incomplete about how the 
process of mainstreaming is achieved (Uittenbroek, 2014). While the ambition of this 
chapter is substantially more modest in scope than providing further prescriptions, 
the research contributes to the mainstreaming literature from an institutional 
perspective by exploring whether barriers to mainstreaming can be overcome 
through actors actively reshaping existing rules to create an adaptation pathway. We 
asked the following three questions: 1) How do institutional rules (formal and informal) 
shape practitioner’s perspectives about the applicability of policy instruments?; 2) 
Are practitioners willing to reinterpret and reshape such rules in order to mainstream 
climate adaptation investments? and, thirdly 3) How do practitioners learn the extent 
to which rules can be changed and which rules cannot?  
 Beginning with the first two questions, the evidence demonstrates that contextual 
interdependencies play an influential role by shaping what participants considered to 
be appropriate (Hartmann & Spit, 2015). In as much as some participants enforced 
technical rules about why TIF would not be appropriate, the stronger direction, both 
evidenced by the discussions and the written recommendations by the session 
participants, was that TIF could be shaped to fit into the Dutch spatial planning 
toolkit. These arguments picked up on the planning discourse about the conventional 
planning model being in a state of transition. TIF, if applied judiciously and integrated 
strategically as part of a bundle of instruments, could be used for facilitating 
investment in area development. However, as identified in the preceding sections, 
the institutional space was not quite as available for investing in climate adaptation. 
We learned that perhaps the use of a market-based instrument to facilitate investment 
in climate adaptation is not yet appropriate given three factors broadly expressed by 
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the participants; firstly, climate adaptation is not yet an embedded policy or regulatory 
requirement, thus there is little incentive for making explicit investments using risk 
based instruments; secondly, given the economic crisis, the idea of introducing a 
market instrument for this purpose is ill-timed; and thirdly, given the Dutch planning 
model is facing a degree of uncertainty and transition the priority is on recalibrating 
practices to address conventional investments that render clear benefits in relation to 
financial risk. In sum, the evidence illustrates that the formal and informal rules 
underpinning the institutional context shaped practitioners perspectives about the 
applicability and the degree to which they were willing to reinterpret the use of 
property taxes. If the objective was to use a market-based mechanism based on a 
local income stream (ie property taxes) to mainstream climate adaptation investments, 
the findings indicate that this proposal would be confronted with the enforcement of 
various rules thereby erecting a financial barrier as an obstacle to implementation. 
 Turning to the third question, the findings draw attention to how individuals 
actors learn about the appropriateness of policy instruments. On one level, they 
gained instrumental knowledge, but, perhaps, more importantly, participants strongly 
agreed that an added value of participating, was not only learning about a new 
instrument, but learning what others thought. By combining a nexus of actors, 
adaptation, and context, participants mixed and matched the structures that 
conventionally guide planning practice with the norms that underpin to determine the 
institutional fit of TIF for climate adaptation. Further, the findings draw attention to the 
role of individual learning and, secondly, organizational learning as a messy 
incremental process that plays a role in reducing, or increasing, uncertainty about 
the appropriateness of climate adaptation actions. 
5.1 Suggestions for Further Research
The findings arising from this research point to several considerations for further 
mainstreaming-related research. Firstly, institutions are not necessarily inert, which is 
often cited as a barrier (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010) to climate adaptation insofar as 
space can be made available to reinterpret rules and for practitioners to exert a 
degree of agency. Secondly, the findings illustrate the contribution of understanding 
the deeper origins of potential barriers (Eisenack et al., 2014). By acknowledging that 
institutions are ontologically prior to individuals (Bell, 2011), and most certainly prior 
to the idea of mainstreaming adaptation to climate change, it is critical to develop a 
thick description of the institutional context in which policy actions are taking place. 
In the case of the Netherlands, a particular suite of historical and contemporary 
issues (ie the origins) informed the recommendations by the simulation game 
participants. 
 At this stage of planning practice in adapting to climate change, we are, 
arguably, in a phase of experimentation and searching. Berkhout et al (2006) 
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describe this as the ‘trial and error’ phase of learning. This concept relates to “...
semi-automatic stimulus-responses processes and the, mainly tacit, accumulation 
of experience that occurs incrementally through the enactment of operating routines” 
(139).  Our findings point to the role of individual tacit knowledge in defining the outer 
perimeter of rules, including space for alternative applications. Practitioners are, 
thus, currently on a ‘learning curve’ about what type of processes and combination 
of instruments are most likely to be effective. These choices are critical given policy 
instrument selection may enhance the mainstreaming process or, conversely, 
reinforce barriers (Eisenack et al., 2014).  
 As asserted in section 1, we predicated our research on the assumption that 
mainstreaming climate adaptation is a policy-process that is nested within complex 
interdependencies that need to be teased out and identified. Simulation gaming is a 
strategy that can be used to triangulate key variables and allow participants to ‘play’ 
with the institutional ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990). Through the interactive format, 
the results provide a rich description about how participants learned about under 
what terms TIF would be acceptable and whether financing explicit adaptation 
investments using local income would be acceptable. Ultimately, mainstreaming 
climate adaptation is beyond the capacity of individual actors and requires broader 
organizational learning. Building more knowledge about the way in which policy- 
makers enforce or reinterpret existing rules may assist practitioners in the 
development of strategies that shift from trial and error into legitimate organizational 
routines (Berkhout et al., 2006).  Further research in this area would benefit from the 
use of experiential methods such as simulation gaming, not least of which to allow 
practitioners to experience novel approaches without the fear of expending valuable 
personal and organizational resources, ranging from financial to political capital. 
Given the formative stage of adaptation policy-processes, we think it would be of 
research and practice interest to experiment13 with different institutional arrangements 
using simulation processes to garner insights about where possible spaces for 
institutional tailoring should be pursued. The aim would be to develop heuristic 
methods that could help practitioners determine whether the institutional conditions 
are receptive towards carving out a mainstreaming pathway or whether the policy 
train14 has arrived too early and with an ineffective arrangement of policy instruments. 
13 Similarly, Termeer et al. (2011)  note that conducting empirical research on climate adaptation is a 
challenge given adaptation policies and governance approaches “..are still in their infancy” (177).
14 We have reformulated a quote from Atkinson’s (2011): “if the train of policy change arrives too late it is 
because the institutional conditions are not suited to the problem solving on time” (14).
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1.0  Introduction
The first chapter of this dissertation began with the claim that we are not planning for 
climate change, but rather, we are planning in times of climate change. Despite the 
scientific research that has built the case to support this claim, the activity of local 
climate adaptation planning remains limited and outside of regulatory requirements. 
For example, although empirical evidence is emerging that adaptation at the local 
level is gradually edging its way onto policy agendas of municipal governments, 
explicit actions remain largely at the voluntary level (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013) or in 
response to an extreme weather event. Extreme events, such as Hurricane Sandy in 
New York that caused substantial flooding and damage opened up a policy window 
prompting political actions, policy shifts, and the allocation of financial resources. 
Yet, for municipalities that do not experience the material impact of extreme weather 
events, adapting to climate change remains an abstract issue. Operationalizing measures 
to adapt to climate change as part of organizational routines to enable long-term 
local investment planning remains obscured by the lack of a concrete understanding 
about potential financial benefits to anticipatory actions. Lack of investment planning 
is often explained as due to the absence of appropriate policy instruments or that 
insufficient financial resources are available to be allocated towards climate 
adaptation investments. The point of departure of this dissertation was to consider 
whether the lack of financing instruments is better understood as an outcome 
rather than a reason for limited municipal actions. That is, the research explored 
whether these ‘reasons’ are substantive in nature or represent a “surface constraint” 
(Measham et al, 2011). In doing so, the aim was to enrich conceptualizations about 
the role of institutions in shaping urban planning practitioners’ perspectives about 
the appropriateness of financing instruments in relation to investment in climate 
 adaptation-related public infrastructure investments. 
 To achieve the aim of the research, four inter-related research questions were 
identified in chapter 1: 1) What modes of practice and instruments do Dutch spatial 
planners use to facilitate investment in local public urban infrastructure?;  2) Are new 
municipal instruments necessary to facilitate  investment climate  adaptation?; 3) Are 
spatial planning practitioners willing to reinterpret and reshape institutional rules to 
enable local investment in climate adaptation? and; 4) How can we conceptualize 
and explain the role of institutions in 
 
facilitating local public investments in climate adaptation, and in shaping practitioners’ 
perspectives about the applicability of policy instruments? 
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As described in chapter 2, the research design is based on multiple methods using 
qualitative strategies for the data collection and analysis. In order to respond to the 
research questions, four research papers were developed, based on three streams 
of inquiry: learn; analyze, explore. The objective of  ‘learn’ was to consider the role of 
the Dutch planning and development in adapting to climate change from an 
institutional perspective. The purpose of this approach was to identify the dynamics 
and dimensions of Dutch planning and development practices as a fundamental 
context in relation to whether spaces for adjustments to policy instruments are 
available for climate adaptation. The second objective was to ‘analyze’ the inter- 
relationship between institutional structures and norms, and the interface between 
municipal public financing as well as the planning and development process in the 
Netherlands. The assumption of this starting point is that understanding how the 
institutional apparatus intersects is fundamental. By analyzing the intersections, the 
results of the research provide an empirically grounded explanation about whether 
institutional informal and formal spaces are available to reinterpret the use of property 
taxes and apply tax increment financing as a means to facilitate investment in local 
physical infrastructure. Chapters 3 and 4 provide data for the third ‘explore’ stage 
using simulation gaming. In this stage, the application of tax increment financing is 
explored as a possible means for municipalities to allocate local resources to 
physical adaptation-related investments. This stage also considered how practitioners 
Figure 1   Analytical relationship between research questions
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learn about the potential institutional fit of the instrument. The analyses in chapters 5 
and 6 endeavor to problematize both the oft cited barriers to implementing climate 
adaptation such as technical limitations, and lack of political will and normative 
claims about what practitioners ‘ought’ to do. The analyses dig into the institutional 
context to consider the structures, norms, and the influences that shape perspectives 
about the potential application of a market instrument, as a means to facilitate 
physical infrastructural investments in local adaptation to climate change. 
 In sum, the short answer to the research questions identified above is: yes, the 
findings indicate that there is institutional space and evidence about the willingness 
to reinterpret the application of existing mechanisms. However, in the case of utilizing 
existing municipal income in conjunction with a market-based instrument to facilitate 
local climate adaptation investments, the willingness is limited. Why is it limited? In 
what way do institutions matter in shaping practitioners’ perspectives about the type 
of policy implementation instruments that are appropriate to facilitate investment in 
local climate adaptation? The purpose of this concluding chapter is twofold: firstly, it 
provides a response to these queries by summarizing the overall research findings 
and bridging the analyses, as presented in the foregoing chapters. Secondly, the 
final two sections offer reflections on the methodology, suggestions for future 
research, and the implications of this research for practice. 
2.0  Discussion of Core Findings 
2.1   Understanding the Planning Context: implications for facilitating 
local investment
As introduced in chapter 3, the discourse about the Dutch planning and development 
sector forms part of the institutional context on which local adaptation policies and 
practices, for local level investments, will be formed in the Netherlands. Consistent 
with the subsidiarity principle broadly acknowledged in the climate adaptation 
literature, policy directions under the Delta Program indicate that municipal level 
public good investments required to reduce the physical impact of climate change 
will be delivered using existing spatial planning frameworks and mechanisms 
available at the municipal level of government. Practices conventionally used to 
facilitate investments in a range of local public goods, however, have come under 
significant scrutiny. More practically, given the over-supply in the residential and 
office sector, such practices are unlikely to be effective in the foreseeable future. 
Practices based on the public land development model that positioned municipalities 
as master developer and primary financial risk taker in the land acquisition and 
pre-construction phases have resulted in substantial financial losses and have been 
the subject of political criticism. 
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In light of unstable economic conditions, Delta Program documents are cited as 
encouraging municipalities to use existing mechanisms “innovatively” as a means to 
enable adaptation actions.  Despite this encouragement, such actions imply requisite 
adjustments to organizational routines. The findings from this dissertation illustrate 
the central role played by both the planning and development institutional context, 
which is intertwined with the municipal financing system, in delineating the potential 
institutional action spaces. While the findings could be cast as evidence about 
limitations imposed by institutions, the case studies, for example, in chapter 3 and 4, 
illustrate the innovative potential of legal rules (Van Rijswick & Salet, 2012) insofar as 
new practices were enabled by the dynamics and interplay between the institutional 
context and governance processes. As illustrated in the Rotterdam Stadshaven 
case, the governance process can be characterized as an iterative cycle between 
the policy and the plan making processes, wherein the tension between informal and 
formal rules of planning practice were responsive to both internal and external 
pressures. These, in turn, informed the approach to how planning policy in the 
Stadshaven project unfolded in relation to climate adaptation. As a cumulative 
process, the trajectory of the Stadshaven process can be traced in relation to the 
shared narrative about the economic benefits of demonstrating leadership on climate 
adaptation. The Stadshaven case provides informative evidence about the role of the 
governance process not simply a means of system coordination nor, secondly, as 
existing in isolation from institutional norms and values, but rather as an essential 
process that establishes an internal and external narrative. March and Olsen (2005) 
observe that institutions are defended by insiders and validated by outsiders. The 
Rotterdam strategy illustrates the effectiveness of external validation through 
international recognition as a front-runner in urban climate adaptation, as a means to 
facilitate internal acceptance.  Routinization of internal organizational acceptance is 
complex but can be connected, to some degree, to the levering effect of the external 
validity that allowed Stadshaven project actors to engage in a phase of experimenta-
tion and testing (Berkhout, Hertin, & Gann, 2006). For example, the Stadshaven 
planning actors overcame the typical implementation barriers by using existing 
mechanisms and processes: solutions were located in the ‘soft spot’ that was 
opened up by shifting modes of practice in Dutch planning and a broad agreement 
about the economic value of climate adaptation as a means to brand Rotterdam as 
an innovator in urban climate adaptation research and development. By locating the 
soft spot, actors were able to reinterpret existing rules and develop a mix that could 
be aligned with emerging norms about tolerance to water in residential areas, which 
could also be reconciled with current planning discourse about the need for flexibility. 
In finding the flexible application of existing mechanisms, the research also revealed 
that stakeholders do not support new formal mechanisms, such as regulations and 
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additional requirements. The general reluctance about devising new regulations was 
accounted for in the analysis with two explanations. Firstly, it reflects the lack of clear 
understanding about what type of new rules are needed to propel concrete actions. 
Secondly, a dynamic within Dutch planning culture: on the one hand, there is the 
desire to open spaces to establish new forms of action (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010) for 
climate adaptation, as argued above, and on the other hand, conventional Dutch 
planning culture tends to straddle between a plan-led and a development-led 
approach. The latter has provided Dutch planners with steering capacity (Buitelaar & 
Sorel, 2010) to achieve spatial planning objectives by way of negotiated and 
collaborative processes with key stakeholders, such as private and social housing 
developers. In the context of adapting to climate change, project actors were unsure 
of what types of concrete measures are required and how much investment is 
needed. The two streams flow together insofar as the desire to steer the process is 
illustrated by the general perception that adaptation implementation will be 
encouraged by allowing room for reinterpretation of the existing framework, as 
opposed to additional regulations. Regulations, from this perspective, were portrayed 
as potentially creating political obstacles, which meant that political will could  become 
a barrier to actualizing local adaptation actions. 
In sum, the Rotterdam case is an example of a dynamic process that resulted in the 
development of a shared understanding and a set of normative rules as a precursor 
to introducing formal regulatory actions. The findings highlight that the interactions 
between broader factors influenced local actions. Rotterdam has made significant 
strides and has attracted international attention for their range of innovative ideas 
and the proactive policy process. Yet, in terms of operationalization, the findings 
indicate that the implementation pathway in Rotterdam is far from delineated. 
Moreover, the current phase can be characterized as in the experimental and testing 
phase of routinization, which is tuned into the institutional context from which it is 
taking its cues. The ongoing development of strategies and solutions is linked to an 
evolution in thinking about climate adaptation on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, in response to volatile aspects in Dutch planning and land development 
practice. 
While the Rotterdam case study in chapter 3 focused on the dynamic interplay 
between institutions and governance in the context of planning and the climate 
adaptation policy formation process, chapter 4 provides theoretical and empirical 
insights about the normative underpinnings of the institutional systems that structure 
and inform municipal investments in local public infrastructure. Here the findings 
illustrate, as cited above, the innovative potential of legal rules, yet the degree to 
which caution is exercised in relation to the uncertainty posed when faced with 
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adjustments to existing policy instruments. In chapter 4, the focus is on building a 
normative understanding about the use of property taxes in the Netherlands as 
essential to understanding the applicability of tax increment financing in the 
Netherlands.  The research departs from the literature that offers overviews of 
potential financing instruments that could be used to enable climate adaptation 
investment. That research orientation contributes technical knowledge, but socio-po-
litical considerations tend to be treated as secondary to the analysis. Turnpenny et al. 
(2015) observe that research on policy instrument selection is “…treated largely as a 
‘given’…”  (p. 20) and does not account for the reasons why policy-makers elect for 
certain instruments and not others. In accordance with this, the focus of chapters 5 
and 6 is on whether TIF, as a financial instrument, is institutionally applicable for 
facilitating local investment in climate adaptation, given the socio-political dynamics 
related to the Dutch municipal financing system and planning process. Thus, the 
critical variable in the analysis is whether the use of property taxes for localized 
public infrastructure investments would be supported institutionally in terms of both 
structures and norms. 
 Returning to the findings described in chapter 4, the analyses demonstrate 
that there is sufficient space within formal structures for municipal actors to exert 
agency and reinterpret how property taxes are used, as evident in the Waalfront 
redevelopment case study. Yet, conventional practice, and the norms and values that 
underpin choices, are likely to place limits on deviations from accepted practice. For 
example, the Waalfront redevelopment project in Nijmegen tentatively walked 
through the four tiers (Berkhout et al., 2006) of routinization from experimentation, 
knowledge articulation, and codification by developing a policy rationale and 
processes that were organizationally, aligned with political aspirations and supported 
by broader values and formal financing structures (i.e. property taxes and lending 
practices). Yet, the alternative application of property taxes proved to be relatively 
short-lived due to the drastic change in the land market conditions since 2008. The 
significant value loss changed the business plan fundamentals of the entire initiative. 
The moment of ‘feedback and iteration’, as the critical last step in embedding 
changes into organizational routines, was undertaken in the full glare of the budgetary 
post-mortem, wherein the strategy of speculating on future property tax income, to 
support public goods investments, drew substantial criticism (despite representing a 
minor component of the overall budget). The Waalfront case study offers clear 
evidence that the use of property taxes by the City of Nijmegen, based on a TIF-like 
conceptualization, is unlikely in the foreseeable future given the ongoing fiscal 
challenges and the ‘sticker shock’ of speculating on property value that did not 
materialize. 
 The analysis described in chapter 4 also included data drawing upon expert 
interviews and a questionnaire of senior municipal tax officials. The findings reveal 
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that the application of property taxes retains a certain sticky adhesion to conventional 
practice, beyond the critical juncture of the economic crisis. That is, conventional 
practice, and the norms and values that underpin choices, are likely to place limits on 
substantial deviations. By piecing together the broader institutional story, the findings 
indicate that the limits to applying TIF in the Netherlands are connected to the 
broader system of municipal financing. By scaling the assessment of TIF to the Dutch 
institutional context, the research illustrates the complexity of operationalizing tax 
increment financing, which will likely be constrained by current views about the need 
to reduce municipal financial risk taking and deeper socio-political dimensions in 
comparison to technical dimensions. Nonetheless, rather than ruling out TIF as a 
possible instrument, the findings described in chapter 3 and 4 also demonstrate that 
there is a degree of flexibility within the Dutch municipal context to reinterpret the use 
of existing mechanisms. Together with austerity measures from the national level, 
critical discourse levelled at the current planning model, and emerging interest in 
developing new practices we might expect that perspectives may gradually shift. 
This would create more space in the use of existing revenue streams, such as 
property taxes, in alternative applications. Secondly, given the way in which the 
Dutch institutional context informs how property taxes are used, chapter 4 argues 
that rather than acting as an instrument to incentivize private investment, by providing 
the structural means for market-players to absorb financial risk, such as 
market-backed TIF financing models, the corporatist nature of Dutch planning culture 
implies that the TIF instrument may not inherently facilitate such a shift in practice. 
That is to say, as argued, we cannot assume that, by introducing a new instrument, 
modes of practice would substantially change insofar as Dutch municipalities are 
likely to continue taking risk positions. This can be explained by the durability of 
norms and values and the structures that operationalize and replicate them. In other 
words, understanding the configuration of the Dutch planning and public finance 
governance tells us why the application of property taxes (a seemingly modest 
proposal) is complex and why the answer to the applicability of tax increment 
financing is connected to a larger institutional system. 
 The findings from chapters 3 and 4 provide a partial answer to the broader 
query articulated in the fourth research question. That is, in what way do institutions 
matter in shaping practitioners’ perspectives about the type of policy implementation 
instruments that are appropriate to facilitate investment in local climate adaptation? 
Chapters 5 and 6 turn to the explore phase of the research design. This phase uses 
the empirical findings from ‘learn’ (chapter 3) and ‘analyze’ (chapter 4) to develop a 
simulation game, referred to as the ‘Watervliet Safe Haven Game’. The results arising 
from the simulation game sessions provided data to develop a multi-dimensional 
explanation about how practitioners attempt to reconcile institutional dynamics and 
the dilemmas inherent in climate adaptation. A blend of factors played an influential 
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role in how practitioners made choices about the suitability of tax increment financing, 
as a market-based instrument based on local income, to facilitate investments in 
climate adaptation. The analysis reveals that, indeed, if the issue about investing in 
climate adaptation is primarily about the availability of financial resources, the answer 
would be substantially more straightforward.
2.2   If It Was Only About The Money: Institutional dilemmas and  
the limits to local risk-based financial instruments
The analyses in chapters 5 and 6 are based on data collected from the Watervliet 
Safe Haven Game simulation sessions. Together, these chapters offer two 
complementary explanations about the complexity of adjusting existing practices to 
enable and embed climate adaptation, using an existing municipal financing 
structure. Chapter 5 undertook a two level analysis. One level addressed the 
acceptability of using TIF for general investment purposes, and a second level 
considered applying TIF specifically as a means to facilitate investment in local level 
climate adaptation-related infrastructure investments. The findings offer a juxtaposition 
of views. Participants were generally positive, with some reservations, about using 
TIF as part of conventional practice. This perspective was based on the premise that 
TIF had a better chance of being integrated into the Dutch urban planning ‘toolkit’ for 
general purposes than for facilitating investment in climate adaptation. The lack of 
confidence and weak support about the appropriateness of TIF was in part due to 
the financial risk and lack of foreseeable benefits of climate adaptation-related 
investments. The analysis conceptualized these key concerns running through the 
participants’ narratives as bound up with three fundamental dilemmas. It could be 
argued that the reluctance to use TIF for climate adaptation investments is attributed 
to current economic circumstances and weak political support for planning 
mechanisms that rely on speculative earnings from real estate. However, the findings 
provide further evidence that such reasons are not sufficient to explain the 
disinclination to use TIF: the rationales are more complex and not specific to TIF as 
an instrument per se. Chapter 5 identifies the three climate adaptation dilemmas that 
underpin the rationales: 1) uncertainty about societal values; 2) the mismatch 
between the planning horizon of adaptation and that of conventional planning 
horizons, and; 3) the perceived lack of benefits to contemporary investors. These 
three dilemmas re-enforced views about the type of financing instruments that would 
be most appropriate. The three key dilemmas (values uncertainty, planning horizon, 
indirect benefits) are characterized in chapter 5 as institutional in nature, given the 
normative and value oriented characteristics. These characteristics form an 
undercurrent in the narrative of the participants that shaped responses to both 1) 
investing in adaptation and, 2) in the use of local income, which is to say, property 
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taxes. While participants found a degree of value certainty about climate change as 
an abstract issue, to the extent that views were aligned that climate adaptation is an 
urban planning issue that requires explicit actions, participants struggled to reconcile 
the degree to which municipalities ought to underwrite long-term investments or 
whether the market will recognized the added-value of such investments in the 
foreseeable future. 
 Leading on from the analysis in chapter 5 that explored how the dilemmas of 
climate adaptation affect perspectives about investments, chapter 6 considers the 
application of tax increment financing as a possible instrument to ‘mainstream’ local 
adaptation investments. Firstly, the empirical premise of this approach is to explore 
whether property taxes, as a fundamentally local income stream, could be used to 
enhance autonomous adaptation. Secondly, the theoretical aim was to tease out the 
institutional dimensions that are often overlooked in the mainstreaming-oriented 
literature. The concept of mainstreaming is generally conceived of as the integration 
of climate adaptation policies and actions into existing processes (Eisenack et al., 
2014; Uittenbroek, Janssen-Jansen, & Runhaar, 2013). To achieve this goal, emphasis 
is often placed on the role of policy entrepreneurs and in policy windows of 
opportunity as drivers in the mainstreaming process. However, the interest of this 
dissertation is focused on how individual practitioners, acting within an institutional 
context, actively (re)shape existing rules and what influences inform those choices 
vis-à-vis financing local adaptation actions. The evidence arising from the Watervliet 
Safe Haven game simulation demonstrates that the interdependencies within the 
institutional context play an influential role by shaping what participants considered 
to be appropriate (Hartmann & Spit, 2015). For example, although some simulation 
game participants enforced formal rules about why TIF would not be appropriate, the 
stronger direction was that TIF could be shaped to fit into the Dutch spatial planning 
toolkit. The affirmative arguments picked up on the planning discourse about the 
conventional planning model being in a state of transition, which were consistent with 
the findings in chapter 3. TIF, as asserted by some participants, if applied judiciously 
and integrated strategically as part of a bundle of instruments, could be used for 
facilitating investment in area development. However, the institutional space was not 
quite as available for investing in climate adaptation by way of a risk based market 
instrument, given three factors broadly expressed by the participants; firstly, climate 
adaptation is not yet an embedded policy or regulatory requirement, thus there is 
little incentive for making explicit investments using risk based instruments; secondly, 
given the economic crisis, the idea of introducing a market instrument for this 
purpose is ill-timed; and thirdly, as the Dutch planning model is facing a degree of 
uncertainty and transition, the priority is on recalibrating practices to address 
conventional investments that render clear benefits in relation to financial risk. In 
sum, the evidence illustrates that the formal and informal rules underpinning the 
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institutional context shaped practitioners’ perspectives about the applicability and 
the degree to which they were willing to reinterpret the use of property taxes. If the 
objective was to use a market-based mechanism based on a local income stream 
(i.e. property taxes) to mainstream climate adaptation investments, the findings 
indicate that this proposal would be confronted with the enforcement of various rules 
thereby erecting a financial barrier as an obstacle to implementation. 
2.3   Triangulating the Data: A concise answer to the  
research questions
Rather than addressing each research question separately as identified in figure 1, 
this section draws together the analyses provided in chapters 3 to 6 to offer an 
answer in the aggregate, as follows:
 The modes of practice and instruments used in Dutch planning and development 
play a fundamental role in facilitating investment in local public infrastructure. 
Facilitating investment in climate adaptation is, thus, sensitive to how those practices 
are played out and what instruments are applied in the process. Actions to reinterpret 
existing rules as a means to facilitate investment in climate adaptation are under - 
pinned by a complex assortment of rationales. In the Rotterdam case, two key 
enabling factors can be identified. Firstly, organizational support that created the 
conditions to make experimental modifications to existing rules, thus enabling the 
‘climate-proof’ measures to be linked to pragmatic economic objectives, to position 
Rotterdam as an innovative leader. Secondly, adjustments to existing instruments 
also reflected the broader shifting landscape of Dutch planning practice, given the 
public land development model has been rendered ineffective and the subject of 
substantial criticism. Thus, there are indeed degrees of freedom to reinterpret and 
shape rules to facilitate climate adaptation-related investments during the planning 
process. The findings also point to the role of formal and informal institutions in 
limiting the degrees of flexibility, i.e., agency with constraints. Lacking a cohesive set 
of informal institutional conditions, it is much less likely that practitioners will be in a 
position to vary how existing instruments are used or to introduce new mechanisms, 
such as tax increment financing, to fund local public infrastructure aimed specifically 
at climate adaptation. Because investing in adaptation confronts practitioners with a 
set of dilemmas, there is a struggle to reconcile those dilemmas with the need to 
operationalize adaptation actions using a risk-based instrument. The reluctance to 
take the plunge of applying a market-based financing instrument is beyond 
unwillingness to prioritize1 local adaptation investments, but rather, participants 
were unable to sufficiently align values and norms with structures that would enable 
the application of tax increment financing. The question as to whether practitioners 
1 Lack of priority given to climate adaptation is frequently identified as a barrier to implementation.
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are willing to reinterpret and reshape institutional rules to enable local investment in 
climate adaptation teased out a response that provides two stark lessons for climate 
adaptation policy-makers. Firstly, the empirical evidence points to the limited 
acceptance that a local market-based financing instrument is likely to have in the 
Netherlands in relation to facilitating adaptation-related investments. Secondly, in 
contrast, practitioners appeared able to imprint an incrementalism and customize 
TIF into a ‘made in the Netherlands’ instrument for investments that were conceived 
of as non-adaptation specific. Here a distinction is drawn between conventional 
public goods investments and climate adaptation-specific investments (see appendix 5). 
The latter provoked participants to simplify the complexity of climate adaptation into 
a trio of thematic clusters, referred to as institutional dilemmas. The institutional 
dilemmas functioned as heuristic ‘short-cuts’ by serving as rationales for participants 
to impose a financial barrier on the climate adaptation investments proposed in the 
Watervliet Safe Haven game. As argued in the preceding section, the financial gap 
was not necessarily actual, but rather practitioners were unable to fully accept the 
choice of a financial instrument that could have been used to augment the project 
budget. This outcome was based on the dynamics of the institutional context and the 
perceived constraints that were informed by formal and informal institutional rules 
and the intersection with the dilemmas of climate adaptation. Together these factors 
shaped practitioners’ perspectives about the limits to applying tax increment 
financing as a new financial instrument for the Dutch planners’ climate adaptation 
toolkit. 
3.0 Methodological Reflections 
The objective of the research design was to develop an actor-centered strategy that 
aimed to develop a thick description of the decision-making context in which 
planning practitioners operate. In doing so, the intention was to produce insights 
about the dynamic interplay within the institutional context that shapes the degree to 
which planning practitioners are able to ‘play’ with the rules. The following three 
sections reflect on the research strategy by situating the discussion on the 
methodological choices in the governance-related climate adaptation literature, and 
offers reflections on the implications for practice of this research. The final two 
sections turn to suggestions for future research and final conclusions.
3.1 Methodological Considerations 
As described in chapter 2, the research design integrates a number of methods, 
which include project-specific case studies, interviews, a questionnaire, and multiple 
repetitions of a simulation game. The advantage of this strategy is that it created 
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several angles to develop an  understanding about the characteristics of real-life 
events (Yin, 2013). By developing a research process that was cumulative in effect, it 
increased the validity of the findings. For example, in chapter 4 the findings in the 
Rotterdam case study demonstrate external validity in relation to the current 
conditions of Dutch planning and development, and the literature that specifically 
focuses on urban climate adaptation. These findings were further validated by the 
data arising from the simulation gaming sessions (analysis in chapter 5 and 6), both 
in terms of the participants’ narratives and the questionnaires administered during 
the game simulation process. That is, responses from the simulation game 
participants were consistent with views about the need to address adaptation to 
climate change as an urban planning issue, but the question of how to finance 
physical investments remained unclear in the minds of practitioners. The validity of 
the findings was demonstrated by the broad agreement between the participants 
that the recommendation to the fictional city council of Watervliet regarding tax 
increment financing was realistic. Similarly, the findings in chapter 4 focusing on the 
question of the appropriateness of using tax increment financing in the Netherlands 
was based on three methods: a telephone questionnaire of senior municipal tax 
officials, expert interviews, and a project-specific case study. The triangulation of 
these methods yielded empirical findings that are also consistent with existing 
literature on tax increment financing with respect to how practitioners outside of the 
Netherlands generally view the instrument. This is particularly the case with respect 
to the pros and cons. It also generated new data that is particular to the Netherlands. 
The results of the questionnaire, for example, established an important benchmark 
about the limited use of property taxes in the Netherlands to finance area specific 
physical investments. The findings in chapter 4 were further reinforced by the 
participants of the simulation game, as revealed in the debates about the strengths, 
weaknesses, risks, and fairness of using tax increment financing. 
 The following three sections provide a brief discussion about the methodological 
choices, with a specific emphasis on the building blocks of the case study presented 
in this dissertation.
3.2  Case Study Construction: Core building blocks
In order to advance scholarship and practice on climate adaptation, recent arguments 
emphasize the need to shift away from so-called ‘functionalist’ views that are 
prevalent in the governance literature (Biesbroek et al., 2015). The outcome of such 
approaches may offer a range of instruments to overcome the barriers to 
implementation, but neglect the analytical opportunity to embrace the complexity 
and dynamics of policy and decision-making processes. The result may provide a 
description of the symptoms that are frequently present when confronted with 
implementation challenges, but, as implied earlier in this chapter, lacks explanations 
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about the causes of the various barriers and challenges in the climate adaptation 
policy and implementation process. Here the strategic construction of a case study 
is recognized as essential to developing an understanding about what Flyvbjerg 
describes as the “…the deeper causes behind a given problem...” (2006, p. 229). 
Indeed, while case study research has been criticized for being too context 
dependent, thus not possible to generalize for the purposes of science in comparison 
to, for example, large-n quantitative methods, according to Flyvbjerg the context 
dependent nature of case studies is the method’s strength: “context dependent 
knowledge and experience are at the very heart of expert activity. Such knowledge 
and expertise also lie at the center of the case study method of learning” (Flyvbjerg, 
2006, p. 222). Not surprisingly, in the quest to understand in what forms climate 
adaptation policies are being realized, and what challenges practitioners are 
confronting, a substantial amount of climate adaptation research, focusing on 
questions of governance, is based on case studies. Although a critical mass of 
research based on case studies has been generated over the years (Bulkeley & 
Broto, 2012), it has also been identified as a weakness of the literature. Eisenack et al. 
(2014) argue that  the literature is sufficiently mature that comparative research 
focusing on the underlying causes of impediments should be consolidated into 
transferable knowledge as an important next step for governance research. This 
dissertation takes a further step in this direction by constructing a case study strategy 
that gathers information from smaller cases, within the broader Dutch case, as a 
means to draw together and link evidence in different ways (Flyvbjerg, 2006). While 
the research does not embark on broader comparative work, in terms of country 
comparisons, the approach contributes to climate adaptation research in terms of 
enriching understandings about the underlying institutional attributes in order to 
explain the dimensions of policy instrument choices that confront planning 
practitioners. 
3.3  Institutional Dexterity: The Rotterdam case
Rotterdam is an interesting case because it is a frontrunner city. But what is 
interesting, as argued in chapter 3, is not the successes, widely reported in policy 
and scholarly literature. Rather, it is interesting because despite the successes, it is 
an organization that continues to work towards embedding climate adaptation as 
part of routines. Rotterdam has been the subject of urban planning related climate 
adaptation case studies. These range from a focus on physical measures such as 
water plazas and floating houses, and specific adaptation policies initiatives (van 
Vliet & Aerts, 2015); stakeholder engagement and cross-sectoral policy analysis 
(Kokx & Spit, 2012); and the interface between local and national climate adaptation 
planning policy visions (Stead & Ta€an-Kok, 2013). Limited studies focus on the 
institutional dexterity of the City of Rotterdam by way of cross-programmatic 
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integration and the challenges presented by organizational and institutional 
complexities (Lenhart, van Vliet, & Mol, 2015), Also important are, as noted by Ward 
et al. (2012), the “institutional path-dependency and deep-rooted policy beliefs” that 
are the common realities that Rotterdam shares with other cities. As has been argued 
in this dissertation, the empirical findings and theoretical insights contribute to the 
literature by making empirical connections between the inter-relationship between 
the structures and norms of Dutch urban planning, municipal financing, and 
adaptation to climate change. As a single case study, within the research design of 
this dissertation, the Rotterdam case may bear similar limitations as other small-n 
research strategies, in terms of transferability of the particular success factors. That 
is, the results could be construed as offering a tempting example of ‘best practices’ 
that practitioners can directly draw from and apply in their own context. However, as 
Yin (2013) points out, the purpose of using cases studies is to develop explanations 
and identify patterns in order to develop analytical generalizations to explain ‘how’ or 
‘why’ certain strategies or programs are successful or not. Thus, the research 
strategy used here acknowledges the importance of context, not as a weakness, but 
as a relevant piece in a complex puzzle. 
 The next section discusses the choice of tax increment financing as a potential 
instrument to facilitate local investment by Dutch municipalities. 
3.4   Application of Municipal Income: Instrument diversity  
within constraints 
Financing municipal public infrastructure is achieved using a wide variety means, 
from government driven funding programs to sophisticated public-private partner - 
ships such as design, build, finance, operate, and maintain contractual arrangements 
used both in the Netherlands and elsewhere (Lenferink, Tillema, & Arts, 2013). 
Despite the depth of experience with such models, which offer short and long-term 
strategies, variations of managing public sector risk, and the means to stimulate 
private sector investment, actual application for local adaptation investments is 
limited. The consideration of market-based instruments remains within the realm 
of research that takes stock of potential instruments, rather than application. 
A characteristic of this research stream is that it has not yet been scaled to the local 
level, as few researchers have explored the structural and normative benefits and 
limitations of potential instruments at the municipal level of government. Drawing 
from several sources (Butzengeiger-Geyer, Michaelowa, Kohler, & Stadelmann, 
2011; Corfee-Morlot et al., 2012; Isoard & Winograd, 2013; Merk, Saussier, Staropoli, 
Slack, & Kim, 2012; Oberlack & Neumarker, 2011), table 1 summarizes a range of 
possible mechanisms and financing instruments. The inventory of potential 
instruments indicates that municipalities have access to relatively few of these. For 
example, there is a wide accessibility gap between local fees and the use of 
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sophisticated instruments such as insurance products and private bond financing. 
Ability to implement these measures may be constrained by regulations, knowledge 
and experience, and limited local financial resources that could be used to lever 
alternative funding sources. Table 1 conceptualizes the relative degree of dependence 
and autonomy municipalities have in relation to accessing global bond markets, 
reliance on grant programs from senior levels of government or market players that 
may be limited, subject to the attractiveness of local economic opportunities, and 
more modest fundraising measures such as local fees and taxes, over which 
municipalities typically have relative autonomy (Kitchen, 2010; Slack, 2005). 
Based on the above argument, in this dissertation the core reason why tax increment 
financing was selected (see chapter 1 and 4 for more discussion), is that the 
instrument relies on a pre-existing income (i.e. property taxes) and municipal actors 
have knowledge about the workings of property tax. These two institutional conditions 
provide a solid platform on which to develop an analysis of tax increment in relation 
to its applicability to climate adaptation and its potential use in the Netherlands. By 
isolating one instrument, the analysis yielded an account about the potential and the 
limitations of the instrument both in terms of the practical ‘fit’ (for planning practitioners 
searching for new instruments) and in terms of the theoretical insights about the 
interplay between structures and norms. The underlying assumption is that certain 
factors, which Turnpenny et al. identify as actors, venues, and capacities, influence 
the selection of certain policy tools. The key point here is that the selection of certain 
policy tools over other policy tools is not a value-free process. Similar to Turnpenny et 
al.’s trio of variables, chapter 6 identifies the nexus of actors, adaptation, and context 
(Eisenack et al., 2014) as critical variables that influence how climate adaptation 
investments are approached. While focusing on a single instrument as the unit of 
Table 1   Relative Degree of Municipal Autonomy financing instruments
Autonomous Fees
Taxes (commercial and property)
Regulations
Land development and leasing
Private financing
Tradeable bonds
Dependent Insurance products
Researcher’s conceptualization based on identified sources
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analysis could be a potential weakness, the results provide evidence that the 
triangulated approach used in this research could also be used to explore other 
financing instruments. This research goal is in line with practice-oriented interests 
about the need to identify strategies that would incentivize private sector investment, 
rather than the public sector remaining the primary investor (Mees, Driessen, & 
Runhaar, 2012). However, while the answer to what type of financing instruments 
exist can be found in policy and scholarly literature, as cited above, the answer to 
how to operationalize them, or why public and private sector practitioners would be 
more or less receptive to the array of potential instruments, is a multi-dimensional 
question. As reinforced by the findings reported on in this dissertation, the pathway 
to discovering what type of instruments are appropriate may be less about the formal 
content and characteristics of the instrument per se than methodological in nature. 
With that in mind, the following section provides reflections on the use of simulation 
gaming as a component of the research design by focusing on its utility to explore 
socio-political dimensions. This section also draws attention to practical issues that 
researchers should consider in selecting this method.
3.5   Simulation Gaming: An experiential method to explore  
policy options
Adaptation to climate change remains a peripheral issue for municipal government. 
Thus, in comparison to measures to mitigate, which are primarily focused on an array 
of actions to reduce energy consumption, examples of climate adaptation are 
comparatively limited (Lenhart et al., 2015; van Buuren, van Vliet, & Termeer, 2015). 
This is particularly evident with respect to using local market-based financing 
instruments. If that is the case, then how can we, scientifically and practically, 
research and learn about how to adapt to climate change? Bulkeley and Broto (2013) 
present the concept of viewing cities as living laboratories for climate adaptation 
where we can learn about “climate change experiments” (p.361) undertaken by other 
cities. The aim should be analyzing the dynamics of the governance process, rather 
than the particular technical solutions, to consider the ways in which “…existing so-
cio-technical systems establish the possibilities for intervention” (p.372). Furthermore, 
Bulkeley and Broto argue that in order to understand how cities are engaging with 
adaptation to climate change through experimentation or, as noted earlier, by ‘trial 
and error’ (Berkhout et al., 2006), it requires “…alternative forms of in-depth analysis, 
in particular through the use of detailed case studies” (p. 372). Simulation gaming 
offers the methodological means to address both of these observations, as can be 
found in a limited but growing literature that applies gaming to climate adaptation 
governance research (Eisenack & Reckien, 2013; Juhola, Driscoll, Mendler de 
Suarez, & Suarez, 2013; Meadows, 2013; Reckien & Eisenack, 2013; Sterman et al., 
2014; Zhou, Bekebrede, Mayer, Warmerdam, & Knepfle, 2013). The commonality is 
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firstly the interest in understanding the socio-political dynamics and, secondly, a 
general interest in developing ‘bottom-up’ understandings about challenges 
presented to practice by climate change. As Zhou et al. (2013) state, gaming “…
allows human players to simulate the real policy-making process and activities…
[and] because participants choose their objectives and decisions, they become part 
of the analyzing process”(p. 125). Similarly, in this dissertation, I found that the 
interactions between participants produced insights about the interconnections 
between, to some degree, disparate issues (i.e. application for property taxes, 
investment in local climate adaptation, and tax increment financing). The participants 
themselves made the connections and sorted through the complexity to arrive at 
outcomes that were similar between the different simulation sessions and consistent 
with the findings from the Rotterdam case study (chapter 3) and the separate 
research focusing solely on the appropriateness of tax increment financing in the 
Netherlands (chapter 4). That is, the simulation gaming process enabled participants 
to ‘join-up’ the separate units of analysis. In doing so, the process was a comparatively 
expedient means to generate data using a process that was driven largely by the 
participants themselves. Here the concept of expedient refers both to the research 
process and for the participants themselves. That is, they were able to learn relatively 
quickly about technical characteristics of tax increment financing and to grasp the 
socio-political subtleties of utilizing this instrument 1) in the Netherlands and 2) in 
association with climate adaptation investments. Thus, the process of experimenting 
with an instrument was achieved in a confined and ‘safe’ place in comparison to the 
real world of practice.
 Moving from the reasoning underpinning the choice of simulation gaming, it 
would be remiss not to account for several general challenges of using simulation 
gaming. This discussion supplements the explanation in chapter 2 about the 
strategies used to address validity threats (see table 1, chapter 2). As noted by 
Straatemeier, Bertolini and Brommelstroet (2010) experiential methods share a 
similar attribute to case studies in terms of the multiple inter-dependencies that could 
be the cause of certain results. With respect to analyses based on data arising from 
simulation gaming, conclusions are based on tacit knowledge of participants, which 
is inherently contextually grounded. Similar to previous cautions about the transfer-
ability of case study knowledge to other situations, it is important to focus on the 
broader conceptual findings rather than the particularities or idiosyncratic findings 
that might be pertinent to the sectoral or organizational context. The strength of 
simulation gaming, particularly using a role play format, is that humans become part 
of the model, thereby introducing complexity that is difficult to replicate in controlled 
laboratory settings or by using computer modeling (Daré & Barreteau, 2003). The flip 
side to the proposition that humans enrich and add complexity to the model is the 
question of how to control for risky or out-of-the-ordinary behaviors that may 
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significantly alter the outcomes of the process. This challenge is recognized in the 
gaming literature and not a phenomenon limited to simulation game methodology. 
Given this potential, the research design sought to manage the issue by keeping a 
sharp analytical focus on a key validity concept underpinning gaming, namely, 
whether arguments or claims by participants reasonably correspond with the 
reference system on which the simulation game model was based (Peters, Geert, & 
Heijne, 1998). In the case of this research described here, this ‘rule-of-thumb’ was 
helpful, but the resulting analysis did not detect significant anomalies.
 The second set of cautions relates to logistical matters. Developing a simulation 
game is a labour intensive process in terms of creating the content to ensure it is 
grounded theoretically and empirically. Once the ‘software’ of the game is created, 
devising the ‘hardware’, in terms of the format and the materials, also requires 
sufficient time and resources. The game package needs to be designed, produced, 
and tested to ensure the simulation sessions will function as intended (as described 
in chapter 2 and the appendix 5). In creating the materials an important logistical 
issue was also encountered in this dissertation: language. Generating the simulation 
game materials in Dutch was essential to facilitate robust participation and strengthen 
the validity of the findings: as I am a non-native speaker of Dutch, this meant that all 
game materials were translated by a native Dutch speaker and the session recordings 
were thematically summarized in Dutch based on the conceptual framework and 
later translated into English for further analysis. The assumption was that by speaking 
Dutch, rather than English, participants were likely to participate and articulate their 
ideas in more rich and nuanced way than they could in a second language. The 
exception was the role of the game master, which was done in English.2 A third 
caution is important to highlight for those interested in using simulation gaming. This 
issue gets to the very core of simulation gaming, without which no data would be 
possible: the participants. It is widely acknowledged in the gaming literature, as well 
as in qualitative research more generally, that research strategies requiring human 
participants (especially busy professionals) are a significant challenge. Secondly, in 
the case of this research, it was critical to obtain content experts, i.e. sufficiently 
seasoned urban planning professionals. Given the subject matter and research 
objectives of this dissertation, using students or non-experts was not appropriate. 
The strategy used in this research successfully attracted the target group of planning 
and development professionals, which was based on postings on a range of 
professional networking websites and a database of contacts. Related to the issue of 
attracting the appropriate group of participants, the time commitment required by 
participants is also an important consideration. A three-hour session was deemed 
2  In the pre-game questionnaire 100% of the participants indicated that they were comfortable with the 
introductory presentation being spoken in English.
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the maximum time that professionals could be expected to voluntarily commit to. 
This time slot was coincident with either a morning or afternoon session. None of the 
participants were financially compensated for their participation. The time constraint 
did limit the opportunity to conduct an extensive post-game debriefing session. 
According to Crookall (2010), debriefing with game participants should ideally be 
included as part of the process for several reasons which include enhancing or 
reinforcing learning outcomes, providing a way for participants to ‘cool off’ from the 
gaming process, particularly if the game created anxiety or other troubling outcomes 
and, thirdly, for research, debriefing might be an opportunity to gather data that did 
not emerge in the gaming process. Further iterations of the Watervliet Safe Haven 
game would benefit from expanding the three-hour time slot to include a greater 
opportunity to debrief with the participants. The game process required the full three 
hours, thus leaving little time for further post-game discussion. However, if using 
debriefing as part of a research focused simulation process, two issues should also 
be considered in relation to validity and practical matters. With respect to the former, 
it is important to control the timing of when the debriefing is conducted (Peters et al., 
1998). Firstly, debriefing should not be done before post-game questionnaires (as in 
the case of the Watervliet game) are completed, as the opinion of an individual might 
be swayed by the group discussion. Secondly, as was the decision of this researcher, 
the robustness of in-game discussion may, on balance, provide richer data for the 
purposes of research (which would likely not be the case if the sole purpose of the 
simulation game was to stimulate social learning). 
3.6  Reflections: Implications for practice
The findings described in this dissertation are, ultimately, optimistic. They do not 
provide an answer to those practitioners that have a thirst for a range of instruments 
that will simplify the adaptation process. Rather, the analysis identifies a puzzle 
wherein a technical fix is only part of the answer to identifying the financial means to 
climate adaptation. That is, knowledge arising from cost-benefit analyses and 
assessments provides technical rationales for policy-making processes but limited 
operational direction. The practical value of the findings arising from this dissertation 
is the emphasis on breaking down the parts from the whole (Healey, 2009) and 
building them back up again, as key steps in operationalizing an implementation 
strategy. The findings suggest that an imperative in the design of a financing 
instrument would be to pay attention to the congruency of informal institutions at the 
‘street level’ (Buitelaar, Galle, & Sorel, 2011) and to ensure that sufficient incentives 
are available to motivate the use of diverse instruments for climate adaptation 
purposes. In the Dutch context, to be in-step with the current socio-political 
conditions, I extrapolate that a market-based financing instrument in relation to 
climate adaptation would need to be aligned with several attributes. That is, to 
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overcome a financial gap, the design of a market-based instrument would need to 
align with the following principles: incrementalism; long term financial risk 
management; and risk sharing between stakeholders. Also, it would need to be part 
of a diverse bundle of instruments. In that sense, understanding what type of 
instruments align with those attributes may be a more successful strategy than an 
instrument and forcing a fit.
 Finally, with respect to the practical question of whether tax increment financing 
is applicable to the Dutch planning adaptation toolkit, TIF might very well be 
appropriate to facilitate investment in local physical public infrastructure to support 
adaptation investments in the Netherlands in due course. In the meantime, the 
findings indicate that the current decision-making environment is not ready for such 
a market instrument in relation to climate adaptation. The contribution of an in-depth 
examination of tax increment financing is that we learn municipalities may have more 
financial opportunities than they are aware of, yet the results come with a forewarning 
about the need to pay attention to the institutional nexus of factors when endeavoring 
to reformulate existing instruments for new applications. 
4.0  Directions for Future Research: Learning  
what works
The role of organizational learning in relation to climate adaptation policy-formation 
processes is a growing area of inquiry in the field of governance research (Baird et el, 
2014; Jordan, A., & Huitema, 2014). The findings in this dissertation also reinforce 
that the answer of how to facilitate investment in the planning process remains very 
unclear insofar as planning practitioners remain, broadly speaking, in the phase of 
testing and experimentation. Moreover, in considering how actions should be 
financed yet more questions arise largely because the pre-conditions for the 
financing conversation have not been satisfactorily resolved. Discussions about 
adaptation to climate change remain within the realm of determining sectoral and 
jurisdictional roles (i.e. ‘the who’ and ‘the where’), and conceiving of possible 
strategies (i.e. ‘the what’ and ‘the when’) to reduce the impacts of climate change in 
urban areas. In order to advance knowledge about how investments can be achieved, 
research that explores ‘how’ and ‘why’ practitioners are able to reduce complexity to 
facilitate investment in climate adaptation would be a fruitful line of inquiry. How 
practitioners interact with different financing instruments could provide indicators 
about the role of both formal and informal institutional rules in shaping what is 
deemed appropriate (and possible). That is, what does the response to a particular 
financing instrument tell us about how the institutional context reinforces 
organizational (un)certainty about investing in adaptation? Why do practitioners 
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differentiate between affirmative or negative narratives to determine what type of 
instruments would be deemed appropriate? Do certain financing instruments create 
dead-ends where other instruments create pathways to implementation? In either 
case, what do such outcomes tell us about how the institutional dilemmas of climate 
adaptation could be overcome and why certain governance arrangements would 
enhance the implementation process? 
 As implied in the set of proposed research questions, the core aim, and 
suggestions for future research, is to investigate the process of how decisions about 
certain financing instruments are arrived at. Indeed, when confronted with a list of 
possible instruments, methodologies that are designed to connect the institutional 
puzzle will contribute to a more robust understanding about the complexity of 
adjusting existing instruments and designing the governance processes that are 
required for operationalization. Thus, suggestions for future research are method-
ologically-oriented. Firstly, as experienced in the research process for this 
dissertation, simulation gaming, as an experiential approach, was a useful strategy 
to engage practitioners to experiment with a novel financing instrument. The effect 
was the generation of data for scientific purposes. Secondly, it provided a learning 
opportunity for participants. Methodologies such as simulation gaming or scenar-
io-building, for example, that are oriented towards participation and co-learning, are 
promising for several reasons including acting as a ‘reality check’ and as a means to 
strike a balance between social relevance and making a scientific contribution to 
knowledge. As noted by Jonsson and Swartling, research processes guided by this 
perspective may also produce data “…that otherwise would remain unknown or 
difficult to access” (2014, p. 1). Both from a research and social learning perspective, 
for scholars interested in how organizations learn, as fundamental to the process of 
adaptation to climate change (Lenhart, Bouteligiera, Mol, & Kern, 2014), and how to 
transform research into policy actions (Termeer et al., 2011), methodologies that 
embrace the messy business of policy-making and consider how practitioners 
simplify the complexity of a multi-dimensional problem, such as adaptation to climate 
change, could contribute to the real world of practice and scientific inquiry. Urban 
planning research and research on the governance of climate adaptation share an 
overt bias towards enhancing practice through investigating possible spaces for 
institutional change – both of which have a clear orientation towards improving future 
outcomes (Healey, 2007). Researchers, thus, should look to the design sciences for 
strategies that build scientific knowledge and allow for experiential engagement 
because, as van Aken (2004) asserts, “…understanding a problem is only halfway to 
solving it. The second step is to develop and test (alternative) solutions” (p.220). The 
application of such a perspective in the design of governance research just might 
help practitioners advance systemic adjustments and make advances toward 
embedding adaptation to climate change into everyday practice.
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5.0  Final Conclusions
Rather than offering further diagnoses or prescriptions, this dissertation contributes 
to scientific research on the institutional dimensions of adaptation in three ways. 
Firstly, it substantiates findings from other scholars (Burch, 2010; Hulme, 2009; 
Juhola, Keskitalo, & Westerhoff, 2011; Wejs, 2014) that establishing a means to 
bridge the so-called implementation gap is largely not a financial issue nor a problem 
that can be addressed with technical fixes. A new institutional approach revealed that 
implementation barriers are generally normative in nature and the interplay between 
1) the dilemmas associated with climate change, and, 2) the degree of boundedness 
of planning practice, creates institutional conditions that currently do not stimulate 
substantial innovation in relation to applying a market instrument based on local 
revenue to facilitate adaptation investments. Secondly, although the Netherlands is 
recognized as a frontrunner in adapting to climate change, particularly in relation to 
water management, the institutional landscape of urban planning is fluid and 
ill-defined. The findings described in this dissertation strengthen the assertion that 
understanding how organizations are entities embedded within broader institutional 
structures (Berkhout, 2012) is core to advancing scientific understanding about 
adapting to climate change. More specifically, organizations develop policy and 
make choices about instruments within a broad polycentric environment with a 
pre-existing institutional rationality. From a methodological perspective, the study 
contributes empirically to the adaptation literature as it is based on a multi-dimen-
sional case study strategy using simulation gaming. This adds an exploratory 
behavioral dimension to the growing academic interest in understanding how 
individuals and organizations learn to adapt to climate change. In doing so, the 
findings point to the dynamic process of organizational learning (Berkhout et al., 
2006) and the ‘little ways’ that are applied in the flow of practice that change 
perceptions and shape decisions (Healey, 2009).  In the context of this research, the 
findings add to knowledge about how practitioners construct meanings in relation 
to the appropriateness of certain financing instruments.
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Appendix 1: Chapter 3
1.0  Interview Questions Summary: Rotterdam, 
Stadshaven Case Study
The interview guide was designed to elicit responses to four themes: 1) the degree to 
which climate adaptation factors into the land and development process in the 
Stadshaven redevelopment process; 2) to develop an understanding about the in-
ter-organizatioal interactions with respect to implementing climate adaptation 
investments during the planning and development process; 3) what financial 
resources are made available to support the implementation process, and 4) are new 
mechanisms needed to support investments in climate adaptation. The following 
identifies the key questions that guided the discussion:
1.1   Climate Adaptation in the Planning and Land  
Development Process
o How does planning for climate adaptation factor into the current planning and 
land development process? 
o Is the focus on implementation or more long-term vision?
o Do you think climate adaptation is shifting towards being regarded as conventional 
practice? If so, what is the shift about? Where is the shift coming from? Or, is 
climate adaptation concerned considered as an outlier issue?
o How, in your experience (ie make reference to sustainability/green as an example) 
does what was once ‘unconventional’ become ‘normalized’? For example, can 
you remember when green standards became the norm, for example? What was 
the driver?
1.2   Inter-Organizational Interaction
o What specific department/individual/organization is driving the climate change/
adaptation agenda? What formal authority do they have? Do they play a deci-
sion-making and/or implementation role? Has the location of what department 
that has had the ‘climate file’ changed? Do you think that makes any difference?
o What are the programs and processes that are available to them to assign 
resources? Are there actual funds? Budgeting processes in which to integrate 
adaptation requirements? 
1.3   Facilitating Investments in Climate Adaptation 
o What are the range of different funding sources available, generally, in the planning 
process for public infrastructure investment (ie public realm investments). Are they 
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based on local tax revenues? Land development? Regulatory requirements, such 
as cost recovery? Are there any shifts in practice and/or alternative approaches 
emerging?
o What is the most important planning instruments (or sets of mechanisms) for 
extracting funding to support investments in physical infrastructure and public 
goods that are used in the planning and land development process? 
o What are the typical priorities for public investments? 
o Does climate adaptation (ie adjustments to infrastructure, green space, etc) factor 
into current priorities? How are those investments being thought about?
o Do you think integrating climate adaptation measures into the planning and land 
development process is different than other elements of city planning that are 
generally considered important to creating good places to live and work? (ie trees 
for water absorption; water retention capabilities; sensitivity flood prone areas)? 
o Is the focus on the financial cost of adaptation to climate change or other issues in 
relation to this subject?
1.4   Are new mechanisms needed to support investments  
in climate adaptation
o How do you think you can use existing planning instruments and mechanisms? 
Do you think that it can be done already with existing standards? Or would changes 
to standards/regulations be required? 
o If you think adjustments to existing mechanism are needed, why is that? What 
adjustments are required?
o Do you think that there is a consensus that new tools are needed and a general 
idea about what those mechanisms would be? If not, why do you think some people 
think new mechanisms are needed, while others think that new mechanisms are 
not needed? 
o What kind of time horizon do existing planning mechanisms operate within? 
Does the uncertain time horizon (re: climate change) present a challenge? Can you 
imagine a tool/process that might be more congruent?
o Would new tools or adjustments to existing tools potentially change what players 
are involved in the process (including decision making and they way planning and 
land development is currently practiced?). How do you think that would play out?
o How do you view the use of taxes as a potential funding source? 
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The following supplementary material is comprised of three sections: 1) results from 
the questionnaire administered to 34 senior tax officials from different municipalities 
across the Netherlands; 2) interview guide used for the expert interviews on Dutch 
property taxes and municipal funding system, and 3) the interview guide used in 
connection with the Nijmegen Waalfront redevelopment project.
1.0 Municipal Tax Officials: Questionnaire results 
Table 1  Property Tax Questionnaire: Results
Number Municipality Response to Survey
•  34/43 = 79% 
response rate
TIF is known to 
respondent
•  18/34 = 53% 
know about TIF as 
an instrument
TIF as Instrument  
for the Future
•  15/34 = 44% 
interested in more 
information
•  8/15 interested 
in potential 
application
Nr 1 Alkmaar Yes Yes No
Nr 2 Almelo Yes Yes No
Nr 3 Almere Yes Yes Yes
Nr 4 Amersfoort Yes Yes Yes
Nr 5 Amsterdam No - -
Nr 6 Apeldoorn Yes No Yes
Nr 7 Arnhem Yes No No
Nr 8 Breda Yes No No
Nr 9 Delft No - -
Nr 10 Den Bosch Yes Yes No
Nr 11 Den Haag Yes Yes No
Nr 12 Deventer Yes No Yes
Nr 13 Dordrecht Yes Yes Yes
Nr 14 Ede Yes Yes No
Nr 15 Eindhoven Yes No No
Nr 16 Emmen Yes No Yes
Nr 17 Enschede Yes No Yes
Nr 18 Goes Yes Yes No
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Table 1  Continued
Number Municipality Response to Survey
•  34/43 = 79% 
response rate
TIF is known to 
respondent
•  18/34 = 53% 
know about TIF as 
an instrument
TIF as Instrument  
for the Future
•  15/34 = 44% 
interested in more 
information
•  8/15 interested 
in potential 
application
Nr 19 Gouda Yes Yes Yes
Nr 20 Groningen Yes Yes No
Nr 21 Haarlem Yes Yes No
Nr 22 Heerlen Yes No No
Nr 23 Helmond Yes No Yes
Nr 24 Hengelo No - - 
Nr 25 Hilversum Yes No No
Nr 26 Leeuwarden Yes No No
Nr 27 Leiden No - -
Nr 28 Lelystad Yes Yes Yes
Nr 29 Maastricht Yes Yes Yes
Nr 30 Rotterdam Yes No No
Nr 31 Schiedam No - -
Nr 32 Sittard-Geleen Yes Yes No
Nr 33 Spijkenisse Yes Yes No
Nr 34 Stichtse Vecht Yes Yes No 
Nr 35 Tilburg No - -
Nr 36 Utrecht Yes Yes No
Nr 37 Veenendaal Yes Yes Yes
Nr 38 Venlo No - -
Nr 39 Vlaardingen Yes Yes No
Nr 40 Waalwijk No - -
Nr 41 Zaanstad No - -
Nr 42 Zoetermeer Yes Yes Yes
Nr 43 Zwolle Yes No Yes
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2.0   Expert Interviews: Property taxes, socio-political 
and technical considerations 
2.1 Interview Questions Summary: 
The purpose of the expert interviews was to explore the socio-political and technical 
reasons that may form an obstacle to using tax increment financing in the Netherlands. 
Open-ended questions were designed to elicit responses based on those key 
themes, as follows:
2.1.1 Technical Considerations:
•  What are the key sources of income for Dutch municipalities? 
•  Can municipalities set their property tax rate? Is there a technical reason that explains 
the taxation rate? 
•  Is there any restriction to how property taxes can be used in relation to financing? 
For example:
 o  Lending & borrowing: Can municipalities float bonds? Would there be time 
restrictions on holding the debt? Is there a maximum debt level rate? Would 
municipalities need to seek provincial approval?
 o  What is the budget approval process for local municipalities and would they be 
required to identify use of the TIF-like approach publicly (or would that be 
based on financial practices of each municipality)?
 o  What is a typical risk assessment of a local municipality re: borrowing and 
lending practices? Can they lend to private operators?
•  Are there limitations to how property taxes are used? 
•  Is there a way to disconnect the future increment from the tax capacity (ie a portion 
of the property taxes wouldn’t be calculated in the tax capacity), which means a 
municipality might float above the tax bandwidth and not penalized? 
•  Would it be necessary to change the tax system pertaining the municipalities to 
introduce tax increment financing as a formal tool? If so, what would the changes be?
2.1.2 Socio-Political Considerations:
•  What are the key debates and trends regarding market-based revenue tools 
vis-à-vis municipalities and need to raise revenue locally in the face of cuts from 
national government
•  Does this relate to debates regarding decentralization and greater control over 
locally generated resources? 
•  What are the issues associated with the idea of increasing the property tax 
bandwidth?
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 o  Would that impact the grant value received by municipalities from the Municipal 
Fund? 
 o  Is there a possibility of exemptions in relation to how property tax capacity is 
reported?
•  Based on what has been discussed during this interview, are there political 
implications associated with the introduction of tax increment financing as an 
instrument? Or is it a decision by local municipalities about how they budget their 
property taxes (and the mechanism that is used)? (ie as long as they must do it in 
relation to abiding by municipal budgeting processes)
3.0 Nijmegen, Waalfront Case Study
Interviews were conducted with municipal and project staff that had direct experience 
on the Waalfront redevelopment project, including the design and application of 
property taxes as part of the development project budget. The following describes 
the over-ended questions that formed the basis of the interview:
3.1   Waalfront Financial Strategy: Overview funding / focus on 
property taxes
•  What are the particular funding mechanisms?
 a. What was the mix of cost-recovery?
 b. Grants: Municipal Fund and EU?
 c. Other?
•  What types of value capturing mechanisms were used in development budget 
and what parts of the plan were they meant to be supporting? 
•  How was the use of property taxes formulated in the budget?
 o What was the policy rationale?
 o How did it work?
			How long was the future value projected?
				How does the financing actually work in terms of getting the funds? Was the 
bank informed for the debt repayment plan?
				Was the money lent to the developer or does the debt cover the municipality 
work? 
				Who holds the debt? Municipality? Arms-length? Private?
				What happens if the value is not realized? Covered by general revenues?
				Was the potential impact on transfer funds from the Municipal Fund assumed? 
 o How was the approval by Nijmegen City Council this mechanism achieved?
			Did municipal politicians understand it as different than land speculation?
			Was approval by province required?
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			How is the debt identified with the annual budget review by the province?
			Who is involved in the decision making about allocation of budgets?
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The following supplementary material provides additional data in connection with 
chapters 5 and 6. The first section summarizes perspectives between applying tax 
increment financing for general purposes in comparison to climate adaptation 
specific investments. The second section provides data from chapter 6 (section 
4.3.5). The final section offers a comprehensive description of the Watervliet Safe 
Haven simulation game package.  
1.0   Comparing Responses to Tax Increment Financing: 
General Purpose vs. Climate Adaptation Specific 
Investments
As described in chapters 5 and 6, and summarized in chapter 7, the introduction of a 
market-based mechanism for the purpose of facilitating investment in local 
adaptation would likely have to be in-step with ‘street level’ informal institutional 
norms and values. The purpose of the following is to provide clarification in relation to 
those findings. Chart 1 identifies the five core structural characteristics of tax 
increment financing and juxtaposes the Watervliet Safe Haven simulation game 
participants’ perspectives in relation to two distinct categories: 1) using TIF for 
general investment purposes and, 2) using TIF specifically as a means to facilitate 
investment in local level climate adaptation-related infrastructure investments. The 
findings indicate that although participants were generally positive, with some 
reservations, about using TIF, for climate adaptation specific investments there was a 
significant lack of confidence about its applicability. The weak support by participants 
for TIF as a potential tool was primarily due to the potential financial risk and lack of 
foreseeable benefits of climate adaptation related investments. Conversely, there 
was a degree of support for TIF as a general purpose instrument because participants 
considered the possibility of integrating the instrument into the existing Dutch spatial 
planning ‘toolkit’ to create a ‘made in the Netherlands’ tax increment financing 
instrument. 
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Chart 1   Tax Increment Financing: Comparing simulation game participant 
perspectives
TIF: Core 
Structural 
Characteristics
For General Purposes Climate Adaptation Specific
Market-Based 
Mechanism
+
-
Tailor to current ideas about 
slow-growth/”organic “ 
development (footnote)
Speculating on future earnings 
is politically challenging 
-
-
Expectation that climate 
adaptation investments will not 
be recognized as adding to 
market value
Market has a short-term 
outlook / climate adaptation 
has  long horizon
Use of  
Property  
Taxes
+
-
Modest revenue stream 
could be integrated with other 
budgets and programs to 
stimulate market
Risk that national  government  
could change tax regime
- Insufficient revenue as 
stand-alone instrument to 
support “hard” infrastructure 
investments
Designated  
Area
+
-
Could unlock stalled 
development areas
May indicate an unfunded 
project
-
-
May create “winners 
and losers” between 
neighbourhoods
‘one-neighbourhood-at-a-
time” too narrow in scale: 
broader inter-jurisdictional 
issues should be considered
Earmarking 
Instrument
+
-
Integrate with existing 
planning instruments to 
achieve specific investments
May reduce budgetary 
flexibility during project 
lifecycle 
- Benefit of climate adaptation 
investments not recognized by 
taxpayers/investors
Range of 
Financing 
Models
+
-
Design model to spread 
financial risk to range of 
beneficiaries to broaden risk 
holders
Analysis required to determine 
if reduction from Municipal 
Funds would result
+/- Municipality should be 
the risk-holder for specific 
adaptation investments
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2.0   Acquiring Instrument and Tacit Knowledge: 
Indication of social learning effects
Chapter 6 includes a description of the type of learning effects that arose from the 
simulation gaming process for the participants. Chart 2 provides the results of the 
post-game questionnaire on which the analysis was based. These findings provide 
an indication about the learning effects and, as noted in chapter 6, the analysis is 
limited to the level of the individual with respect to social learning.
Chart 2   Post-Game Questionnaire Summary 
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3.0   Watervliet Safe Haven Description and  
Game Material 
3.1 Participant List and Locations 
Seven three-hour sessions were held in five different locations in the Netherlands. 
The simulation game session was advertised via a range of social networking sites, 
including sites that focus on Dutch spatial planning issues and climate change 
related subjects. The result of the outreach strategy was a sampling of 59 experienced 
spatial planning practitioners and policy-makers. The sectoral mix of the participants 
was a balanced representation of both private sector practitioners and participants 
that worked for municipalities (see chart 3). While the majority of participants had a 
spatial planning orientation, participants also had a particular disciplinary area of 
specialization. Chart 3 and chart 4 illustrate the range of specializations. The majority 
of participants are categorized generally as spatial planners; this category represents 
process managers, project developers, policy-makers, and advisers. 
Chart 3   Sectoral and disciplinary breakdown
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Chart 4   Participant List and Locations
Organization Profession/title Sector Specialization
Utrecht: March 28, 2014    
University of Utrecht Research Coordinator Education Research
Province North-Brabant Senior Policymaker Province Environmental
KuiperCompagnons Adviser Spatial and City Planning Private Spatial Planning
KuiperCompagnons Planner Private Spatial Planning
Metrum Advisor Land Policy Private Spatial Planning
Stec Advisor Private Spatial Planning
van der Staak Business 
Logic bv
Director Private Real Estate
Milieuregie Planning Advisor Private Spatial Planning
Amsterdam: April 1, 2014
Municipality of Lisse Project Leader Municipal Spatial Planning
Bureau Het Noordzuiden Director/Process Manager Private Spatial Planning
Inbo/Universiteit Utrecht Partner/ University Teacher Education Spatial Planning
Turner & Townsend Consultant private Spatial Planning
ARCADIS / MUAD Senior Advisor / Program ManagerPrivate Spatial Planning
PBL Senior Researcher Education Research
Master of Urban & Area 
Development
Training Manager Education Research
Province of North HollandPolicy Advisor Province Spatial Planning
Den Haag: April 4, 2014
National Government, 
Real Estate Agency
Strategic Real Estate Advisor National Real Estate
Municipality of Westland Policy Planner Spatial Planning Municipal Spatial Planning
Municipality of  
Eindhoven
Strategic Policy Advisor, Land and 
Real Estate  
Municipal Spatial Planning
Ministry of Infrastructure 
and the Environment, 
Deltaprogramma 
New Housing and 
Restructuring Program 
Team Member, Climate Proof 
Cities
National Spatial Planning
Urhahn Urban Design City Planner Private Spatial Planning
Hoogheemraadschap 
van Delfland
Senior Policy Advisor Waterboard Planning
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Chart 4   Continued
Organization Profession/title Sector Specialization
Zuyd Hogeschool Portfolio Coordinator,  Real Estate 
Management
Education Research
National Government, 
Real Estate Agency
Asset Manager National Real Estate
National Government, 
Real Estate Agency
Head, Portfolio Management National Spatial Planning
Landshapstaal Advisor Private Planning
Rotterdam: April 2, 2014   
Municipality of 
Papendrecht
Head of Department of Spatial 
Development
Municipal Spatial Planning
Municipality of  
Rotterdam
City Planner Municipal Spatial Planning
Municipality of  
Rotterdam
Policy Advisor Municipal Environmental
TU Delft PhD Candidate Education Research
    
Municipality of 
Papendrecht
Head of Department of Spatial 
Development
Municipal Spatial Planning
Municipality of  
Rotterdam
City Planner Municipal Spatial Planning
Municipality of  
Rotterdam
Policy Advisor Municipal Environmental
TU Delft Planning Advisor/PhD Candidate Private/
Education
Spatial Planning/
Research
vA-SAAV Owner Private Spatial Planning
Ecorys Senior Consultant Vastgoed en 
Gebiedsontwikkeling
Private Real Estate
MBDSO | Duurzame 
Stedelijke Ontwikkeling
Owner Private Spatial Planning
Municipality of 
Heerhugowaard
Strategic Advisor Municipal Spatial Planning
Nijmegen: April 9, 2014    
Municipality of Nijmegen Advisor Municipal Spatial Planning
Municipality of  Meppel Strategic Advisor Sustainability Municipal Spatial Planning
Municipality of  Nijmegen Senior Advisor Municipal Economics
Municipality of  Nijmegen Senior Advisor, Environment Municipal Environmental
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Chart 4   Continued
Organization Profession/title Sector Specialization
Municipality of  
Amsterdam
Policy Advisor Municipal Spatial Planning
Municipality of  Zwolle Planning Economist Municipal Economics
Ixin Vastgoed, Ruimte en 
Retail
Advisor City Renewal Private Spatial Planning
Province of Gelderland Policy Advisor Area Vision Province Spatial Planning
Nijmegen: March 21, 2014 
Lysias Consulting Group Partner Private Real Estate
Social Housing 
Corporation Portaal
Senior Developer Private Spatial Planning
elings landschap BV Head Designer Private Planning
ING Relationship Manager Private Economics
Thus 
Landschapsarchitectuur 
& Stedenbouw
landscape/arch) Private Planning
Wijnen Bouwgroep Director Private Real Estate
Unassigned individual Planner Private Spatial Planning
Municipality of 
Geldermalsen
Policy Advisor Municipal Spatial Planning
Municipality of  Zevenaar Policy Advisor Municipal Spatial Planning
Nijmegen: March 21, 2014 
Municipality of  Rijnwaard Policy Advisor Municipal Spatial Planning
Municipality of  Ede Spatial Projects Department 
Manager 
Municipal Spatial Planning
Municipality of GroesbeekConsultant Municipal Spatial Planning
Municipality of  Oss Planner Municipal Spatial Planning
Municipality of Wijchen Policy Advisor, Spatial and 
Economic
Municipal Economics
Municipality of Ede Planning Economist Municipal Economics
Newland Kennistransfer Senior Project Manager Municipal Spatial Planning
Vreman Advies Director Private Spatial Planning
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3.2  Data Collecting Strategies:
The following methods were used to collect the data during the simulation game 
sessions:
• Two questionnaires: Upon arrival each participant was asked to complete a 
pre-game questionnaire. The purpose of the questionnaire was to obtain demo- 
graphic information and to probe participants about their view of climate change, 
how related investments could be funded, the roles of different stakeholders, 
and to gain an understanding about views related to the use of property taxes. 
The session finished with a second post-game questionnaire, which focused on 
opinions regarding tax increment financing. Both questionnaires were based on a 
Likert Scale, using a five point scale ranging between strongly agree to strongly 
disagree. A statistical software program (SPSS) was used to analyze the results of 
the questionnaires using descriptive statistics. The findings from the questionnaires 
have been used in the analysis to substantiate the discussions and/or whether 
significantly different views were expressed in the questionnaire than in the group 
discussions.
• Audio recording of each 3-hour session: a written summary of each session was 
produced identifying the themes, key debates and tensions. In particular, the 
thematic summaries were alert to points of consensus and key opinion differences 
in relation to norms, values, as well as technical issues associated with tax 
increment financing and  the degree to which adaptation to climate change inform 
their deliberations and shaped their perspectives about whether the financial 
instrument was appropriate.
• Participant produced report: Each group produced a brief written report, using the 
same report template, to make a recommendation to the fictional City of Watervliet. 
The challenge for each group was to summarize lengthy discussions, the range 
of issues, and differences of opinions, into a single report. Ultimately, each group 
had to reach a consensus, to the degree possible, on the recommendation of 
whether TIF should be applied to the Watervliet Safe Haven redevelopment project 
budget, in which form it should take, or whether TIF ought not to be used in any 
form. 
3.3  Watervliet Safe Haven Game Role Overview: 
In RPG’s, roles provide players with a particular function that refers back to the 
system that has been model (Os van, 2012). Roles can be written to be open and 
flexible, thereby giving the player a degree of freedom, or roles can be detailed and 
specific. In the Watervliet game, each participant was provided with an open role, 
which to some degree responded to their real life profession and/or the role would 
not be too much of a ‘stretch’ given their professional experience. Several issues and 
concerns were included as part of the role description. The purpose was to give 
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participants a sense of issues and motivations to keep in mind. The role types were 
developed to reflect the key players typically involved in Dutch planning and 
development processes (Needham, 2007). Thirteen (13) roles were generated:
Municipal Government Representatives Non-Governmental Representatives
•  Community Planner
•  Land use planner 
•  Development manager  
•  Chief financial officer
•  Neighbourhood liaison officer,
•  Environmental planner
•  Planning economist
•  Climate change policy officer
•  Private developer
•  Economic/investment advisor
•  Planning consultant
•  Social housing developer
•  Neighbourhood association chairperson
For illustrative proposes, the community planner role identified that the municipality 
was interested in integrating adaptation to climate change when opportunities arise, 
but the financial crisis was making it difficult to achieve even basic community 
planning goals. The chief financial officer role identified to the participant that this 
role had not thought about using property taxes for area-specific investments, but 
was interested in finding out more. And, lastly, for example, the private developers 
had a range of interests and motivations that were identified, including considering 
the market advantages of profiling the project as innovative, yet still concerned about 
potential costs. The research design assumed that not all of the participants would 
fully adopt the role nor limit their engagement in the session to the role description. 
Nevertheless, the role, to some degree, provided a means for participants not be 
limited by their ‘real-life’ role to the extent that they may not wish to offer ideas that are 
inconsistent with their employer, for example. For research purposes, I were interested 
in finding out about the perspectives of the participants so keeping within the realm 
of ‘reality’ was essential.  
3.4  Background on Tax Increment Financing: Policy rationales 
Given tax increment financing is not an instrument used in the Netherlands, it was 
essential to provide participants with sufficient information that was quick to grasp. 
The written material supplemented and reinforced the information on TIF that was 
conveyed in the Mayor’s presentation at the beginning of the session. In a brochure 
format (see figure 7), a description of TIF was provided, including an overview of the 
strengths and weaknesses of three key principles that underpin the instrument. The 
principles were conceptualized as policy rationales:
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Chart 5   Key Policy Rationales of Tax Increment Financing:  
Different Perspectives
Rationale 1: Function
Fiscal Tool
Different Perspectives
Strengths Weaknesses
• Projected future tax 
gains are directed to 
finance area-specific 
redevelopment programs 
and infrastructure 
projects. 
• Tax increment financing 
promotes economic 
development without 
tapping into general 
funds or levying special 
assessments on property 
owners. 
• Facilitates investment 
in public goods type 
infrastructure through 
private redevelopment 
(municipal infrastructure, 
parks, affordable housing, 
etc). 
• There is often an 
insufficient public policy 
rationale to warrant public 
sector intervention . 
• There is often an 
insufficient public policy 
rationale to warrant public 
sector intervention.
Rationale 2: Income Stream
Future Property  
Tax Increment
Different Perspectives
Strengths Weaknesses
• Recoups value overtime 
(ie  typically 25 years) 
• Expected increase (ie the 
increment)  in property 
taxes  is used to raise 
financing
• Earmarked income 
for climate adaptation 
investments
• By recovering value 
overtime upfront costs are 
not added (ie levy’s)  to 
the development  phase 
and/or immediate profit 
return is not required
• Potential to manage 
public sector financial 
commitment and financial 
risk by shifting it to the 
private sector
• If used extensively by 
municipality: freezes 
general tax base for up to 
25 years, which impacts 
on general revenue that 
supports other public 
programs and operations
• Public Sector is exposed 
to financial risk if based 
on municipal backed 
borrowing. If the tax 
increment does not 
materialize debt is repaid 
from the city’s general 
fund.
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3.4.1 Financial Models: basic options
The possible financing vehicles using tax increment financing are diverse with a 
range of variations, however, three basic options are broadly identified in the literature 
(Pricewaterhouse Cooper, 2008). These three approaches were presented as a point 
of departure for session participants to consider, given the three models are relatively 
straightforward in relation to representations about the degree of risk between the 
public and private sector: 
1. Bond-Funded: the municipality issues bonds secured against the projected tax 
increment. Revenue Bonds can be used wherein the city and taxpayers are not at 
risk if TIF revenue is less because bond purchasers shoulder the risk. Alternatively, 
General Obligation (GO) Bonds are backed by the municipality’s general revenue, 
which means if the TIF revenue is less than expected, the financial risk rests with 
the municipality.
2. Municipality-Funded: the municipality borrows to provide the initial capital. The 
authority then repays the borrowing from the actual tax increment.
3. Developer-Funded: the developer borrows to provide the initial capital. The 
municipality then reimburses the developer using the actual tax increment which 
Chart 5   Key Policy Rationales of Tax Increment Financing: Different 
Perspectives
Rationale 3: Market Stimulation
Added Value
Different Perspectives
Strengths Weaknesses
• Assumes new 
infrastructure will attract 
new investment activity 
and increase property 
values 
• Capitalizes investment in 
property value 
• Acts as a catalyst for 
private sector investment 
to create more jobs and 
expand the city’s tax 
base. 
• Investments improve local 
amenities and services
• TIF’s rely on a ‘market 
test’ that drives the 
development program 
towards “highest & best 
uses” – cash strapped 
municipalities face the 
Two Hats Dilemma  in 
their quest for funds to 
support public benefit 
investments 
• Private interests are 
served to subsidize 
shopping malls at the 
expense of the public 
policy rationale. 
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the developer uses to repay its borrowing. This method shifts the risk from the 
municipality to the developer.
 During the gaming sessions participants considered the advantages and 
disadvantages of the models, in addition to offering further variations to shift and/or 
share financial risk between the public sector and market-players. 
4.0 Simulation Game Sequencing and Materials
The simulation game sessions were undertaken in several stages. The following 
provides a brief description of pre-game stage and phases within the simulation 
game itself. Figures 2 to 13 illustrates the simulation game package.
4.1 Pre-Game:
• One week prior: participants received an information package (see figures 2 
to 6) up to one week prior to the session. The package contained the following:
• Letter from the researchers confirming logistical details and role description
• Simulation Material:
 o Invitation from the Mayor of Watervliet
 o Letter from national government
 o Two fictional newspaper articles from a local newspaper
• Upon arrival to the simulation session (see figures 7 to 12):
• Questionnaire:  participants completed it on an individual basis 
• Watervliet redevelopment project budget
• Brochures explaining tax increment financing and ‘green’ infrastructure
4.1.1 Simulation Session:
The simulation game is structured around three distinct phases. The intent is to 
produce sufficient flow that mimics the policy-process to create psychological 
fidelity1 (Lukosch & Bekebrede, 2014), which includes unexpected events (Duke, 
1980) that are beyond the control of the participants. The phases are designed to 
provide participants with sufficient information in which to base their recommendation, 
to provoke discussion and manage the participants through a thinking process, 
including introducing a degree of tension, yet it is entirely led by the group itself. No 
formal facilitation or intervention by the researchers is included. As a group self-driven 
process, it allows sufficient room for participants to work with the materials and to 
structure the debate without influences arising from the researchers. Yet, the events 
1 According to Lukosch and Bekebrede, psychological fidelity relates to the degree to which a game 
matches the emotional and cognitive perceptions of the players, which includes, the play process and 
flow of the game (2014).
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introduce new information, thereby focusing players attention on particular issues, 
and the distinct phases structures the process around the task of devising a 
recommendation.
Phase One:  begins with a presentation by the Mayor to the group. The purpose of 
the presentation is to describe the scenario to participants, thereby setting up the 
problems and tensions. The problems and tensions are nested in the scenario, in 
what Duke refers to as ‘the pulse’ (1980). According to Duke, the pulse compels 
players to focus on a shared phenomena. The Mayor kept in the role throughout the 
duration of the simulation in order to maintain what Klabbers (2009) refers to as ‘the 
magic circle’. This phase of the simulation was styled on a meeting of professionals 
wherein the Mayor briefs participants about the project and the new financial 
instrument that they have been invited to analyze and make a recommendation to the 
Watervliet City Council. 
Phase Two: participants engage in a ‘brainstorm’ session wherein participants 
discuss whether property tax, as the income source of tax increment financing, is it 
the right income stream to support localize investments in climate adaptation, 
whether it is a potential instrument for the Watervliet Safe Haven Project, and whether 
there is a way to tailor the instrument that is specific to the Dutch socio-political 
context. During this phase, the Mayor provides three pieces of information: 1) a press 
release from the City’s public relations department announcing the relocation of a 
large investor into the redevelopment project area; 2) a newspaper article announcing 
further budget cuts from the national government for city services and; 3) a petition 
from citizens from the abutting neighbourhood protesting that they also experience 
flooding and it is unfair that only a community with market potential will receive long 
term investment to address flooding issues.
Phase Three: the group is asked to make their final recommendation using a report 
template (figure 13), which was based on a conventional government format. A laptop 
is provided and the report template is projected onto a screen to facilitate group 
interaction and discussion over the reasons and final recommendation.  
Figure 1   Den Haag Session
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Figure 2   Pre-Game Package: cover of Watervliet Safe Haven simulation game 
information package
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Astrid Dijkstra
Burgemeester van Watervliet
Watervliet Plein 100
Watervliet
20 maart, 2014
Mevr. Shirin Jaffri
Directeur: Planoloog/Belied
Gemeente Watervliet
Watervliet Plein 100
Watervliet
Geachte Mevrouw Jaffris;
Betreft:  Uitnodiging 
Gemeenschappelijke Werkgroep Veilige Haven
Op basis van uw vooruitstrevende denkwerk in veel projecten in onze stad nodig ik u 
hierbij uit deel te nemen aan de Gemeenschappelijke Werkgroep Veilige Haven, voor 
een uitdagend, nieuw, lange termijn herontwikkelingsinitiatief. Het gaat om een zeer 
belangrijk project voor onze stad, waarmee wij vele doelen kunnen bereiken die onze 
lokale economie zullen verbeteren en aangename plekken zullen creëren om te 
leven, werken en spelen. Dit project is een kans om onze prachtige stad in de 
schijnwerpers te zetten en innovatief denkvermogen en slimme oplossingen te tonen 
voor een grote uitdaging: klimaatverandering. We hebben een nieuwe en vernieuwde 
publieke infrastructuur nodig die veerkrachtig is en gemaakt voor het omgaan met 
de uitdagingen die extreme weersomstandigheden met zich mee zullen brengen. 
Alle nieuwe investeringen in de publieke infrastructuur moeten bestaan uit proactieve, 
duurzame en kostenefficiënte oplossingen die aangepast kunnen worden aan 
onzekere klimaatinvloeden.
Figure 3   Pre-Game Package: invitation letter from Mayor to participant
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Het doel van de Gemeenschappelijke werkgroep is het Speciale Projectteam van de 
burgemeester te adviseren bij het ontwikkelen van een financiële visie die het ont-
wikkelingsprogramma zal ondersteunen. Ik ben me ervan bewust dat het vinden 
van financiering in tijden van economische druk een obstakel kan zijn. Maar dat mag 
ons niet tegenhouden. Wij moeten creatieve manieren vinden om de middelen en 
instrumenten die wij in het planningsproces tot onze beschikking hebben efficiënt te 
gebruiken. Ik ben recentelijk teruggekeerd van een onderzoeksreis naar de Verenigde 
Staten en het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Ondanks vergelijkbare financiële uitdagingen, vinden 
gemeenten daar manieren om lange termijn investeringen te stimuleren. Zij gebruiken 
bijvoorbeeld een financieel mechanisme met de naam tax increment financing. Dit 
instrument leidt verwachte toekomstige inkomsten uit de OZB terug naar het her-
ontwikkelingsgebied door er onderdelen van het project mee te financieren, zoals de 
publieke infrastructuur. Misschien moeten wij ook nadenken over hoe wij de OZB 
effectiever kunnen gebruiken en misschien is er een “Made in the Netherlands” 
benadering die van betekenis kan zijn voor ons. Echter, ik laat de beoordeling daarvan, 
en het geven van aanbevelingen, over aan het projectteam en de Gemeenschappelijke 
Werkgroep. Meer informatie over het mechanisme zal gegeven worden tijdens de 
bijeenkomst van 1 april.
Bij deze uitnodiging vindt u een brief van Minister van Infrastructuur en Milieu Jos 
Onderwater, waarin staat dat ons initiatief niet in aanmerking komt voor financiering 
van het Rijk.
Ik zie ernaar uit op de hoogte te blijven over de voortgang van de Gemeenschappelijke 
Werkgroep. Ik verwacht dat u een uitstekende vooruitstrevende bijdrage aan dit 
boeiende project zult leveren.
Met vriendelijke groeten,
Astrid Dijkstra
Burgemeester van Watervliet
Figure 3   Continued
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1 Maart 2014
Burgemeester Astrid Dijkstra
Gemeente Watervliet
Watervliet Plein 100
Watervliet
Geachte burgemeester Dijkstra,
Betreft: Verzoek om financiering: herontwikkelingsproject Veilige Haven
Het verheugd mij te vernemen dat Watervliet doorpakt met een ambitieus initiatief als project 
Veilige Haven. De projectomschrijving is visionair en de speciale focus op de noodzakelijke 
investeringen in de publieke infrastructuur om klimaatverandering te adresseren is vooruitst-
revend. Het is zeer bemoedigend te weten dat u dergelijke proactieve stappen neemt en 
belangrijk leiderschap op dit gebied laat zien, aangezien niet alle steden in Nederland inzien dat 
dit een essentieel onderdeel is van planning voor de toekomst.
Ondanks mijn grote respect voor uw initiatief kan het Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu 
echter geen budget beschikbaar stellen voor dergelijke investeringen. Op basis van uitgebreid 
onderzoek en consultatie van belanghebbenden is vastgesteld dat investeringen die klimaat-
verandering adresseren gefinancierd moeten worden door gemeenten met gebruikmaking van 
bestaand investeringsbeleid en bestaande processen voor ruimtelijke ordening. Hoewel we 
ons realiseren dat het een complexe onderneming is, zijn we er zeker van dat gemeenten 
voldoende financiële instrumenten tot hun beschikking hebben op basis van verscheidene inkom-
stenstromen en effectiever gebruik van onder andere heffingen, belastingen en daaraan 
gerelateerde markt activiteiten die beschikbaar zijn in het gebiedsontwikkelingsproces.
Ik vertrouw erop dat u innovatief leiderschap zult tonen en een strategie zult ontwikkelen 
specifiek voor en passend bij uw stad.
Met vriendelijke groeten,
Minister Jos Onderwater
Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu
Figure 4   Pre-Game Package: Letter from Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment 
to the Mayor of Watervliet
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Figure 5   Pre-Game Package: Newspaper article/positive coverage of project
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Figure 6   Pre-Game Package: Newspaper article/negative
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Figure 7   Provided upon arrival to simulation: information on tax increment 
financing (brochure cover)
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Figure 8   Provided upon arrival to simulation: information on green/blue 
infrastructure (brochure cover)
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Figure 9   Provided upon arrival to simulation: Watervliet Project Budget/10% Gap
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Figure 10   Information received during simulation: newspaper article/national 
government announces reduced funding for Dutch municipalities
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Figure 11   Information received during simulation: City of Watervliet press release/
commitment by large investor employer to city centre
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Figure 12   Information received during the simulation: neighbourhood petition 
against redevelopment project 
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Figure 13   Information received during the simulation: recommendation to 
Watervliet City Council template used by participants
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4.1.2 Watervliet Safe Haven Simulation Game: Questionnaires
 
Original English Version: Pre & Post Simulation Game Questionnaires
A. Pre-Game Questionnaire
Section 1
Please circle the category that describes your personal information. In the section 
identified as “other” please insert a response or indicate that you decline to provide 
this information. 
Socio Demographic: base your answer on your personal situation, not based on the your that 
you will play in the simulation.
Age 20-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 60 plus
Gender female male
Field of Expertise City 
Engineering
Financing 
or Plan 
Economics 
Environmental 
Planning
Spatial 
planning
Taxation
Population Size of 
Municipality
Less than 
20,000 
20,000 - 
50,000
50,000 - 
100,000
More than 
100,000
How long have 
you worked at the 
municipal level of 
government?
1-5 years 6-15 years 16-25 years 25+ years
How long have 
you worked for the 
municipality where 
you are currently 
employed?
1-5 years 6-15 years 16-25 years 25+ years Other
Does the municipality 
that you work for have 
a policy framework 
that specifically 
recognizes climate 
adaptation? 
Yes No Other
Have you given policy 
or planning advice 
in relation to climate 
adaptation? 
Yes No 
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Other
You work for one 
of the following 
governmental 
organizations. 
Municipality Province National Government 
organization 
(Which type):
None
In which sector do 
you work>
Private sector Non-
governmental 
organization 
Other, namely:
Do you advise 
municipalites on their 
finances?
No Yes Not applicable
Do you advise 
developer about 
financing?
No Yes Not applicable
Have you given 
policy or planning 
advice about climate 
adaptation?
No Yes Not applicable
Section 2
Instructions:
This section begins with a brief background statement. Thereafter you find four 
themes with statements and you are asked to indicate to what extent you agree with 
them. Please read each statement and put an “X” in the box that most closely reflects 
your opinion. The answer options range from strongly agree to strongly disagree. For 
example, if you agree with the statement: “The scientific evidence that the climate is 
changing is certain” you would put an “X” in the box “Agree”. 
Please respond to the statements based on:
• Your professional experience and opinion 
Background Information: 
Scientific evidence suggests that long-term climate adaptation is needed at the local 
level. To be more resistant to weather conditions as strong winds, frequent and heavy 
rainfall and higher temperatures, investments and new forms of physical public 
infrastructure will be required, though it will not be the same for every municipality. 
Alternative methods to mitigate future adverse effects, or to exploit potential benefits, 
such as permeable paving, renovation of existing systems to separate storm and 
sewage, increase in urban areas, strategic use of green spaces and tree-planting, 
extra space for water storage and improved surface water drainage will likely reduce 
the negative impacts of climate change.
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2a) Adaptation to Climate Change 
(if you do not work for a municipality go to section 2c)
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
Scientific evidence 
has sufficiently 
demonstrated that the 
climate is changing.
Local government 
should plan for long-
term climate change.
We need more 
information about what 
we should be planning 
for in our local area.
It is unclear when we 
should be making 
investments in 
adaptation to climate 
change.
Climate change 
is increasingly a 
consideration in our 
spatial and capital 
planning process.
The municipal level of 
government should play 
a key role in adaptation 
to climate change in the 
following areas:  
circle all or none
Policy-
making
Spatial 
Planning
Implementation Providing 
information 
to citizens 
Providing 
necessary 
funding
The remaining statements relate to possible financing instruments that could be 
used to support or facilitate investment in climate change adaptation. Please tick the 
answer that is most in line with your views and knowledge as identified in the 
statement.
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2b) Funding Local-Level Climate Adaptation 
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
disagree
There are no plans to 
include new types of 
public infrastructure 
or to retrofit existing 
infrastructure in relation 
to climate adaptation in 
our budgeting process.
 
There are plans in our 
budget that included 
public infrastructure 
investments in relation 
to climate adaptation.
Our budgeting 
priority is focused on 
delivering services 
and programs that are 
regulatorily required by 
the municipal level of 
government. 
2c) If you do not work for a municipality 
Speciale financiering is 
niet nodig, aangezien 
investeringen in 
klimaatadaptatie moeten 
worden in het normale 
budgetteringsproces. 
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
disagree
Circle the role that you 
think local government 
should play in adapting 
to climate adaptation. 
Policy maker Spatial 
planning
Implementation Information 
to citizens 
Providing 
financial 
resources
2d) Possible Policy Instruments to Fund Climate Adaptation Investments in Public 
Infrastructure 
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
disagree
a. Municipally-led actions using one or more income streams
o Development 
levies
o Sewer levies
o Advertisement 
levies
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o Residential 
property taxes
o Commercial 
property taxes
o Proceeds from 
land development
o Proceeds from real 
estate leasing
o Grants from 
national 
government
o Private financing
b. Regulatory 
requirements in the 
development process
c. Negotiation and 
consultation with 
marketplayers 
(private contracts)
d. Incentives for private investors
o Tax rebates
o Development 
costs reductions
o Government 
Grants
2e) Residential and Commercial Property Taxes 
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
disagree
The role of property 
taxes is to support local 
programs and services 
that cannot be fully 
funded by the Municipal 
Fund.
 
Property taxes are 
a source of income 
for area-specific 
public infrastructure 
investments.
Property taxes are too 
low to be a significant 
investment income 
stream for public 
infrastructure. 
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Property taxes are a 
stable income source of 
municipal governments 
that could support 
long-term public 
infrastructure financing 
strategies. 
Politicians will not 
increase the property 
taxation rate because 
taxpayers already think 
rates are too high.
Section 3
Language Considerations No Problem No Problem  
(but not optimal)
Rather Not
What do you think if the briefing at 
the end in English?
What do you think if the briefing at 
the end in English and you are also 
free to respond in Dutch?
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B. Post Game Questionnaire
Instructions:
There are four themes for you to respond to. Please read each statement within each 
theme and put an “X” in the box that most closely reflects your opinion. For example, 
one of the statements says: “The urgency to invest in climate change drove the 
rationale”. If you strongly agree with that statement mark the box with an “X”, if you 
disagree or are uncertain mark one of those boxes with an “X”. 
Please respond to the statements based on:
• Your professional experience and opinion
• The experience of playing the simulation game
In the first part we were interested in your opinion what were the main factors to arrive 
at the recommendations to the Council. The next two sections want to find out about 
your opinion of Tax Increment Financing, in general, and with respect to the potential 
to use this tool for long-term investment to mitigate climate change. The statements 
concern in particular the question of which model of TIF you think is best. We would 
like to know if your opinion has changed since that planning instruments and whether 
the workshop for you has been instructive in the latter parts. We ask you to indicate 
the extent to which the simulation provided a realistic scenario to try out new planning 
instrument.
Reasons for the Recommendation to the City Council 
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
disagree
The urgency to invest in 
climate change was an 
important reason for the 
recommendation to City 
Council.
 
The political urgency 
drove the rationale and 
recommendation.
No strong reason other 
than we had to get 
everybody to agree 
for the report to city 
council.
Other: according to 
you, what the driving 
force behind the 
recommendation
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Using Tax Increment Financing 
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
disagree
Property taxes are not 
meant to be used for area 
redevelopment budgets.
Committing future property 
tax income is too financially 
risky.
If property taxes were 
higher, then TIF would be 
a new effective investment 
instrument.
Spreading the cost into 
the future makes sense in 
relation to long-term public 
investments needed for 
climate adaptation.
Provide Your Opinion: Tax Increment Financing
Potential Instrument Uncertain No Potential
Area  
Investments
Climate 
Adaptation
Area  
Investments
Klimaat-
adaptatie
Climate 
Adaptation
Klimaat- 
adaptatie
Repayment of Debts
with Future Value
Bonds
o Revenue (private 
investors bear 
risk)
o General 
Obligation 
(general 
city budget 
guarantees debt)
Borrowing
o Developer (tax 
rebate)
o Municipal (private 
financing)
Organic and 
Incremental 
o Pay-as-you-go
o Individueel  
(taks rebate)
o Rainy Day Funds
o Revolving Funds
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Reality Check and Learning Effects
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
disagree
The recommendation 
to the City Council was 
realistic
The scenario that was 
used for the simulation 
was realistic and provided 
a basis for developing the 
recommendation.
The simulation helped me to learn about….
A new financing 
instrument.
How my colleagues 
responded to this new 
financing mechanism.
About the challenges in 
relation to investing in 
climate adaptation.
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Translated into Dutch: Pre and Post Game Questionnaires
A. Pre-Game Questionnaire
Nijmegen/9 April/10:00-13:00
Speciaal Projectteam
Vragenlijst vooraf
Deel 1
Omcirkel het antwoord die uw persoonlijke situatie het best omschrijft. Een ander 
antwoord of een weigering te antwoorden kunt u kwijt in de categorie ‘anders’.  
Sociaal-demografische informatie: Baseer uw antwoord op uw persoonlijke situatie, niet op de rol 
die u spelt in de simulatie
Leeftijd 20-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 60 +
Geslacht Vrouw Man
Vakgebied Steden- 
bouwkunde
Financiering 
of plan-
economie 
Milieu- 
planning
Ruimtelijke 
ordening
Belasting Anders:
Gemeenteambtenaren
Bevolkingsomvang 
gemeente
Minder 
dan 20,000 
inwoners
20,000 
- 50,000 
inwoners
50,000 -  
100,000  
inwoners
Meer dan 
100,000 
inwoners
Hoeveel jaar heeft 
u op gemeentelijk 
niveau gewerkt? 
1-5 jaar 6-15 jaar 16-25 jaar 25+ jaar
Hoe lang werkt u 
al bij uw huidige 
gemeente?
1-5 jaar 6-15 jaar 16-25 jaar 25+ jaar
Heeft uw huidige 
gemeente beleid dat 
specifiek is gericht op 
klimaatadaptatie? 
Ja Nee 
Heeft u beleids 
of planadvies 
gegeven over 
klimaatadaptatie?
Ja Nee
Anders
Bent u in dienst van 
een van de volgende 
overheidslagen of 
organisaties? 
Gemeen-
telijk
Provinciaal Nationaal Overheidsorganisatie 
(welk type):
Nee 
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In welke sector bent u 
werkzaam?
Private sector Niet-gouver-
nementele 
organisatie
Anders, namelijk:
Adviseert u 
gemeenten over hun 
financiële strategie?
Ja Nee niet van toepassing
Adviseert u 
ontwikkelaars over 
hun financiële 
strategie?
ja Nee niet van toepassing
Heeft u beleids 
of planadvies 
gegeven over 
klimaatadaptatie?
Ja Nee niet van toepassing
Deel 2
Aanwijzingen:
Dit onderdeel begint met een alinea met achtergrondinformatie. In het vervolg wordt 
u enkele stellingen voorgelegd, met de vraag aan te geven in welke mate u het hier 
mee eens bent. Lees elke stelling en zet een “X” in het vakje dat het meest in lijn is 
met uw mening. De mogelijke antwoorden lopen van sterk mee eens tot sterk mee 
oneens. Een voorbeeld, als u het eens bent met de stelling: “Er is voldoende weten-
schappelijk bewijs voor de stelling dat het klimaat verandert”, zet dan een “X” in het 
vakje onder “Mee eens”.
Laat uw antwoorden afhangen van:
• uw professionele ervaring en mening
Achtergrondinformatie:
Wetenschappelijk bewijs doet vermoeden dat op de lange termijn klimaatadaptatie 
op lokaal niveau noodzakelijk is. Om beter bestand te zijn tegen meteorologische 
omstandigheden als harde wind, veelvuldige en zware regenval en hogere temperaturen 
zijn waarschijnlijk nieuwe investeringen in en nieuwe vormen van fysieke publieke 
infrastructuur vereist, al zullen deze maatregelen niet voor elke gemeente hetzelfde 
zijn. Alternatieve methodes om toekomstige negatieve effecten te ondervangen, of 
om potentiële voordelen te benutten, zijn doorlatende bestrating, vernieuwing van 
bestaande systemen om storm- en rioolwater te scheiden, verhoging van stedelijke 
gebieden, strategische inzet van groengebieden en bomenplant, extra ruimte voor 
wateropslag en verbeterde bovengrondse afwatering.
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2a)  Aanpassing aan Klimaatverandering 
(Als uw niet een Gemeenteambtenaren,  Deel 2c.)
Sterk mee 
eens
Mee eens Onzeker Mee 
oneens
Sterk mee 
oneens
Er is voldoende 
wetenschappelijk bewijs 
voor de stelling dat het 
klimaat verandert.
De lokale overheid moet nu 
plannen maken voor lange 
termijn klimaatverandering.
We hebben meer 
informatie nodig over de 
vraag waarvoor we in 
onze gemeente moeten 
plannen.
Het is onduidelijk wanneer 
we moeten investeren in 
klimaatadaptatie.
Speciale financiering is 
niet nodig, aangezien 
investeringen in 
klimaatadaptatie moeten 
worden in het normale 
budgetteringsproces. 
Omcirkel de rol die de 
lokale overheid volgens 
u moet spelen bij 
klimaatadaptatie. Zet geen, 
een, of meerdere cirkels. 
Beleids-
maken
Ruimtelijke 
ordening
Uitvoering Informatie-
voorziening 
aan burgers 
Voorzien in 
financiële 
middelen
De resterende stellingen gaan over mogelijke financieringsinstrumenten die gebruikt 
kunnen worden om investeringen in klimaatadaptatie te ondersteunen of faciliteren. 
U wordt verzocht het antwoord aan te kruisen dat het meest in lijn is met uw mening 
en kennis van de situatie die wordt geschetst in de stelling.
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2b) Financiering van Klimaatadaptatie op Lokaal Niveau 
Mee eens Weet niet Mee 
oneens
Er zijn plannen om, met het 
oog op klimaatadaptatie, 
nieuwe vormen van 
publieke infrastructuur  in 
ons begrotingsproces op 
te nemen
 
Er zijn plannen in onze 
begroting om, met het 
oog op klimaatadaptatie, 
bestaande infrastructuur 
her in te richten. 
Onze budgetprioriteit is 
gericht op het verlenen van 
diensten en programma’s 
die juridisch vereist zijn 
door de gemeente, 
klimaatadaptatie is hierin 
geen specifieke prioriteit. 
2c) Als uw niet een  Gemeenteambtenaren
Sterk mee 
eens
Mee eens Onzeker Mee 
oneens
Sterk mee 
oneens
Omcirkel de rol die de 
lokale overheid volgens 
u moet spelen bij 
klimaatadaptatie. Zet geen, 
een, of meerdere cirkels. 
Beleids-
maken
Ruimtelijke 
ordening
Uitvoering Informatie-
voorziening 
aan burgers 
Voorzien in 
financiële 
middelen
Speciale financiering is 
niet nodig, aangezien 
investeringen in 
klimaatadaptatie moeten 
worden in het normale 
budgetteringsproces. 
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2d) Mogelijke Beleidsinstrumenten om Klimaatadaptatie Investeringen in 
Publieke Infrastructuur te Financieren
 
Sterk mee 
eens
Mee eens Onzeker Mee 
oneens
Sterk mee 
oneens
a. Door de gemeente geleide actie gebruikmakend  
van een of meerdere inkomensstromen
o Ontwikkelingsheffin-
gen
o Rioolheffingen
o Advertentie heffingen
o OZB
o Niet-Woning OZB 
o Opbrengsten van 
grondexploitatie
o Opbrengsten uit ver-
pachting
o Toelages van centrale 
overheid
o Private financiering
b. Regelgeving in bouw- 
en ontwikkelingspro-
ces
c. Onderhandeling met 
marktpartijen (private 
contracten) 
d. Stimuli voor private investeerders
o Belastingteruggave
o Verminder ontwikkel-
ingskosten
o Overheidstoelages
2e) Belastingen op Woningen en Commercieel Vastgoed 
Sterk mee 
eens
Mee eens Onzeker Mee 
oneens
Sterk mee 
oneens
Het is de rol van de OZB 
lokale programma’s en 
diensten te ondersteunen, 
die niet volledig kunnen 
worden gefinancierd door 
het Gemeentefonds.
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De OZB is een inkomsten-
bron voor gebiedsgebon-
den publieke infrastructuur 
investeringen.
Inkomsten uit de OZB zijn 
te laag om een significante 
inkomstenstroom voor 
investeringen in publieke 
infrastructuur te vormen. 
De OZB is een inkomsten-
bron van lagere overheden 
die lange termijn publieke 
infrastructuur financiering 
kan ondersteunen 
De politiek zal de OZB niet 
verhogen, aangezien be-
lastingbetalers die nu al te 
hoog vinden. 
Deel 3
Taaloverwegingen Geen probleem Moet lukken  
(maar niet optimaal)
Liever niet
Wat vindt u ervan als de debriefing 
aan het einde in het Engels is?
Wat vindt u ervan als de debriefing 
aan het einde in het Engels is en 
u daarnaast vrij bent in het Neder-
lands te reageren?
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B. Post-Game Questionnaire
Nijmegen/9 April/10:00-13:00
Speciaal Projectteam
Vragenlijst #2
Aanwijzingen:
We willen graag uw mening over vijf thema’s. Lees elke stelling en zet een “X” in het 
vakje dat het meest in lijn is met uw mening. Bijvoorbeeld, een van de stellingen stelt: 
“De urgentie om in klimaatadaptatie te investeren was de belangrijkste reden voor de 
aanbeveling aan de gemeenteraad”. Als u het hiermee eens bent, zet dan een “X” in 
het vakje “Mee eens”. Bent u het er niet mee eens, of weet u het niet zeker, zet dan in 
die hokjes een “X”. 
Laat uw antwoorden afhangen van:
• uw professionele ervaring en mening
• uw ervaringen tijdens het doen van de simulatie
In het eerste onderdeel zijn we benieuwd naar uw mening over wat de belangrijkste 
factoren waren om tot de aanbevelingen aan de Raad te komen. De daarop volgende 
twee delen gaan over uw mening over Tax Increment Financing, in zijn algemeen en 
wat betreft het potentieel dit instrument te gebruiken voor lange termijn investering-
splannen om klimaatverandering te ondervangen. De stellingen gaan met name over 
de vraag welk model van TIF volgens u het beste is. In de laatste delen willen we 
graag weten of uw mening ten opzichte van mogelijke planologische instrumenten is 
veranderd en of de workshop voor u leerzaam is geweest. We verzoeken u de mate 
aan te geven waarin de simulatie een realistische scenario bood om nieuwe 
planologische instrument uit te proberen. 
Redenen voor de aanbeveling aan de gemeenteraad:  
Sterk mee 
eens
Mee  eens Onzeker Mee  
oneens
Sterk mee 
oneens
De urgentie om in 
klimaatadaptatie te 
investeren was de 
belangrijkste reden voor 
de aanbeveling aan de 
gemeenteraad.
 
De politieke urgentie was 
een belangrijke drijfveer 
voor de aanbeveling.
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Niet echt een belangrijke 
reden, behalve dan dat 
iedereen het er mee eens 
moest zijn, zodat we een 
aanbeveling konden mak-
en.
Anders: wat was volgens 
u de drijfveer achter de 
reden?
De volgende afdeling presenteert dezelfde selectie beleidsinstrumenten als werd 
gepresenteerd in de vragenlijst voor de simulatie. We zijn benieuwd of u uw mening 
wat betreft de rol die de verschillende instrumenten kunnen spelen bij het faciliteren 
van lokale investeringen in publieke infrastructuur is veranderd.
Geef uw mening: Potentieel Financieringsinstrument in Nederland  
(Tax Increment Financing)
Potentieel Instrument Onzeker Geen Potential
Gebieds-
gerichte 
Investeringen
Klimaat-
adaptatie
Gebieds-
gerichte  
Investeringen
Klimaat-
adaptatie
Klimaat-
adaptatie
Klimaat-
adaptatie
Terugbetaling van Schulden
 met Toekomstige Waarde
Obligaties
o Revenue (private 
investeerders 
dragen risico)
o General Obliga-
tion (algemeen 
budget ter 
ondersteuning 
van financiering))
Lenen:
o Ontwikkelaar 
(belastingterug-
gave)
o Gemeente 
 (private finan-
ciering)
Organisch en 
Incrementeel:
o Pay-as-you-go
o Individueel 
(teruggave)
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o Regendag 
Toelagefonds
o Fonds voor 
doorlopende 
leningen
Het volgende onderdeel vraagt vanuit twee perspectieven uw mening over de 
mogelijke toepassing van TIF: 1) Als instrument dat geschikt is voor financiering van 
gebiedsgerichte publieke infrastructuur in zijn algemeen; 2) en meer in het bijzonder, 
met betrekking op klimaatadaptatie. U hoeft hier niet uit te kiezen, als u denkt dat TIF 
goed zal werken in beide gevallen, kunt u ook in meerdere vakjes een kruisje zetten. 
De toepassing van OZB: TIF als inkomensstroom  
Sterk mee 
eens
Mee eens Onzeker Mee 
oneens
Sterk mee 
oneens
De OZB moet niet 
gebruikt worden voor 
gebiedsgebonden 
ontwikkelingsbudgetten. 
Het reserveren van 
toekomstig inkomen 
uit de OZB is onder 
alle economische 
omstandigheden te riskant.
Als de OZB hoger was, dan 
zou TIF een effectief nieuw 
investeringsinstrument 
kunnen zijn.
Het is zinnig de kosten 
van lange termijn 
publieke investeringen 
in klimaatadaptatie te 
verspreiden naar de 
toekomst.
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Reality Check en leereffecten
Sterk mee 
eens
Mee eens Neutraal Mee 
oneens
Sterk mee 
oneens
De aanbeveling aan de 
Raad was realistisch. 
Het scenario dat gebruikt 
werd in de simulatie was 
realistisch en volledig gen-
oeg om een aanbeveling 
te doen.
De simulatie heeft me 
wat geleerd over…
Een nieuw financieringsin-
strument.
Hoe mijn collega’s 
reageerden op die nieuwe 
planologisch instrument 
om lokale investeringen te 
financieren.
Over de uitdagingen ver-
bonden aan investeren in 
klimaatadaptatie.
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Summary
The point of departure of this dissertation was to consider whether the lack of 
financing instruments is better understood as an outcome rather than a reason for 
limited municipal actions. That is, the research explored whether this ‘reason’ is 
substantive in nature or represents a “surface constraint” (Measham et al, 2011). 
In doing so, the aim is to enrich conceptualizations about the role of institutions in 
shaping urban planning practitioners’ perspectives about the appropriateness of 
financing instruments in relation to climate adaptation-related public infrastructure 
investments. To achieve the aim of the research, four inter-related research questions 
were identified: 1) What modes of practice and instruments do Dutch spatial planners 
use to facilitate investment in local public urban infrastructure? 2) Are new municipal 
instruments necessary to facilitate investment in climate adaptation? 3) Are spatial 
planning practitioners willing to reinterpret and reshape institutional rules to enable 
local investment in climate adaptation? and, 4) How can we conceptualize and explain 
the role of institutions in facilitating local public investments in climate adaptation and 
in shaping practitioners’ perspectives about the applicability of policy instruments?
 The short answer to the research questions identified above is: yes, the findings 
indicate that there is institutional space and evidence about the willingness to reinterpret 
the application of existing mechanisms. However, in the case of utilizing existing 
municipal income in conjunction with a market-based instrument to facilitate local 
climate adaptation investments, the willingness is limited. Why is it limited? In what 
way do institutions matter in shaping practitioners’ perspectives about the type of 
policy implementation instruments that are appropriate to facilitate investment in 
local climate adaptation?
The Longer Answer:
The findings from this research indicate that the modes of practice and instruments 
used in Dutch planning and development play a fundamental role in facilitating 
investment in local public infrastructure. Facilitating investment in climate adaptation 
is, thus, sensitive to how those practices are played out and what instruments are 
applied in the process. Actions to reinterpret existing rules as a means to facilitate 
investment in climate adaptation are underpinned by a complex assortment of 
rationales. In the Rotterdam case, two key enabling factors were identified (chapter 3). 
Firstly, organizational support created the conditions to make experimental 
modifications to existing rules, thereby enabling the ‘climate-proof’ measures to be 
linked to pragmatic economic objectives – which positioned Rotterdam as an 
innovative global leader. Secondly, adjustments to existing instruments also reflected 
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the broader shifting landscape of Dutch planning practice, given the public land 
development model has been rendered ineffective and the subject of substantial 
criticism. There are, indeed, degrees of freedom to reinterpret and shape rules to 
facilitate climate adaptation-related investments during the planning process. The 
findings also point to the role of formal and informal institutions in limiting the degrees 
of flexibility, i.e., agency with constraints (chapter 4). Lacking a cohesive set of 
informal institutional conditions, it is much less likely that practitioners will be in a 
position to vary how existing instruments are used or to introduce new mechanisms, 
such as tax increment financing (TIF), to fund local public infrastructure aimed 
specifically at climate adaptation. Because investing in adaptation confronts 
practitioners with a set of dilemmas, there is a struggle to reconcile those dilemmas 
with the need to operationalize adaptation actions using a risk-based instrument 
(chapter 5). The reluctance to take the plunge of applying a market-based financing 
instrument is beyond unwillingness to prioritize local adaptation investments, but 
rather, the findings reveal that practitioners were unable to sufficiently align values 
and norms with structures that would enable the application of tax increment 
financing. The question as to whether practitioners are willing to reinterpret, reshape, 
and bend institutional rules to enable local investment in climate adaptation teased 
out a response that provides two stark lessons for climate adaptation policy-makers. 
Firstly, the empirical evidence points to the limited acceptance that a local 
market-based financing instrument is likely to have in the Netherlands in relation to 
facilitating adaptation-related investments. Secondly, in contrast, practitioners 
appeared able to imprint an incrementalism and customize TIF into a ‘made in the 
Netherlands’ instrument for investments that were conceived of as non-adaptation 
specific (chapter 6). Here the distinction was drawn between conventional public 
goods investments and climate adaptation-specific investments. The latter provoked 
participants of the simulations to simplify the complexity of climate adaptation into a 
trio of thematic clusters, referred to as institutional dilemmas. The institutional 
dilemmas functioned as heuristic ‘short-cuts’ by serving as rationales to impose a 
financial barrier on the climate adaptation investments proposed in the Watervliet 
Safe Haven game. The financial gap was not necessarily actual, but rather 
practitioners were unable to fully accept the choice of a financial instrument that 
could have been used to augment the project budget. This outcome was based on 
the dynamics of the institutional context and the perceived constraints that were 
informed by formal and informal institutional rules and the intersection with the 
dilemmas of climate adaptation. Together these factors shaped perspectives about 
the limits to applying tax increment financing as a new financial instrument for the 
Dutch planners’ climate adaptation toolkit. 
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Contribution to Research and Practice:
Rather than offering further diagnoses or prescriptions, this dissertation contributes 
to scientific research on the institutional dimensions of adaptation in three ways. 
Firstly, it substantiates findings from other scholars (Burch, 2010; Hulme, 2009; 
Juhola, Keskitalo, & Westerhoff, 2011; Wejs, 2014) that establishing a means to 
bridge the so-called implementation gap is largely not a financial issue nor a problem 
that can be solely addressed with technical fixes. A new institutional approach 
revealed that implementation barriers are generally normative in nature and the 
interplay between 1) the dilemmas associated with climate change, and, 2) the 
degree of boundedness of planning practice, creates institutional conditions that 
currently do not stimulate substantial innovation in relation to applying a market 
instrument based on local revenue to facilitate adaptation investments. 
 The findings in this dissertation reinforce that the answer of how to facilitate 
investment during the planning process remains very unclear insofar as planning 
practitioners remain, broadly speaking, in the phase of testing and experimentation. 
Moreover, in considering how actions should be financed yet more questions arise 
largely because the pre-conditions for the financing conversation have not been 
satisfactorily resolved. Discussions about adaptation to climate change remain within 
the realm of determining sectoral and jurisdictional roles (i.e. ‘the who’ and ‘the 
where’), and conceiving of possible strategies (i.e. ‘the what’ and ‘the when’) to 
reduce the impacts of climate change in urban areas. In order to advance knowledge 
about how investments can be achieved, research that explores ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
practitioners are able to reduce complexity to facilitate investment in climate 
adaptation would be a fruitful line of inquiry. How practitioners interact with different 
financing instruments could provide indicators about the role of both formal and 
informal institutional rules in shaping what is deemed appropriate (and possible). 
That is, what does the response to a particular financing instrument tell us about how 
the institutional context reinforces organizational (un)certainty about investing in 
adaptation? Why do practitioners differentiate between affirmative or negative 
narratives to determine what type of instruments would be deemed appropriate? Do 
certain financing instruments create dead-ends where other instruments create 
pathways to implementation? In either case, what do such outcomes tell us about 
how the institutional dilemmas of climate adaptation could be overcome and why 
certain governance arrangements would enhance the implementation process? 
 From a methodological perspective, the study contributes empirically to the 
adaptation literature as it is based on a multi-dimensional case study strategy using 
simulation gaming. This adds an exploratory behavioral dimension to the growing 
academic interest in understanding how individuals and organizations learn to adapt 
to climate change. In doing so, the findings point to the dynamic process of 
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organizational learning (Berkhout et al., 2006) and the ‘little ways’ that are applied in 
the flow of practice that change perceptions and shape decisions (Healey, 2009).  In 
the context of this research, the findings add to knowledge about how practitioners 
construct meanings in relation to the appropriateness of certain financing instruments. 
The analysis reveals that, indeed, if the issue about investing in climate adaptation is 
primarily about the availability of financial resources, the answer would be 
substantially more straightforward. In the Dutch context, to be in-step with the current 
socio-political conditions, I extrapolate that a market-based financing instrument in 
relation to climate adaptation would need to be aligned with several attributes. That 
is, to overcome a financial gap, the design of a market-based instrument would need 
to align with the following principles: incrementalism; long term financial risk 
management; and risk sharing between stakeholders. In that sense, understanding 
what type of instruments align with those attributes may be a more successful 
strategy than pre-identifying an instrument and forcing a fit.
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Samenvatting
Het uitgangspunt van dit proefschrift was de stelling of het gebrek aan financierings-
instrumenten eerder dient te worden opgevat als een resultaat van dan als een reden 
voor beperkte gemeentelijke maatregelen. Er is dus onderzocht of deze ‘reden’ 
substantief van aard is of een “oppervlakkige beperking” betreft (Matthews, 2013). 
Het doel hierbij is te komen tot een rijkere beeldvorming over de rol van instanties bij 
het vormgeven van de standpunten van stedenbouwkundigen over de geschiktheid 
van financieringsinstrumenten in relatie tot investeringen in de openbare ruimte die 
verband houden met klimaatadaptatie. Om het onderzoeksdoel te realiseren zijn 
er vier samenhangende onderzoeksvragen opgesteld: 1) Van welke praktijken en 
instrumenten maken Nederlandse planologen gebruik om investeringen in de lokale 
openbare stedelijke infrastructuur te faciliteren? 2) Zijn er nieuwe gemeentelijke 
instrumenten nodig om de investering in klimaatadaptatie te financieren? 3) Zijn 
planologen bereid institutionele regels te herinterpreteren en opnieuw vorm te geven 
om zo lokale investeringen in klimaatadaptatie mogelijk te maken? En, 4) Wat is een 
goede definitie en uitleg van de rol van instanties bij het faciliteren van plaatselijke 
investeringen in klimaatadaptatie en bij het vormen van de standpunten van planologen 
over de geschiktheid van beleidsinstrumenten?
Het korte antwoord op bovenstaande onderzoeksvragen is dat de bevindingen laten 
zien dat er binnen instanties ruimte en bewijs is voor de bereidheid om de toepassing 
van de bestaande mechanismen te herinterpreteren. Deze bereidheid is echter 
beperkt als er bestaande gemeentelijke inkomsten, in combinatie met een markt-
instrument, gebruikt moeten worden om lokale investeringen in klimaatadaptatie te 
financieren. Waarom is deze bereidheid beperkt? Welke rol spelen instanties bij 
het vormen van de standpunten van planologen over welk type instrumenten voor 
beleidsimplementatie geschikt zijn voor het faciliteren van lokale investeringen in 
 klimaatadaptatie?
Het langere antwoord:
De bevindingen uit dit onderzoek laten zien dat de praktijken en instrumenten die bij 
de Nederlandse planning en ontwikkeling worden gebruikt, een fundamentele rol spelen 
bij het faciliteren van investeringen in de lokale publieke infrastructuur. Het faciliteren 
van investeringen in klimaatadaptatie is dus gevoelig voor de manier waarop deze 
praktijken worden uitgespeeld en welke instrumenten tijdens het proces worden 
ingezet. Maatregelen om bestaande regels te herinterpreteren om zo investeringen in 
klimaatadaptatie te faciliteren, berusten op een complexe reeks motieven. In het 
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geval van Rotterdam werden er twee sleutelfactoren vastgesteld (hoofdstuk 3). Ten eerste 
heeft organisatorische ondersteuning ervoor gezorgd dat de bestaande regels 
experimenteel gewijzigd konden worden. Hierdoor konden de ‘klimaatbestendige’ 
maatregelen worden gekoppeld aan pragmatische economische doeleinden, 
waarmee Rotterdam als wereldleider op het gebied van innovatie kon worden 
gepositioneerd. Ten tweede vormen de aanpassingen van de bestaande instrumenten 
ook een weerspiegeling van de bredere verschuiving binnen het Nederlandse 
 planningslandschap, aangezien het model van ruimtelijke ordening niet effectief is 
gebleken en daarmee het onderwerp van veel kritiek is geworden. Er is inderdaad 
flexibiliteit om tijdens het planningsproces regels te herinterpreteren en te hervormen 
om zo investeringen in klimaatadaptatie te faciliteren. De bevindingen wijzen ook op 
de rol van formele en informele instanties bij het beperken van deze flexibiliteit, d.w.z. 
keuzebeperking door instanties (hoofdstuk 4). Aangezien er een samenhangende 
reeks informele institutionele voorwaarden ontbreekt, is het onwaarschijnlijk dat 
planologen iets te zeggen krijgen over de manier waarop bestaande instrumenten 
worden gebruikt of nieuwe mechanismen kunnen introduceren, zoals een belasting-
verhoging als financieringsinstrument voor een lokale publieke infrastructuur die 
specifiek op klimaatadaptatie is gericht. Investeringen in klimaatadaptatie leiden 
ertoe dat planologen met een reeks dilemma’s worden geconfronteerd. Er wordt 
naar gestreefd deze dilemma’s te verzoenen met de noodzaak om adaptatiemaat-
regelen in de praktijk te brengen met behulp van een risicogebaseerd instrument 
(hoofdstuk 5). De aarzeling om een op marktwerking gebaseerd financieringsmiddel 
in te zetten gaat verder dan onwil om prioriteit in lokale adaptatie-investeringen aan 
te brengen. De bevindingen laten eerder zien dat het planologen onvoldoende is 
gelukt waarden en normen af te stemmen op structuren die financiering door 
belasting verhoging mogelijk zouden maken. De vraag was ook of planologen bereid 
waren tot het herinterpreteren, hervormen en ombuigen van institutionele regels om 
lokale investeringen in klimaatadaptatie mogelijk te maken. Deze vraag bood 
beleidmakers op het gebied van klimaatadaptatie twee confronterende antwoorden. 
Ten eerste blijkt uit empirisch bewijs dat een op marktwerking gebaseerd, lokaal 
 financieringsinstrument in Nederland slechts beperkt geaccepteerd zal worden om 
investeringen in klimaatadaptatie te financieren. Ten tweede bleken planologen 
echter wel in staat tot incrementalisme en aanpassing van het financieringsinstrument 
van belastingverhoging tot een ‘typisch Nederlands’ financieringsinstrument voor 
investeringen die als niet-adaptatiespecifiek werden gezien (hoofdstuk 6). Hierbij 
werd onderscheid gemaakt tussen conventionele investeringen in publieke goederen 
en klimaatadaptatiespecifieke investeringen. Deze laatste categorie zette deelnemers 
aan de simulaties ertoe de complexiteit van klimaatadaptatie terug te brengen tot 
een drietal thematische clusters, oftewel institutionele dilemma’s. Deze institutionele 
dilemma’s functioneerden als heuristische ‘short-cuts’ die dienden als redenen om 
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een financiële drempel op te werpen voor de investeringen in klimaatadaptatie die in 
het spel ‘Watervliet Safe Haven’ werden voorgesteld. Deze financiële kloof was niet 
noodzakelijkerwijs realiteit, het probleem was eerder dat planologen zich niet volledig 
schaarden achter de keuze voor een financieel instrument waarmee het projectbudget 
verhoogd had kunnen worden. Deze situatie was gebaseerd op de dynamiek van de 
institutionele context en de vermeende beperkingen die het gevolg waren van 
formele en informele institutionele regels en het raakvlak met de dilemma’s van 
klimaat adaptatie. Deze factoren tezamen bepaalden het standpunt van de Nederlandse 
planologen over de grenzen waarbinnen belastingverhoging kon worden ingezet als 
nieuw financieringsinstrument voor investeringen in klimaatadaptatie. 
Bijdrage aan onderzoek en praktijk:
Dit proefschrift biedt geen verdere diagnoses of oplossingen, maar levert wel op drie 
manieren een bijdrage aan wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar de institutionele dimensies 
van adaptatie. Ten eerste onderbouwt het de bevindingen van overige weten schappers 
(Burch, 2010; Hulme, 2009; Juhola, Keskitalo, & Westerhoff, 2011; Wejs, 2014) dat 
het tot stand brengen van middelen om de zogenaamde implementatiekloof te 
over bruggen voor een groot deel geen financiële kwestie of een probleem is dat met 
uitsluitend technische oplossingen kan worden aangepakt. Uit een nieuwe institutionele 
benadering kwam naar voren dat obstakels bij implementatie doorgaans normatief van 
aard zijn en dat het samenspel tussen 1) de dilemma’s die verband houden met 
 klimaatverandering en 2) de mate van begrenzing van planningspraktijken, institutionele 
voorwaarden schept die momenteel geen stimulerende werking hebben op belangrijke 
innovaties ten aanzien van de toepassing van een marktinstrument waarmee met 
lokale inkomsten adaptatie-investeringen kunnen worden gefinancierd. 
De bevindingen uit dit proefschrift beamen dat het antwoord op de vraag hoe 
investeringen tijdens het planningsproces gefinancierd moeten worden, zeer onduidelijk 
blijft omdat planologen globaal genomen in de test- en experimentenfase blijven 
steken. De vraag hoe maatregelen gefinancierd moeten worden werpt bovendien nog 
meer vragen op, omdat de voorwaarden voor de financieringsdiscussie niet duidelijk 
genoeg zijn vastgesteld. De discussie over adaptatie aan klimaatverandering gaat 
niet verder dan het bepalen van sectorale en jurisdictionele rollen (‘wie’ en ‘waar’) en 
het opstellen van mogelijke strategieën (‘wat’ en ‘wanneer’) om de effecten van 
 klimaatverandering in stedelijke gebieden terug te dringen. Om meer kennis te 
krijgen over de manier waarop investeringen gerealiseerd kunnen worden, moet 
onderzoek worden verricht naar ‘hoe’ en ‘waarom’ planologen de complexiteit van 
investeringen in klimaatadaptatie kunnen verminderen. De manier waarop planologen 
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met de uiteenlopende financieringsinstrumenten omgaan, vormt een indicatie voor 
de rol van zowel formele als informele institutionele regels bij het vormgeven van 
hetgeen geschikt (en haalbaar) wordt geacht. Oftewel, wat vertelt de reactie op een 
bepaald financieringsinstrument ons over de manier waarop de institutionele context 
de organisatorische (on)zekerheid over het investeren in adaptatie versterkt? Waarom 
maken planologen onderscheid tussen bevestigende of negatieve verhalen om te 
bepalen welke soort instrumenten geschikt zouden zijn? Vormen sommige financierings-
instrumenten een doodlopend spoor, terwijl andere instrumenten juist mogelijkheden 
voor implementatie creëren? En wat vertellen de antwoorden op deze vragen ons 
over de wijze waarop de institutionele dilemma’s van klimaatadaptatie opgelost 
kunnen worden en waarom bepaalde governanceregelingen het implementatie-
proces zouden kunnen verbeteren? 
Vanuit een methodologisch standpunt levert het onderzoek een empirische bijdrage 
aan de adaptatieliteratuur, omdat het is gebaseerd op een multi-dimensionele case-
study-strategie waarbij een simulatiespel is gebruikt. Dit voegt een verkennende 
 gedragsdimensie toe aan de groeiende academische belangstelling voor de manier 
waarop individuen en organisaties zich leren aanpassen aan klimaatverandering. 
Hierbij wijzen de bevindingen op het dynamische proces van organisatorisch leren 
(Berkhout et al., 2006) en de ‘kleine manieren’ waarop percepties in de praktijkstroom 
veranderen en beslissingen worden gevormd (Healey, 2009). In de context van dit 
onderzoek zorgen de bevindingen voor meer kennis over de manier waarop 
planologen betekenissen construeren in relatie tot de geschiktheid van bepaalde 
 financieringsinstrumenten. Uit de analyse blijkt dat als de beschikbaarheid van 
financiële middelen inderdaad het grootste struikelblok voor investeringen in klimaat-
adaptatie zou zijn, dat het antwoord hierop dan aanzienlijk eenvoudiger was. Om 
rekening te houden met de huidige sociaalpolitieke omstandigheden zou dit, in de 
Nederlandse context, leiden tot de stelling dat een op marktwerking gebaseerd 
 financieringsinstrument voor klimaatadaptatie met diverse attributen op één lijn moet 
worden gebracht. Om een financiële kloof te overbruggen, zou het ontwerp van 
een marktinstrument dus moeten worden afgestemd op de volgende principes: 
 incrementalisme, langetermijnbeheer van financiële risico’s en het delen van risico’s 
tussen de belanghebbende partijen. In die zin vormt begrijpen welke instrumenten goed 
bij deze attributen passen een succesvollere strategie dan vooraf een instrument 
uitkiezen en dit geforceerd toepassen.
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